Do investors benefit from the use of options and complexity of derivative strategy of a hedge fund? by Peltomäki, Jarkko
U N I V E R S I TA S  WA S A E N S I S  2 0 0 9
ACTA WASAENSIA NO 216
B u S I N E S S  A d m I N I S T r AT I O N  9 1
A C C O u N T I N g  A N d  F I N A N C E
J A R k ko  P E lTo m ä k I
Do Investors Benefit from the Use of
Options and Complexity of Derivative 
Strategy of a Hedge Fund? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewers Professor Steven Swidler 
 Auburn University 
 College of Business 
 Auburn, AL 36849 
 USA 
 
 Professor Petri Sahlström 
 University of Oulu 
 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
 P.O.Box 4600 
 90014 University of Oulu 
 Finland 
 
 III 
Julkaisija  Julkaisuajankohta 
Vaasan yliopisto  Joulukuu 2009 
Tekijä(t)  Julkaisun tyyppi  
Monografia 
Julkaisusarjan nimi, osan numero  
Jarkko Peltomäki 
Acta Wasaensia, 216 
Yhteystiedot  ISBN  
978–952–476–280–9 
ISSN  
0355–2667, 1235–7871 
Sivumäärä Kieli  
Vaasan yliopisto 
Laskentatoimen ja rahoituksen laitos 
PL 700  
65101 Vaasa 
191 Englanti 
Julkaisun nimike  
Hyötyvätkö hedgerahastosijoittajat rahaston optioiden ja monimutkaisten  
johdannaisstrategioiden käytöstä? 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan optioiden ja monimutkaisten johdannaisstrategioiden käytön 
vaikutusta hedgerahastojen suorituskykyyn ja riskipiirteisiin. Tutkimuksessa myös huomioidaan 
mahdollinen hyöty osakeindeksisuureiden käytöstä. Hedgerahastojen lisäksi tämän tutkimuksen 
analyyseissä huomioidaan myös hedgerahastoihin sijoittavat rahastot. Tutkimusongelmien tutki-
miseen käytetään Lipper TASS-hedgerahastotietokantaa, joka mahdollistaa yhteensä 3,403 yksit-
täisen hedgerahaston ja 763 hedgerahastoihin sijoittavan rahaston käytön tutkimuksessa. Tutki-
muksen teoreettiset analyysit keskittyvät hedgerahastojen riskipiirteisiin ja yksittäisen hedgerahas-
ton suorituskyvyn mittaamiseen. 
 
Aragonin ja Martinin (2007) tutkimus implikoi, että hedgerahastot käyttävät optioita informoituun 
kaupankäyntiin. Tämän tutkimuksen tulokset kuitenkin näyttävät, että suotuisat vaikutukset opti-
oiden käytöstä häviävät, kun markkinaperusteiset riskifaktorit huomioidaan. Lisäksi edellä maini-
tun kaltainen optioiden käytön havaitaan olevan yhteydessä suurempaan todennäköisyyteen kärsiä 
suuria tappioita. Frino, Lepone ja Wong (2009) esittävät evidenssiä osakeindeksifutuurien hyödyl-
lisyydestä sijoitusrahastoille. Tämä tutkimus kuitenkin näyttää evidenssiä, että osakeindeksifutuu-
rien käyttö on yhteydessä heikompiin epänormaaleihin tuottoihin hedgerahastojen kohdalla. Tämä 
tutkimus ehdottaa myös muuttujaa, joka kuvaa hedgerahaston johdannaisstrategian kompleksi-
suutta. Tutkimuksen tulokset tukevat hypoteesia, jonka mukaan kompleksisuus olisi yhteydessä 
suurempaan todennäköisyyteen kärsiä suuria tappioita. Kehitetyn muuttujan havaitaan myös ole-
van negatiivisesti yhteydessä hedgerahaston suorituskykyyn vastoin hypoteesia. 
 
Tutkimustulokset, jotka koskevat hedgerahastoihin sijoittavia rahastoja eroavat, hedgerahastoja 
koskevista tuloksista. Näiden rahastojen kohdalla johdannaisstrategian kompleksisuuden ei havai-
ta vaikuttavan rahaston suorituskykyyn ja muutaman johdannaisen käyttö saattaa olla jopa yhtey-
dessä parempaan suorituskykyyn. Kompleksisuuden havaitaan myös olevan yhteydessä pienem-
pään riskiin samaisten rahastojen kohdalla. Kompleksisuuden kuitenkin havaitaan olevan yhtey-
dessä lisääntyneeseen todennäköisyyteen kohdata suuria tappioita, joka hedgerahastoihin sijoitta-
vien rahastojen kohdalla on yhteydessä rahastokohtaisen riskiin. 
 
Tutkimustuloksista yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että monimutkaiset johdannaisstrategiat ovat 
ennemminkin käytetty riskienpiilottamiseen kuin riskienhallintaan. Täten monimutkaisten johdan-
naisstrategioiden käyttö voidaan rinnastaa ”piiloriski” strategioiksi, jotka eivät ole sijoittajien 
etujen mukaisia. 
Asiasanat  
hedgerahastot, informoitu kaupankäynti, optiot, johdannaisstrategiat 

 V 
Publisher Date of publication 
Vaasan yliopisto  December 2009 
Author(s)  Type of publication 
Monograph 
Name and number of series 
Jarkko Peltomäki 
Acta Wasaensia, 216 
Contact information ISBN  
978–952–476–280–9 
ISSN  
0355–2667, 1235–7871 
Number of 
pages 
Language 
University of Vaasa  
Department of Accounting and  
Finance 
P.O. Box 700,  
FI–65101 Vaasa, FINLAND 
jape@uwasa.fi 191 English 
Title of publication  
Do Investors Benefit from the Use of Options and Complexity of Derivative 
Strategy of a Hedge Fund? 
Abstract 
This study investigates the possible advantages of the use of options and a more complex deriva-
tive strategy of a hedge fund in relation to its performance and risk characteristics. It also consid-
ers possible advantages of using equity index futures which may be beneficial for the cash man-
agement of a fund. In addition to hedge funds, this study considers funds of hedge funds in its 
analysis. To investigate these problems this study employs the Lipper TASS hedge fund database, 
which provides samples of 3,403 individual hedge funds and 763 funds of hedge funds. Theoreti-
cal analyses of the study focus on hedge fund risk characteristics and performance measurement 
of an individual hedge fund. 
 
The study by Aragon and Martin (2007) suggests that hedge funds use options for informed trad-
ing. But this study finds that any favorable impact from the use of options for its primary assets 
(asset specialized use) vanishes after controlling for market-based risk factors. Moreover, the 
asset specialized use of options is associated with increased probability of suffering large losses. 
Frino, Lepone, and Wong (2009) present evidence that the use of equity index futures is benefi-
cial for mutual. For hedge funds, the results of this study suggest that the use of equity index 
futures associated with weaker abnormal performance. This study also proposes a proxy for the 
complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund. These results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the complexity of derivatives use can be related to increased probability of suffering 
large losses. The impact of the factor on the performance of a hedge fund is also negative and 
contrary to what is hypothesized.  
 
The results for funds of hedge funds differ from those of hedge funds. The complexity of deriva-
tive strategy does not decrease the performance of funds of hedge funds and the use of few num-
bers may even improve their performance. The complexity is also associated with lower risk in 
these funds. However, the complexity is still related to increased probability of suffering large 
losses, which is related to manager-specific risk in these funds.  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that complex derivative strategies are rather used for concealing the 
risks than for risk management. Accordingly, the use of complex derivative strategies may be 
related to “hidden risk” strategies not aligned with the benefits of the investors.  
Keywords 
hedge funds, informed trading, options, derivative strategies 

 VII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My drive to pursue PhD studies started as a result of not finding a job while com-
pleting a Master’s degree in finance. During autumn 2005 I had been searching 
for a job matching my education but met only with rejections from numerous hu-
man resource consultants. Apparently, the only remaining and sensible chance to 
work in the area of finance was to get back to school and get a PhD degree in fi-
nance. Yet, the path to obtaining a PhD in finance appeared to be something much 
more intellectual and challenging than any of those human resource consultants 
could have ever have offered me. After trading my chosen way, I owe gratitude to 
many individuals I met along the way and who came to a lot to me. 
First and foremost, I want to thank Professor Jussi Nikkinen, my supervisor, who 
believed in my skills and motivation to pursue doctoral studies in finance. He 
taught me the way to publish in academic journals and do research. I am espe-
cially grateful to him for his continuing trust in my ideas and for accepting many 
of the choices I made in my pursuit of my studies leading me to complete my dis-
sertation in the way I wanted it to be. 
I also deeply appreciate the work carried by Professor Steven Swidler of the Au-
burn University and Professor Petri Sahlström of the University of Oulu who 
acted as my official pre-examiners. The comments I received from my pre-
examiners helped me to improve my thesis significantly. 
Working at the Department of Accounting and Finance of the University of Vaasa 
provided me with an innovative and supportive working environment, and there-
fore I am grateful to all my colleagues in the department. Thanks to Professor 
Timo Rothovius, head of department, I had all the resources I needed to carry on 
my research including generous support for attending many conferences and 
hedge fund databases. I thank Professor Timo Salmi for organizing research 
seminars paving the way from other professors and colleagues to comment my 
research. I am also grateful for the comments by Professor Sami Vähämaa at 
many stages of my doctoral research. Valuable comments by Professor Mika Vai-
hekoski, Mr. James Cummings, Professor Björn Hansson, Kam C. Chan are ap-
preciated. I would also like to thank all my discussants at the following confer-
ences and workshops in which I participated: Financial Services Institute Sympo-
sium (New York, September 2007) Southwestern Finance Association Annual 
Meeting (San Diego, March 2007 and Houston March 2008), Midwest Finance 
Association Annual Meeting (San Antonio, March 2008), Conference on the 
Theories and Practices of Securities and Financial Markets (Kaohsiung, Decem-
ber 2007), Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (Sydney, December 
VIII 
2008), Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting (Washington D.C., April 
2009), Global Finance Association Conference (Honolulu, March 2009), Interna-
tional Conference on Applied Financial Economics (Samos, June 2008), Nordic 
Finance Network Research Workshops (Bergen, May 2008 and Copenhagen, 
May 2009), and GSF Research Workshops (Oulu, November 2006 and Lappeen-
ranta, November 2007). I am also grateful to Virginia Mattila for language con-
sulting. 
In 2006, I was accepted to the Finnish Graduate School of Finance (GSF). I thank 
Dr. Leppämäki, the manager of GSF, for organizing demanding PhD courses. 
Passing those courses affected significantly to the maturity of my thinking and my 
theoretical knowledge. I also thank the board of GSF for providing me with a 
scholarship to pursue my research and studies full time towards the end of my 
doctoral studies. 
I spent the academic year 2008-2009 as a visiting PhD student at the Centre of 
Computational Finance and Economic Agents in the University of Essex, U.K. 
While staying in this innovative environment, I was allowed to get familiar with 
some of the latest, and practical, development of the financial industry. I also 
thank all my friends and flat mates on that visit. 
Several foundations and organizations have generously supported my research. I 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support by the Finnish Foundation of Ad-
vancement of Securities Market, the Finnish Savings Bank Foundation, the Re-
search Foundation for Technical and Business Studies, the Evald and Hilda Nissi 
Foundation, the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, 
the Foundation for Economic Education, and the Academy of Finland (project 
#117083). The support by these foundations gave me a feeling that my work is 
appreciated and motivated me to work hard. 
Finally, I would like to thank most warmly my parents Jukka and Maire and my 
brother Jarmo for their support and understanding. I would also like to thank all 
my friends for keeping up with me while I spent most of my time for my PhD 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
 IX 
  
Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... 7
LIST OF FIGURES.............................................................................................. 12
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... 13
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................. 15
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
1.1 Hedge Funds ......................................................................................... 2
1.2 Measurement of Investors’ Benefits from the Use of Derivatives ....... 3
1.3 Research Problems, Hypotheses and Purpose of the Study.................. 4
1.4 Contribution of the Study ..................................................................... 7
1.5 Practical Relevance of the Study ........................................................ 11
1.6 Structure of the Study and Brief Outline of the Results ..................... 12
2 HEDGE FUNDS AND RELATED THEORY.............................................. 14
2.1 Hedge Fund Returns ........................................................................... 15
2.1.1 The First Four Moments of Hedge Fund Returns .............. 15
2.1.2 Hedge Fund Returns: Statistical Properties and  
 Accuracy ............................................................................ 16
2.1.3 Serial Correlation in Hedge Fund Returns and Return 
Smoothing .......................................................................... 16
2.2 Common Risk Factors and Performance of Hedge Funds.................. 18 
2.2.1 From Sharpe’s Style Analysis to Hedge Fund Analysis .... 22
2.2.2 Market Neutrality of Hedge Funds .................................... 24
2.2.3 Market Timing Ability and Conditional Performance of 
Hedge Funds ...................................................................... 25
2.2.4 Asset-Based Style Analysis and Trend-Following 
Strategies............................................................................ 29
2.2.5 Asset-Based Style Analysis for the Risk Arbitrage and 
Event-Driven Strategies ..................................................... 30
2.2.6 Asset-Based Style Analysis and the Fixed-Income 
Strategies............................................................................ 31
2.2.7 Asset-Based Style Analysis and the Equity Long/Short 
Strategy .............................................................................. 31
2.2.8 Asset-Based Style Factors and Diversified Portfolios of 
Hedge Funds ...................................................................... 32
2.2.9 Option-Like Factors of Hedge Fund Returns..................... 34
2.2.10 Alternative Benchmarks for the Evaluation of Hedge 
Funds.................................................................................. 36
2.3 Factors Related to Individual Funds ................................................... 38
2.3.1 Hedge Fund Size ................................................................ 38
2.3.2 Hedge Fund Age ................................................................ 40
2.3.3 Leverage Use ..................................................................... 41
2.3.4 Management Fees and Performance Compensation .......... 42
X 
2.3.5 Risk Gaming Behaviour and Option-Like Performance 
Compensation .....................................................................44
2.3.6 Share restrictions ................................................................46
2.3.7 Personal Capital of a Hedge Fund Manager.......................47
2.3.8 Other Managerial and Fund Characteristics and Hedge 
Fund Performance ..............................................................48
2.3.9 Persistence of Hedge Fund Performance............................49
2.4 Conclusion and Discussion .................................................................51
3 DERIVATIVES USE AND FUND PERFORMANCE .................................54
3.1 Derivatives and Mutual Funds ............................................................54
3.2 Derivatives and Hedge Funds..............................................................56
4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT ................................................................59
4.1 Informed Trading, Options Use, and Hedge Fund Performance.........59
4.2 Equity Index Futures and Hedge Fund Performance ..........................61
4.3 Performance and Risk Characteristics of Hedge Funds and 
Derivatives Use ...................................................................................62
5 DATA .............................................................................................................64
5.1 Funds of Hedge Funds.........................................................................74
5.2 Database Biases Related to Hedge Fund Research .............................79
6 METHODS.....................................................................................................81
6.1 Selection of Other Fund Characteristics in the Cross-Sectional 
Analysis ...............................................................................................81
6.2 Performance and Risk Measures .........................................................84
6.3 Determinants of Derivatives Use by Hedge Funds .............................88
6.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Performance and Risk............................89
6.5 Further Analysis ..................................................................................92
6.6 Derivatives Use and Management of Hedge Fund Portfolios .............92
6.7 Autocorrelation and Relevance of the Variable for the Complexity of 
Derivative Strategy..............................................................................92
6.8 Sample Selectivity Bias.......................................................................94
7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................................................95
7.1 Determinants of Derivatives Use ........................................................95
7.2 Univariate Analysis of Derivatives Use ..............................................99
7.3 Derivatives Use and Risk and Return in Hedge Funds .....................102
7.4 Derivatives Use and Hedge Fund Performance ................................107
7.5 Derivatives Use and Higher Moments of Hedge Fund Returns........114
7.6 Complexity of Derivative Strategies and Hedge Fund Risk and 
Performance.......................................................................................117
7.7 Further Analysis of the Complexity of Derivative Strategy and  
 Hedge Fund Risk ...............................................................................133
7.8 Complexity of Derivative Strategy and Management of Hedge  
 Fund Portfolios ..................................................................................135
 XI 
  
7.9 Robustness, Validity and Relevance of the Findings of  
 this Study .......................................................................................... 141
8 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY............................................................... 156
8.1 Motives for Hedge Funds to Use Derivatives................................... 156
8.2 Investors’ Benefits from the Derivative Strategies........................... 157
8.3 Financial Stability ............................................................................. 159
8.4. Micro and Macro Factors of Hedge Fund Performance and Risk .... 161
8.5 Suggestions for Further Research ..................................................... 162
REFERENCES................................................................................................... 163 
APPENDICES.................................................................................................... 174
 
XII 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 1. Number of Different Type of Derivatives Used by a Hedge  
 Fund .................................................................................................70 
Figure 2. Number of Different Type of Derivatives Used by Funds of Hedge 
Funds................................................................................................79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XIII 
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Variables of Cross-Sectional Analysis ...................................... 66 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Hedge Funds...................................... 68 
Table 3.  Correlation Statistics for Hedge Fund Characteristics............... 72 
Table 4.  Correlation Statistics for the Complexity of Derivative Strategy, 
and Hedge Fund Risk and Performance .................................... 73 
Table 5.  Characteristics of Hedge Funds Investing in Other funds ......... 74 
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for Funds of Hedge Funds....................... 76 
Table 7.  Correlation Statistics for Fund of Hedge Funds  
 Characteristics............................................................................ 77 
Table 8.  Correlation Statistics for the Complexity of Derivative  
 Strategy, and Fund of Hedge Funds Risk and Performance ...... 78 
Table 9.  Logistic Regression Statistics of Derivatives Use on Leverage 
and Asset Specialization ............................................................ 97 
Table 10.  Univariate Analysis of Asset Specialized Options Use ........... 101 
Table 11.  Univariate Analysis of Asset Specialized Equity Index  
 Futures Use .............................................................................. 102 
Table 12.  Regression Statistics of Mean Return and Risk Measures on 
Derivatives Use........................................................................ 103 
Table 13.  Regression Statistics of Performance Measures on Derivatives 
Use ........................................................................................... 109 
Table 14.  Regression Statistics of Higher Moments on Derivatives  
 Use ........................................................................................... 115 
Table 15. The Impact of Complexity of Derivative Strategies on Hedge 
Fund Performance.................................................................... 119 
Table 16.  Nonlinear Impact of Complexity of Derivative Strategies on  
Hedge Fund Performance ........................................................ 123 
Table 17.  Impact of Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on Live Hedge 
Funds........................................................................................ 124 
Table 18.  Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on Dead 
Hedge Funds ............................................................................ 126 
Table 19.  Nonlinear Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on 
Live Hedge Funds.................................................................... 128 
Table 20.  Nonlinear Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on 
Dead Hedge Funds................................................................... 129 
Table 21 Information Criteria ................................................................. 131 
Table 22. Quantile Regression Analysis .................................................. 133 
Table 23.  Market-Based and Idiosyncratic Components of Hedge Fund 
Risk .......................................................................................... 134 
Table 24. Complexity of Derivative Strategy and Funds of Hedge  
 Funds........................................................................................ 136 
Table 25. Complexity of Derivative Strategy and Investing in Other  
 Funds........................................................................................ 139 
Table 26.  Derivatives Use and Return Persistence .................................. 144 
Table 27. Analysis of Ex-1999 Incepted Funds....................................... 146 
Table 28. Analysis of Post-1998 Incepted Funds .................................... 148 
XIV 
Table 29. Relevance of the Complexity of Derivative Strategy...............151 
Table 30. Leverage Effect ........................................................................153 
Table 31. Selectivity Bias and Derivatives Use .......................................154 
 XV 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABS Asset-Based Style Analysis 
AIC 
AIMA 
Akaike Information Criterion 
Alternative Investment Management Association 
APT Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
AR Autoregressive 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CF Cornish-Fischer 
CFA Certified Financial Analysts 
CIDSM Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets 
CSFB Credit Suisse First Boston 
CTA Commodity Trading Advisor 
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis 
ES Expected Shortfall 
GARCH Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
HFR Hedge Fund Research Inc. 
HML  High-Minus-Low 
LS Logistic Regression 
LTCM Long-Term Capital Management 
MAR Managed Account Reports 
MBA  Master of Business Administration 
MPT Modern Portfolio Theory 
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International 
MVaR  Modified Value-at-Risk 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares  
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
SAT Scholastic Aptitude Test 
SIC Schwarz Information Criterion 
SMB Small-Minus-Big 
UMD Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor 
VaR Value-at-Risk 
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (Ticker Symbol) 
 
 

  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds are loosely regulated investment vehicles that can use options, other 
complex derivatives, and complex derivative strategies. Derivatives use is indeed 
popular among hedge funds. Chen (2009) finds that 71 % of hedge funds use de-
rivatives, which is a relatively high ratio in comparison to conventional mutual 
funds. Considerable motivators for hedge funds to use derivatives could be trans-
action cost benefits (see Deli and Varma 2002), informed trading (see Aragon and 
Martin 2007), different derivatives strategies, risk management (see Chen 2009) 
and cash management (see Frino, Lepone, and Wong 2009). As such, the use of 
derivatives by hedge funds is a matter of ability rather than disability, and thus 
derivatives use should offer a wide range of possibilities for hedge funds. 
Despite the possibilities inherent in derivatives use and derivatives strategies, 
many individual cases of hedge funds lead to a rather pessimistic view of the use 
of derivatives by hedge funds. A well known example of a hedge fund using op-
tions and a wide range of different derivative strategies is the Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM). This hedge fund had huge bets with extremely high lever-
age leading to approximately $4.6 billion losses at the time of the Russian crisis 
in 1998. 
The lesson from the LTCM is that the relation between the use of derivatives and 
hedge fund performance should be important information. Therefore, the knowl-
edge of the consequences of the actual use of options and complex derivative 
strategies in hedge funds should deserve more attention. Important questions re-
lated to hedge funds and their derivatives use are: 
1. How are derivatives used by hedge funds? 
2. Do hedge fund investors benefit from the use of derivatives by hedge 
funds? 
3. Are the complex derivative strategies of hedge funds beneficial for inves-
tors? 
If the investors do not benefit from the use of options and other derivatives by 
hedge funds, they should possibly perform simple derivative strategies on their 
own. Further, the questions should be especially relevant for hedge funds as they 
are not as restricted in their investment strategies as are mutual funds. Therefore, 
hedge funds can be considered as an important laboratory to investigate the per-
formance and risk arising from the use of derivative strategies and options. As a 
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result, the answers to these questions, in fact, provide a wider perspective for de-
rivatives use rather than hedge fund specific. 
1.1 Hedge Funds 
Defining the term “hedge fund” is complicated and the term can be defined in 
multiple ways. McCrary (2005: 1) states that a typical definition of a hedge fund 
is the following:  
“A hedge fund is a loosely regulated investment company that charges in-
centive fees and usually seeks to generate returns that are not highly corre-
lated to returns no stocks and bonds.” 
Lowenstein (2002: 24) in turn relates the term hedge fund to a limited partnership 
providing a more juridical meaning for the term. However, this definition may not 
be sufficient as private equity funds may also be organized as limited partner-
ships. In some countries, financial regulators aim to regulate and define hedge 
funds in legal terms. For example, the Finnish regulation recognizes as hedge 
funds something that is named as special investment funds (in Finnish erikoisijoi-
tusrahastot). Such of funds are allowed to use leverage and short sell. Contrary to 
legal definition of hedge funds, Bookstaber (2003) argues against defining hedge 
funds based on their regulation as follows:  
“…starting down the regulatory path with hedge funds as the objective is to 
fail before beginning because you cannot regulate an entity that is not well 
defined.” 
The criticism by Bookstaber (2003) has pith as there are a couple or a few limited 
liability corporations in Finland which have a hedge fund-like structure. These 
corporations do not issue shares of the fund but instead issue shares of corporate 
loans for which the returns depend on the investment performance of the corpora-
tion. 
In conclusion, it appears that the table is free for various definitions of the term 
“hedge fund”. As such, defining a hedge fund is rather a subjective matter. How-
ever, it is reasonable to take the view that hedge funds share some common char-
acteristics and regulatory issues which merit consideration. Thus, hedge funds can 
be considered as loosely regulated investment vehicles which aim to produce re-
turns which are not correlated with the markets. Mutual funds in turn are regu-
lated and do not aim to produce absolute returns. 
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1.2 Measurement of Investors’ Benefits from the Use 
of Derivatives  
There are numerous ways to define investors’ benefits from the use of derivatives. 
In this study, the benefits from the use of derivatives are measured in terms of 
hedge funds from which the investors would also benefit. It is the basic assump-
tion of the modern portfolio theory (MPT) that higher return is desirable while 
higher return variance is undesirable. Markowitz (1952) expresses the assumption 
as “….the investor does (or should) consider expected return a desirable thing and 
variance as undesirable thing.” Accordingly, investors would benefit from deriva-
tives use with better return-risk relation for which the risk is measured using the 
variance of returns. Thus, the better risk-return relation associated with the use of 
derivatives would also be beneficial for investors. An additional motivator for 
assuming investors to benefit from the better risk-return relation is the tendency 
of dead hedge funds to have inferior risk-return relation compared to other funds 
(see, e.g. Liang 2000; Getmansky, Lo, and Mei 2004). As such, it is reasonable to 
assume the better risk return-relation to be in the interests of investors as it is the 
basic characteristic of surviving hedge funds. 
Following MPT, the final benefit from the use of derivatives by hedge funds 
would depend on the investors’ ability to improve the risk-return relation of their 
final portfolio by inclusion of derivatives users in their portfolios. This ability 
would be difficult to analyse as investors’ portfolios may vary considerably and 
the impact of the inclusion of hedge fund in their portfolios is difficult to analyse. 
Yet, it is the best considered as controlling for market-based risk factors of hedge 
fund returns and focusing on the abnormal returns. Other considerable (or poten-
tial) investments in investors’ portfolios are then controlled for. In this study, 
market-based risk factors used are defined as the factors of hedge fund perform-
ance that can be derived from marketable prices to explain time-series returns of 
hedge funds, and are motivated by the previous academic research. 
Admittedly, a limitation of the study is that the actual benefits for each hedge 
fund investors are difficult to measure. The results are most relevant for those 
investors who invest significant proportions of their wealth in individual hedge 
funds as then the risk embedded in an individual hedge fund weights the most. 
When measuring the investors’ benefits from the use of options, the higher mo-
ments of returns are also considered, namely the skewness and the kurtosis of the 
returns. The previous evidence suggests that investors prefer higher skewness and 
lower kurtosis for investment returns (see Arditti 1967; Kraus and Litzenberger 
1976; Scott and Horvath 1980). Consistently, Baba and Goko (2009) find that 
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hedge funds with lower skewness in returns are more likely to be liquidated. This 
result implies that also hedge fund investors dislike lower skewness. Therefore, as 
additional measures, the investors are considered to benefit from the use of de-
rivatives and derivative strategies if they are related to higher skewness and lower 
kurtosis. Together higher skewness and lower kurtosis would imply that the left 
tail of the return distribution would be less heavy. For investors, the less heavy 
left tail of investment returns would mean less “unhappy surprises.”  
1.3 Research Problems, Hypotheses and Purpose of 
the Study 
The objectives of this study are to investigate advantages and disadvantages of the 
use of options and the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund from 
the investors’ viewpoint. Advantages and disadvantages of the complexity are 
also considered for funds of hedge funds. In this study, the complexity of the de-
rivative strategy of a hedge fund is defined as the number of different derivatives 
used by a hedge fund. This study also investigates hedge fund performance asso-
ciated with the use of equity index futures. The use of this particular derivative is 
in the interest of recent academic research due to its potential use for cash man-
agement by mutual funds (see Frino et al. 2009). The use of derivatives by finan-
cial institutions can also be a relevant aspect for financial stability because the 
actions of one fund can cause dramatic losses and shake financial markets, which 
happened in 1998 after the actions of the LTCM. This study investigates three 
research questions:  
1. Does the use of options by a hedge fund for the primary asset class of a 
fund affect its performance and risk characteristics? 
2. Does the use of equity index futures by a hedge fund affect its perform-
ance and characteristics? 
3. Does the use of a more complex derivative strategy affect the performance 
and risk characteristics of a hedge fund? 
The use of options for the primary asset class of a hedge fund is hereafter defined 
as the asset specialized use of options. Consistently, the use of options for equity 
when it is the primary asset class of a hedge fund would then be equity special-
ized use of options. The logic is also applied for primary uses of options for fixed-
income, currency and commodity. The advantage of focusing on the asset special-
ized use of options is its high degree of relevance for the strategy of a hedge fund. 
For instance, the use of equity options of a hedge fund which focuses on fixed-
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income does not reasonably matter as much as it matters for a hedge fund which 
focuses on equity.  
The above problems are investigated using 3,403 individual hedge funds and 763 
funds of hedge funds obtained from the Lipper TASS hedge fund database. There 
are also other hedge fund databases available, for example the hedge fund data-
base of Hedge Fund Research Inc. (HFR). But the chosen database provides ex-
tensive information concerning derivatives use of hedge funds. Therefore, it can 
be considered as the best database available to study the above research questions 
although it does not represent the entire hedge fund industry. 
This study posits five main hypotheses. Hypotheses may be directed to both the 
use of options (denoted by a) and complexity of derivative strategy (denoted by 
b). The hypotheses are the following: 
H1: The asset specialized use of options enhances hedge fund performance. 
H2: The equity specialized use of equity index futures is related to lower hedge 
fund performance. 
H3: The use of a more complex derivative strategy of a hedge fund decreases risk. 
H4: The use of a more complex derivative strategy improves hedge fund perform-
ance. 
H5a: The asset specialized use of options has a negative impact on the skewness 
and a positive impact on the kurtosis of a hedge fund return distribution. 
H5b: The use of a more complex derivative strategy of a hedge fund has a negative 
impact on the skewness and a positive impact on the kurtosis of its return distri-
bution. 
For the first hypothesis, there are also at least three considerable reasons why the 
use of options may improve hedge fund performance predicted by the hypothesis: 
first, the ability to trade options can be used for better risk management as the 
results of Chen (2009) for derivatives use by hedge funds imply. Aragon and 
Martin (2008) also find that equity options use is associated with higher Sharpe 
ratio and lower standard deviation. This result implies that the performance statis-
tics of equity options users is specifically higher as a result of risk component of 
the statistics. 
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Second, the ability to trade options allows hedge funds to use wider range of trad-
ing strategies, which may be profitable. For example, the profitability of the 
popular covered call strategy, which involves writing call options against under-
lying equities simultaneously, is suggested by many studies such as Board, Scut-
liffe and Patrinos (2000), Isakov and Morard (2001), Whaley (2002), McIntyre 
and Jackson (2007), and Kapadia and Szado (2007).  
Third, options especially may be important tools for informed trading in the use 
of hedge funds. Several scholarly studies indicate that options market can be a 
channel of informed trading (see, e.g., Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas 1998; Chak-
ravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew 2004). The study by Aragon et al. (2007) presents 
evidence that hedge funds use options for informed trading. Hedge funds also 
seem to have market timing ability in their focus market (see Chen 2006), and 
therefore asset specialization could be associated with better information. This 
evidence leads to a need to focus the hypothesis to the asset specialized use of 
options. Consequently, the asset specialized use of options by a hedge fund 
should have a positive impact on its measured performance. 
For the second hypothesis, it is reasonable to expect that the equity specialized 
use of equity index futures is associated with lower hedge fund performance. The 
use of this derivative is related rather to liquidity motivated and uninformed trad-
ing by mutual funds (see Edelen 1999; Frino et al. 2009). Accordingly, the use of 
this derivative can be seen as a substitute for share restrictions which are used to 
manage illiquid assets by a hedge fund. Thus, equity index futures are also substi-
tuted to illiquidity risk premium rewarded from manage illiquid assets efficiently. 
The hypothesis does not imply that the use of equity index futures would be det-
rimental for hedge funds but it implies that it is associated with the strategies not 
profitable on average in the hedge fund industry. 
The third hypothesis is based on the evidence presented by Chen (2009) for risk 
management consistent use of derivatives by hedge funds. Therefore, it is reason-
able to assume that the use of a more complex derivative strategy would decrease 
the aggregate risk of a hedge fund in the terms of standard deviation. 
The fifth and also the third hypotheses are based on the evidence presented by 
John and John (2006) suggesting that the use of complex derivative strategies 
may lead to better performance statistics but also to higher probability of incur-
ring larger losses. These large losses would appear as lower skewness and higher 
kurtosis of hedge fund returns distributions. Also, option writing strategies which 
improve performance statistics are found to exhibit these risk characteristics (see 
Whaley 2002). 
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However, the asymmetry of option payoffs may also cause asymmetry in the re-
turn distributions of hedge funds. Therefore, possible advantages from hedging 
risks may vanish after accounting for asymmetry in hedge fund returns. The two 
arguments may also be related to the use of complex derivative strategies. 
The negative impact on skewness and positive impact on kurtosis in the distribu-
tion of hedge fund returns as hypothesized (Hypotheses 5a and 5b) implies fatter 
left tail of the distribution as an effect of derivatives use. The impact on the left 
tail, which aggregates the skewness and kurtosis, is also measured and tested in 
accordance with Hypotheses 5a and 5b. Moreover, as funds of hedge funds are 
closely related to hedge funds, the hypotheses presented above may also be di-
rected at funds of hedge funds.  
1.4 Contribution of the Study 
By considering the asset specialized use of options, the use of equity index futures 
and the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund this study makes a 
contribution to six different areas of hedge fund research:  
• Complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund as a relevant 
factor of the performance and risk of a hedge fund: Well known fac-
tors of hedge fund performance prior to this study are, for example, size 
(see Getmansky 2005), age (see Liang 1999), leverage (see Schneeweis,  
Martin, Kazemi, and Karavas 2005), management compensation (e.g. 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba 2007), share restrictions (see Aragon 2007), 
manager’s personal capital invested in the fund (e.g.  Kouwenberg et al. 
2007), and many other managerial and fund characteristics (see Boyson 
2002; Maxam, Nikbakth, Petrova, Spieler 2006). Derivatives use is also 
considered as a factor of hedge fund performance and risk. Chen (2009) 
uses a binary variable of derivatives use as a factor of hedge fund per-
formance and risk and finds only little statistically significant difference in 
the results although some weak evidence when the Sharpe ratio is used. 
This study extends the debate and presents a proxy for the complexity of a 
fund’s derivative strategy as a factor of hedge fund risk and performance. 
Thus, while Chen (2009) focuses on analysing how those 71 % of hedge 
funds using derivatives differ from those not using derivatives, this study 
also aims to analyse derivatives use in this 71 % subgroup. The factor is 
hypothesized to have an impact on hedge fund risk characteristics and per-
formance. In relation to these studies, the present study proposes the com-
plexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund as a new factor of hedge 
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fund performance. Hedge funds have also been found to exhibit non-
normal return distributions by the previous studies (see, e.g., Brooks and 
Kat 2002; Malkiel and Saha 2004) which make the investigation of this re-
lation especially interesting for hedge funds as it is hypothesized in this 
study that derivatives use can be the cause of these characteristics. 
• The use of equity index futures and fund performance: The use equity 
index futures is of particular interest in the research on derivatives use due 
to their potential use for cash management. The finding by Koski and Pon-
tiff (1999) implies that derivatives users have lower variation in system-
atic risk imply the use of index futures for cash management as noted by 
Frino et al. (2009). The results by Frino et al. (2009) implies that by using 
equity index futures mutual funds can better adjust exposure to the market 
when receiving cash inflows. As a result, by using equity index futures 
funds have an ability to achieve marginally better performance as they can 
efficiently adjust their portfolio to desired risk level. So far the use of eq-
uity index futures by hedge funds has been paid less attention, possibly 
due to the ability of hedge funds to control their fund flows by imposing 
share restrictions. Share restrictions in turn are related to higher perform-
ance statistics as a result of illiquidity risk premium associated with the re-
strictions (see Aragon 2007). This study contributes to the literature as it 
hypothesizes that the use of these derivatives by hedge funds, as an indica-
tor of lower illiquidity risk premium, is associated with lower perform-
ance.  
• The asset specialized use of options: The results by Fong, Gallagher, and 
Ng (2005) suggest that mutual funds do not use options for informed trad-
ing. Aragon et al. (2007) test predictive information of option holdings by 
hedge funds and stress the use of stock options for informed trading. 
However, they do not align informed trading and options use directly to 
hedge fund performance and test how the use of options affects hedge 
fund risk and performance as does this study. Chen (2008) and Aragon et 
al. (2008) also test the association between options use and hedge fund 
performance but do not consider the asset specialized use of options1. This 
study in turn considers the asset specialized use of options. This type of 
use options relates to the use of options for primary asset class of a hedge 
                                                
 
1  The results from this study concerning the use of equity options and hedge fund performance 
were published in the Proceedings of the 46th SWFA Annual Meeting (Houston, March 
2008). 
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fund which can be reasonably assumed as the most relevant asset of the 
strategy of a hedge fund. Therefore, if options use for informed trading or 
other profitable strategies on aggregate are important factors of the per-
formance of hedge funds in their primary activities, they are likely to be 
seen by investigating asset specialized use of options.  
• Complexity of the derivative strategy and the management of a port-
folio of hedge funds: For funds of hedge funds, Chen (2009) uses uni-
variate analysis but to examine the difference between the performance 
and risk of derivatives users and nonusers. In the multivariate analysis by 
Chen (2009) funds of funds are analysed in the same sample with the oth-
er funds. However, the use of derivatives may differ significantly for 
hedge funds and funds of hedge funds as the latter ones do not engage in 
trading similar to hedge funds and their objective is to manage hedge fund 
portfolios. It may also be reasonable to consider that the use of derivatives 
by funds of hedge funds is biased towards risk management activity. For 
instance, Denvir and Hutson (2006) present evidence for funds of hedge 
funds having diversification advantage over hedge fund indices. Deriva-
tives use may be associated with this diversification advantage. Therefore, 
it is important to consider the difference between funds of hedge funds 
and examine their difference from hedge funds as a relevant contribution 
to Chen (2009). To further investigate the difference, the analyses con-
sider whether the risk and performance characteristics are different for 
those hedge funds which also invest in other funds. Moreover, the use of 
derivatives by these special type of funds is not considered in earlier re-
search on hedge funds. 
• Market-based risk of a hedge fund and complexity of derivative strat-
egy: The relation between the market-based risk, which is the standard 
deviation of hedge fund returns explained using market-based risk factors, 
and the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund is also con-
sidered. In the estimation of market-based risk, the option-like risk factors 
and other reasonable market-based factors motivated by the previous re-
search are used. Option-like and market-based factors have previously 
been advocated by many studies such as Agarwal and Naik (2004) and 
Fung and Hsieh (2002a). This study then considers a possible relation be-
tween the estimated market-based factors of hedge fund performance and 
the complexity of derivative strategy of an individual fund. The relation is 
especially important given the wide use and the credibility of the market-
based factors (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh 2004b). Chen (2009) considers 
the relation between the exposure of a hedge fund to stock market factor 
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(systematic risk) and derivatives use but does not consider other relevant 
factors such as the option-like risk factors2. 
• The relation between the left tail of the return distribution of a hedge 
fund and fund characteristics: Several studies such as Eling (2006) and 
Bali, Gockan, and Liang (2007) apply both the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and 
Modified Value-at-Risk (MVaR) risk measures in their analyses. These 
studies, however, do not test which hedge fund characteristics affect the 
difference between the VaR and MVaR estimates using the Cornish-
Fischer expansion. The Cornish-Fischer expansion is useful as it considers 
both the skewness and excess kurtosis of the return distribution of a hedge 
fund. Admittedly, some studies, such as Chen (2009), test characteristics 
affecting the skewness and excess kurtosis separately but they do not ag-
gregate them. This perspective should be extremely interesting as VaR 
and MVaR are widely used in practice. Unlike the earlier studies, this 
study considers this issue and tests whether the complexity of the deriva-
tive strategy of a hedge fund has an impact on the Cornish-Fischer expan-
sion of its returns. This study also investigates other factors beside the 
complexity of derivative strategy affecting the Cornish-Fischer expansion. 
The construction of the proxy for the complexity of derivative strategy of a fund 
and the focus on the asset specialized use of options allows one to study the im-
plications of the use of these financial instruments and complex derivative strate-
gies which can contribute to much broader knowledge in finance. The reason is 
that hedge funds can be considered as a laboratory for the potential consequences 
of these uses of derivatives due to their free regulation. They are also relatively 
little restricted in their derivative strategies. The implications relate to the ques-
tion: do investors and traders benefit from the use of derivatives and complex 
derivative strategies? 
                                                
 
2  Specifically, Chen (2009: 10) defines the measure of market risk used in his 
study as follows: “…market risk is estimated by the time-series regression co-
efficient of fund returns on the market portfolio.” In this study, the focus is on 
market-based risk, which is important as hedge funds by definition aim to 
hedge market risk and focus on alternative sources of returns. Chen (2009: 18) 
reports of the use of alternative benchmarks but he does not indicate that the 
definition for the market risk is considered differently nor does he explain the 
use of any additional risk measures in conjunction with the use of the alterna-
tive benchmarks. 
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• Performance from the use of derivatives and option strategies: While 
the previous studies on mutual fund and hedge fund performance such as 
Koski et al. (1999), Johnson and Yu (2004), Fong et al. (2005), Chen 
(2009) and Frino et al. (2009) uses binary variables of derivatives use, this 
study considers the complexity of derivative strategy. This consideration 
of complexity makes it possible to empirically test the implication of the 
study by John et al. (2006) that the use of complex derivative strategies 
may lead to better performance statistics but also to higher probability of 
incurring larger losses. Earlier studies such as Whaley (2002) suggest that 
passive option strategies may improve portfolio performance; by focusing 
on the asset specialized option use this study also attempts to ascertain 
whether this advantage may really be seen at the fund management level. 
• Derivative strategies and the risk of a managed investment portfolio: 
Following John et al. (2006) it can be expected that the use of complex de-
rivatives and options strategies is related to “hidden risk” strategies. The 
study by Chen (2009) finds that derivatives use is related to lower risk but 
the concept of complexity of derivative strategy is not considered by the 
study as it is, none of the previous studies on derivatives use by funds. 
Following John’s et al. (2006) theoretical evidence for derivative strate-
gies and risk, this empirical study aims to assign the use of complex de-
rivative strategies in general to higher moments (the third and the fourth) 
of investment returns. This investigation of the prediction may also be re-
lated to use of derivatives by other institutions and investors which are not 
strictly regulated.  
1.5 Practical Relevance of the Study 
Many institutional investors, including pension funds, have invested considerable 
amounts of wealth in hedge funds. Therefore, the results in this study are impor-
tant for practitioners. News in the financial press about hedge funds and their 
strategies may lead investors to subjective thinking if individual cases appearing 
in financial press are too easily generalized. For example, investors may general-
ize the failure of the LTCM in its derivative strategies too easily. 
The research in this study now aims to provide objective evidence of how deriva-
tive strategies and the use of options may actually result in hedge fund perform-
ance and risk. Being aware of the risks in hedge funds the institutional investors 
can avoid “pitfalls” in hedge fund investing. The study also offers objective in-
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formation to regulators so that they have more objective grounds to regulate the 
use of derivatives by hedge funds. 
1.6 Structure of the Study and Brief Outline of 
the Results 
This study is organized into 8 chapters and three appendices as follows. Chapter 1 
presents a relevant introduction to the topic of this study, its research problems 
and purpose, and presents the contribution of the study. The chapter also defines 
the investors’ benefit which is assigned to the use of derivatives. 
Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature related to the risk and performance of 
hedge funds, which includes a presentation of this discipline in relation to some 
other financial theories of applied microeconomics and asset pricing. In this chap-
ter, the performance measurement of hedge funds is also explained and used to 
define the investors’ benefits from the use of derivatives.  
Chapter 3 is a review of the research on the use of derivatives by mutual funds 
and hedge funds. The main purpose of the chapter is to review the studies investi-
gating the impact of the use of derivatives on the performance and risk of a fund. 
It also presents research on the purposes of derivatives use by investment funds. 
Chapter 3 is followed by Chapter 4, which is denoted for developing the hypothe-
ses of this study.  
Chapter 5 describes the methodology of this study. The chapter also discusses the 
factors for time-series and cross-sectional analysis which are used in this study. 
Chapter 6 describes data of this study and reviews relevant biases related to hedge 
fund return databases.  
Chapter 7 reviews the results of this study. The results imply that the options use 
does not result in better performance by a hedge fund after controlling for market-
based risk factors of a hedge fund. The use of equity index futures is associated 
with lower abnormal performance of a hedge fund. Complexity of the derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund is related to weaker performance and higher probability 
of suffering heavier losses than predicted by risk measures, which assume hedge 
fund returns to be normally distributed. For funds of hedge funds, the use of a 
more complex derivative strategy is related to lower risk but also to suffering 
heavier losses than expected similar to hedge funds.Finally, the chapter presents a 
discussion and additional analysis of the robustness of the results. 
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Chapter 8 is for the conclusion of this study. The main conclusion of the study is 
that it is not beneficial for investors to invest in complex derivative strategies. The 
results will also be discussed in light of financial stability. The results should mo-
tivate regulatory authorities to regulate the use of complex derivative strategies as 
heavy losses of big hedge fund using derivatives which may threat financial sta-
bility. An increase in the regulation would still be aligned with the interests of 
investors as one considers negative association between the complexity of the 
derivative strategy of a hedge fund and its performance. The chapter moreover 
presents some possible avenues for future research related to the topic of this 
study. 
Appendix 1 presents the classification of hedge fund strategies which is used in 
this study. Appendix 2 presents additional analyses for the relation between the 
use of equity index futures and hedge fund performance.  
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2 HEDGE FUNDS AND RELATED THEORY  
This section presents the background for risk and performance characteristics of 
hedge funds. Two distinctions are made in the review of the research on hedge 
funds and their related theory: 
• “Performance and risk measurement:” For the purposes of this study, 
the most relevant issue in financial theory is its relation to the often prom-
ised abnormal performance by hedge funds, what abnormal performance 
means and how it can be measured. The theory is followed by a review of 
empirical studies on hedge funds which presents theories, methods, and 
empirical risk factors used to measure abnormal performance.  
• “Hedge fund characteristics:” These hedge fund studies are followed by 
a review of empirical research and related theory on factors related to the 
performance of individual hedge funds.   
This section concludes with a discussion about relation between these compo-
nents. General symbols used in this section and thereafter are the following: 
 = return on the individual ith security; 
= return on the pth fund; 
= return on the market portfolio; 
= risk-free rate of return; 
= standard deviation of the returns on the individual ith security; 
= standard deviation of the returns on the pth fund; 
= standard deviation of the returns on the market portfolio; 
 = unobservable market factor; 
= systematic factor of the returns of a security; 
 = defines the mean standard deviation of market returns. 
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The following operators are also used: E( ) defines the expectation of the variable 
in the brackets; ( )  defines the standard deviation of the variable in the brack-
ets;Var( )defines the variance of the variable in the brackets; Skew( )defines the 
skewness of the variable in the brackets;Kurt( )defines the kurtosis of the vari-
able in the brackets, andCov( )defines the covariance of the variables in the 
brackets.  
2.1 Hedge Fund Returns  
Hedge fund returns exhibit many statistical properties which are relevant for their 
analysis. The reliability of the returns may be weak in some cases.  
2.1.1 The First Four Moments of Hedge Fund Returns 
It makes sensible to start the review of the hedge fund literature related to their 
“performance and risk measurement” by discussing the returns of hedge funds. In 
conventional investment analysis, it is common and a standard way to analyse the 
first and the second moments of hedge funds returns which are the mean and vari-
ance of their returns. However, the third and fourth moments of the return distri-
bution, which are the skewness and kurtosis, should also matter to investors, and 
hedge fund investors in particular. From hedge fund investors’ viewpoint, the 
problem is usually that hedge fund returns exhibit negative skewness and high 
kurtosis (see, e.g., Brooks et al., 2002; Malkiel et al., 2004). Economic theory 
generally states that investors prefer higher skewness and lower kurtosis (see, 
e.g., Arditti 1967; Kraus et al. 1976; Scott et al. 1980). Practically, if a hedge fund 
exhibits negative skewness and high kurtosis, then it exhibits higher probability of 
suffering larger losses than predicted if the returns were normally distributed. 
Thus, even though many hedge fund strategies provide attractive returns against 
the standard deviation of the returns, negative skewness and high kurtosis make 
the returns less attractive. In other words, this characteristic is the problem of the 
fat left tail of the return distribution of a hedge fund. When accounting for skew-
ness and kurtosis, the objective function to construct hedge fund portfolios by 
Brunel (2004) would be the following: 
(1) max E Rp( )  Rp( ) +   Skew Rp( )   Kurt Rp( )[ ] , 
where  defines the scaling constant associated with skewness, and  defines the 
scaling constant associated with kurtosis.  
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Eling (2006) suggests that after accounting for the existence of serial correlation 
and the higher moments of the return distributions of hedge funds, the attractive-
ness of hedge fund returns decreases.  
To reduce the problem of fat left tails of the return distributions of portfolios that 
include hedge funds, the study by Kat (2005) suggests that with proper asset allo-
cation it is possible to reduce the adverse characteristics of negative skewness and 
high kurtosis by portfolio construction. The proposed allocations are the follow-
ing: purchasing out-of-the-money put options, investing in managed futures 
funds, overweighting the equity market neutral and global/macro strategies, and 
avoiding investing in the distressed strategy (Kat 2005). 
2.1.2 Hedge Fund Returns: Statistical Properties and Accuracy  
The very first problem encountered in the analyses is the accuracy of hedge fund 
returns. Hedge fund returns are usually self-reported by hedge fund managers to 
different databases and investors and there is usually no requirement for auditing 
hedge funds, yet the requirement may depend on the legislation of each country. 
Liang’s (2003) study on the accuracy of hedge fund returns classifies the factors 
that affect hedge fund returns into auditing effectiveness, transparency, manager 
efforts, and ease of calculating returns. Specifically, auditing effectiveness may 
be measured by non-missing auditing dates while transparency may be measured 
by exchange listings of a hedge fund and openness to the public. In addition, 
some hedge fund managers may put or have to put more effort into calculating 
their returns. The calculation of the returns of some strategies and instruments is 
more demanding, which may also lead to problems with the accuracy of the data. 
By comparing the same funds in different databases and in the different versions 
of the same databases Liang (2003) finds return discrepancies which are associ-
ated with the presentation of auditing dates by hedge funds. Smaller funds, ex-
change listed funds, funds of funds, funds open to the public, unlevered funds, 
and funds which invest in only one sector report more accurate returns. 
2.1.3 Serial Correlation in Hedge Fund Returns and Return Smoothing 
Serial correlation in hedge fund returns is an empirical characteristic which is also 
associated with the accuracy of hedge fund returns. Asness, Krail, and Liew 
(2001) open the debate on serial correlation in hedge fund returns. They find posi-
tive serial correlation in hedge fund index returns that alters the performance 
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measurement. The estimated exposure of the returns of hedge funds whose returns 
are serially correlated to asset indices causes the estimated betas to be downward 
biased. As a result, lagged beta models are proposed to be the most conventional 
way to account for this bias in the performance measurement. Some empirical 
studies, more specifically, Amenc, El Bied, and Martellini (2003) and Hamza, 
Kooli, and Roberge (2006) also offer evidence for predictability in hedge fund 
returns by using multifactor models. 
The cause of serial correlation is an important issue related to the effect itself. 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) investigate the causes for serial correlation 
in hedge funds returns. They consider time-varying expected returns, market in-
efficiencies, time-varying leverage, incentive fees with high watermarks, illi-
quidity and return smoothing as possible causes for serial correlation in hedge 
fund returns. They suggest that return smoothing and illiquid assets are the pri-
mary reasons for serial correlation in hedge fund returns.  
Chandar’s and Bricker’s (2002) study of earnings management in closed-end mu-
tual funds may shed some light on serially correlated hedge fund returns. They 
test three objectives of mutual fund managers in managing earnings: maximiza-
tion of current compensation, maximization of compensation over multiple pe-
riods by outperforming passive benchmark, or smooth earnings. The results sug-
gest that fund managers use accounting discretion to manage their earnings in 
order to manage fund returns around a passive benchmark. Moreover, these re-
sults concern both equity security funds and debt security funds. Thus, when a 
fund has excess performance above the benchmark, the performance would be put 
away for a rainy day and then on that day the return is shown. Hedge fund man-
agers may compare themselves against some passive benchmarks in the same 
way, and therefore performance should be a key reason for smoothing returns. 
Good performance has indeed been shown to attract investors to invest money in 
a hedge fund (see Agarwal et al. 2007), and therefore hedge fund managers may 
be willing to smooth their returns, especially when the current performance is 
poor. Intuitively, a hedge fund manager also should be more willing to inflate the 
returns higher when the risk of capital outflow is increased. Bollen and Pool 
(2008) consider conditionality in return smoothing by hedge funds. They account 
for the possibility that serial correlation in hedge fund returns depends on whether 
the performance of a hedge fund is good or bad and they estimate the following 
model: 
(2) Rp,t
0 = ap + b1
+Rp,t1
0 + b1
 1Dt1( ) Rp,t10 +p,t ,  
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where  if systematic return component of observed hedge fund return is 
greater than its mean in month t-1, and  is the residual error. Conditional re-
turn smoothing results in . When , poor returns are smoothed more 
than positive returns implying conditional return smoothing. The results of the 
study relate positive values of to the risk of capital outflow and no use of an 
auditor.  
Evidence for return discretion and return smoothing can also be found as season-
ality in hedge fund returns. Agarwal et al. (2007) find that hedge fund returns are 
significantly higher in December. The authors call this phenomenon the Decem-
ber peak and relate it to managers’ incentives to improve annual performance at 
the end of the year due to incentive fees, which are determined at that time. The 
results show that hedge funds, which have greater incentives and opportunities to 
manage their returns, exhibit a larger December peak.  
Following Agarwal et al. (2007), the December peak may actually be related to 
both positive and negative return smoothing. Positive return smoothing relates to 
the use of stored returns and negative smoothing relates to the use of (possible) 
future returns. Negative return smoothing actually creates negative value for 
stored returns. Convincing evidence for positive smoothing is seen in the results 
of Agarwal et al. (2007) suggesting that hedge funds underreport their returns 
until December, when the remaining reserves are added. Also, these authors find 
that part of the December spike is created by borrowing from January returns, 
therefore giving evidence in favour of negative return smoothing. 
Discontinuity around zero in hedge fund return distributions may also be a result 
of misreporting. Pool and Bollen (2007) study this discontinuity in hedge fund 
returns around zero in the pooled distribution of reported monthly hedge fund 
returns. Their results show that when the returns cross the zero threshold to nega-
tive, the density of hedge fund returns significantly decreases. The result also 
holds for hedge funds which invest in illiquid assets, and is not found to be related 
to hedge fund risk factors. The authors’ explanation for the result is that hedge 
fund managers avoid reporting losses to attract and retain investors.  
2.2 Common Risk Factors and Performance of Hedge 
Funds 
To understand the performance of hedge funds one must first focus on determin-
ing the abnormal performance of a hedge fund and for this purpose theoretical 
analysis is needed. This theoretical analysis for the determination of the abnormal 
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returns starts from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and is completed 
with the presentation of Treynor’s and Black’s (1973) appraisal ratio. 
Probably the best established foundation for theoretical asset pricing is the CAPM 
which is developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). The 
model predicts the following risk-return relation: 
(3) E Ri( ) = Rf +  i E Rm( )  Rf[ ] .  
The CAPM implies that under certain assumptions the required rate of return for 
each stock is determined by its relation with the market returns which is described 
with beta, . The beta is the covariance between the returns of the stock and the 
market returns divided by the variance of market returns, formally: 
(4) i = Cov Ri,Rm( ) /Var Rm( )  
The CAPM, however, is not suitable for proper analyses of hedge fund returns. 
Hedge funds, as stated by Fung et al. (2000b), can be considered as “zero-beta 
like” investments. But the CAPM can be considered as the first essential step to 
understand the required return for an investment. 
In the context of the CAPM, the “zero-beta” nature would mean that the returns 
of hedge funds would have no significant exposure to the market returns, and they 
would not carry significant proportion of systematic risk. Fung et al. (2000b) fur-
ther note that even though hedge funds may carry low systematic risk, they may 
carry high “absolute” risk, which is related to the “event risk” in their strategy. 
The market beta is not suitable to analyse this absolute risk. The absolute risk can 
further be illustrated in the context of Sharpe’s (1963) single index model: 
(5) Ri  Rf = i + bi Ri  Rf( ) + ei , 
where is the abnormal return of the security, and is the idiosyncratic risk of 
the stock. When the above single index model is applied to the context of hedge 
fund analysis, the above discussion suggests that becomes more irrelevant 
while  becomes more relevant. The assumption for the model is that the vari-
ables Ri  Rf( )  and  must be independent random variables and E ei( ) = 0 . 
In the analysis of active investment strategies, it is reasonable to focus on the  
term which is a measure of portfolio performance as first proposed by Jensen 
(1967). Jensen’s (1967) model begins from the CAPM (Equation 2). If investors 
as an essential assumption are allowed to have heterogeneous horizon periods 
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with continuous trading, the single period CAPM can be extended to a multi-
period setup and be rewritten as 
(6) E Ri,t( ) = Rf ,t +  i E Rm,t( )  Rf ,t[ ].  
Verbally, the difference between Equation (6) and Equation (3) is the interval of 
time arbitrary with starting and ending time point which is denoted by subscript t. 
As noted by Jensen (1967), the measure of market risk, , can be approximated 
with the coefficient  in the market model (see, e.g., Fama 1968) with the fol-
lowing analogy: 
(7) Ri,t = E Ri,t( ) + bi t + ei,t ,  
and assuming that , and zero covariance between  and The return 
on the market portfolio can be approximated with the following formal expres-
sion: 
(8) Rm,t  E Rm,t( ) +  t .  
The equations (7) and (8) now define the returns for an individual security and the 
market. The following expression can be formed using Equations (7) and (8) for 
individual security returns and the market return, and by adding  to 
both sides: 
(9) E Ri,t( ) + i t + ei,t = Rf ,t +  i Rm,t  t  Rf ,t[ ] + i t + ei,t , 
In the derivation of the Jensen’s (1967) alpha, a marked assumption is that the 
market model holds for portfolios as well as individual securities. The assumption 
is evidenced by Blume (1968) and Jensen (1967). Hence, the subscript i, which is 
related to individual stock returns, is hereafter replaced with subscript p, which is 
related to portfolio returns. Equation (9) can be reduced further by using Equation 
(7) for the left hand side and the model can be presented as: 
(10) Rp,t = Rp,t + i Rm,t  Rf ,t[ ] + ep,t .  
Following the development of Jensen (1967), it can be shown that the risk pre-
mium on the p’th portfolio is linearly related to that of the market factor by sub-
tracting risk-free rate from both sides of the equation:  
(11) Rp,t  Rf ,t = i Rm,t  Rf ,t[ ] + ep,t .  
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The notion that Jensen (1967) evinced is that an active portfolio manager aims to 
select securities for which . This ability would mean that the manager could 
earn more than the risk premium for the portfolio would predict. To model the 
returns of active investment portfolios correctly equation must be not constrained, 
and the allowance for non-zero constant Equation (11) yields the following ex-
pression: 
(12) Rp,t  Rf ,t = p,t +  i Rm,t  Rf ,t[ ] + ep,t .  
The term now describes the portfolio performance and measures portfolio 
manager’s predictive ability, which is defined by Jensen (1967) as  
“…ability to earn returns through successful prediction of security prices which 
are higher than those which we could expect given the level of riskiness of his 
portfolio.” 
The analogy of the alpha as a performance measure is that if and is 
statistically significant, the manager is doing better than the random selection of 
securities. And, if and is statistically significant the manager is doing 
worse than the random selection of securities. 
However, the alpha as a performance measure has its weaknesses. It does not 
consider the active part of the risk. Therefore, it is reasonable that the fund analyst 
also need to focus to evaluate relation between and . Jensen’s (1967) alpha 
(hereafter alpha) does not consider additional risk taken by portfolio managers 
related to individual securities. In this case, the market risk would not alone be a 
satisfactory variable to capture all relevant risk of the portfolio. Hence, the resid-
ual term is often considered in the analysis. Treynor et al. (1973) propose the 
use of the residual term in the performance analysis: 
(13) Appraisal =
 p
 ep( )
  
The appraisal ratio considers an active part of the portfolio’s risk which is the 
denominator in Equation (13). The active part depends on the manager’s ability to 
balance his active portfolio. The major difference from the alpha is that the ratio 
does not depend on security selection but also on the efficiency of the balance of 
the manager’s portfolio. Hereafter, the analysis of this chapter focuses mainly on 
the alpha of a hedge fund to undermine the underlying market-based risk factors 
of hedge fund performance. 
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2.2.1 From Sharpe’s Style Analysis to Hedge Fund Analysis 
The foundation of hedge fund analysis depends very much on the style analysis of 
mutual funds which is based on Ross’s (1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
This innovation leads motivates one to use more than one factor when evaluating 
the alpha and appraisal ratio of a fund. The APT assumes that stock returns are 
dependent on a set of factors which can be formally presented as:  
(14) Ri = E Ri( ) + bi1 f1 + bi2 f2 .....bin fn + ei  
where is the expected return of security i and defines the residual return 
of the security. The factors  have zero expected values as they measure sur-
prises. The model also involves assumptions that E ei( ) = 0and E ei,e j( ) = 0. Ver-
bally, this means that the expected residual has zero value and that the residuals 
for different securities are uncorrelated. If the conditions cannot be fulfilled, the 
APT does not fully work as the error term cannot be fully ignored through di-
versification and the analyst must not just merely focus on the systematic factors.  
In relevance for the analyses of active investment strategies, the APT is followed 
by the early foundation of mutual fund evaluation based on the following 
Sharpe’s (1992) asset allocation model: 
(15) Rp = bp1 f1 + bp2 f2.....bpn fn + ep ,  
where  defines a factor but can now be considered as an asset class re-
turn; defines the exposure of the portfolio of a fund manager to asset 
classes; defines the residual term, and defines the returns of the overall port-
folio of a fund manager. In Equation (15), the major difference from the previous 
equation is that the focus is the portfolio of stocks instead of an individual stock. 
Sharpe (1992) developed the asset class factor model presented to evaluate style 
of a mutual fund. This model assumes that the returns of a mutual fund are pro-
portional to the returns of standard asset classes or investment styles. It captures 
the fund’s exposure to the variation in the returns of the asset classes and different 
investment styles. Sharpe’s model describes the asset mix allocation style (strat-
egy) of the overall portfolio; a manager can choose asset classes and his/her port-
folios’ exposure to asset classes and investment styles. 
Style analysis is an important procedure when investing in hedge funds. Indeed, 
the style analysis can be a helpful tool when capturing important aspects of hedge 
funds, more specifically their underlying risk factors. However, the problem is 
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that there are no standard procedures for performing style analysis and the risk 
factors for the model must be chosen by the analyst.  
In their pioneering study of hedge fund risk characteristics, Fung and Hsieh 
(1997) applied Sharpe’s model to analyse hedge funds. Fung et al. (1997) analyse 
the returns of 409 hedge funds and 3,327 mutual funds with the following appli-
cation of Sharpe’s (1992) model: 
(16) Rp = p + bpn fn + up ,  
where defines the constant term which describes abnormal returns of the port-
folio of hedge funds or an individual hedge fund. Fung et al. (1997) re-
ferred bpn fn , as “style,” and as “skill.” Thus, it can be noticed that the 
concept of skill is closely related to the appraisal ratio (see Jensen 1967). Further, 
the authors argue that the “style” can be decomposed into two dimensions: loca-
tion and trading strategy. Location of the “style” is the set of assets, , chosen 
by a hedge fund. The trading strategy of the “style” is the way the assets are ap-
plied by hedge funds. Fung et al. (1997) relate the trading strategy to the quantity 
and direction of the application. 
Following Fung et al. (1997), manager’s “skill” can also be decomposed into two 
parts: “selectivity”, which is related to a manger’s ability to pick securities, and 
“market timing” which is related to a manager’s ability to predict the market. In 
their research context, Fung et al. assume that the selectivity may be assumed to 
consist of idiosyncratic risks while market timing consists of non-diversifiable 
and nonlinear payouts of asset returns contingent upon the trading strategy of a 
hedge fund.  
Fung et al. (1997) find that the returns of hedge funds and mutual funds are dra-
matically different. Specifically, the authors find the returns of hedge fund strate-
gies to be more dynamic than those of mutual funds and have low correlation to 
the standard asset indices. The regression analyses estimated using the application 
of Sharpe’s style analysis suggest that mutual fund returns are primarily generated 
from static asset mix decisions while hedge fund returns are primarily generated 
from managers’ skill. Therefore, the model has poor explanatory power for hedge 
funds versus mutual funds when static factors are used. For hedge funds, the au-
thors find five dominant styles estimated using Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA). The factors can be used in the analysis of hedge funds when the Sharpe’s 
model is applied.  
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Fung’s et al. (1997) application of the style analysis can provide a dynamic 
benchmark for the performance measurement of hedge fund returns. In conclu-
sion, the major contribution of Fung et al. (1997) is that they found how the tradi-
tional Sharpe’s style analysis does not work well with hedge funds and that the 
benchmark factors in the style analysis should be different and more dynamic 
than the factors of mutual fund returns. 
Following the APT by Ross (1976), it is important to note that the abnormal re-
turns measured as the constant term in Equation (16) can only be arbitrage if in-
vestors can fully diversify the idiosyncratic risk of a hedge fund, which is de-
scribed by the residual term in Equation (16). Thus, whenever a hedge fund man-
ager is performing actual arbitrage in its strict definition the variance of the error 
term should be diversifiable; arbitrage should truly be return with no risk. Thus, 
with more replication of hedge fund returns (i.e. explaining systematic risk), there 
is relatively less idiosyncratic risk whose relevance must be determined.  
The relevance of systematic risk in relation to idiosyncratic risk is also relevant in 
hedge fund research. Empirically, Tiu (2005) using a combined database of Alt-
vest, HFR and the TASS over the period 1994-2003 finds that hedge funds with 
lower systematic risk exposure perform better in relation to funds with higher 
systematic risk exposure.  
2.2.2 Market Neutrality of Hedge Funds 
An important issue related to hedge fund risk factors is their market neutrality. 
Some hedge funds are marketed as market neutral hedge funds, or they aim to 
follow the market neutral strategy. When a hedge fund claims that its returns are 
market neutral, the returns should not be exposed to the market returns. 
Capocci (2006) focuses on investigating the neutrality of market neutral hedge 
funds using both hedge fund indices and a sample of 634 individual hedge funds 
obtained from the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets 
(CIDSM) database over the period 1993–2002. His results suggest that most of 
the market neutral hedge funds are not significantly exposed to market returns. 
More specifically, those market neutral hedge funds which do not belong either to 
the deciles of the best and the worst performers are rather market neutral. Moreo-
ver, the results show evidence that market neutral hedge funds seem to be less 
market neutral during bear market than bull market. 
Patton (2007) proposes that the completeness of the market neutrality of a hedge 
fund can be decomposed into four different concepts: “mean neutrality”, “vari-
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ance neutrality”, “tail neutrality”, and “complete neutrality”. Here complete neu-
trality is that which corresponds to the strict market neutrality so that hedge fund 
returns are totally independent of market returns. Mean neutrality relates to the 
zero correlation between the returns of a hedge fund and the market returns. Vari-
ance and tail neutrality predicts that the risk of a hedge fund is neutral to market 
risks.  
Patton (2007) performs empirical tests for the neutrality of hedge funds which 
follow different strategies using a sample of 1,423 hedge funds obtained from the 
HFR and TASS databases from April 1993 to April 2003. His results indicate that 
one quarter of market neutral hedge funds exhibit non-neutrality while for those 
funds which are not declared as market neutral funds this ratio is 85 %. For the 
funds of hedge funds, approximately half of them show non-neutrality.  
In conclusion, even many market neutral hedge funds may be exposed to market 
returns. A further issue on the neutrality of hedge fund returns is to examine 
whether hedge fund returns are contagious to the market returns, in other words, 
extremely poor hedge fund returns incidences with extremely poor market re-
turns. The evidence for the contagion is mixed as Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz 
(2007) present evidence against contagion while Brown and Spitzer (2006) pre-
sent evidence for such contagion. 
2.2.3 Market Timing Ability and Conditional Performance of Hedge Funds 
The skill of a hedge fund may be a result of a manager’s market timing ability. 
Two popular and widely accepted market timing models are used in the perform-
ance measurement literature. The first model is that proposed by Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) which can be presented as a simple quadratic model and can be 
applied formally for an individual hedge fund as follows:  
(17) Rp  Rf = p +  Rm  Rf( ) +  Rm  Rf( )
2
+ ep .  
If the estimated regression slope is increasing against higher excess market return, 
specifically, , the results would imply that a hedge fund manager has mar-
ket-timing ability.  
The second popular market-timing model is that proposed by Henriksson and 
Merton (1981) which uses a piecewise linear relation but the basic idea is the 
same; test whether the regression slope is increasing. Yet the model imposes a 
threshold when estimating market timing ability, assuming that a skilled fund 
manager can on average weight more risk on his portfolio during a bull market. 
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The model of Henriksson et al. (1981) as applied to hedge funds can be presented 
formally as follows: 
(18) Rp  Rf = p +  Rm  Rf( ) +  Rm  Rf( )D+ ep ,  
where defines a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the excess market return is 
positive, , and otherwise zero. Analogously to the model by Treynor 
(1966), the results of the model suggest that a hedge fund manager has market-
timing ability when . The remaining now refers to stock the selection 
ability of the manager.  
In spite of the popularity of the models of Treynor et al. (1966) and Henriksson et 
al. (1981) the measurement of the market timing ability of hedge fund managers 
can be problematic and the results of the analyses should be interpreted with some 
caution. The study by Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) casts doubts on the abil-
ity to measure market timing ability when performing dynamic trading strategies. 
The authors show both empirically and theoretically that fund managers can show 
spurious market timing ability when investing in options or levered securities. 
Further, the authors argue that the spurious market timing ability is caused by 
negative correlation between these securities and measured selectivity and market 
timing ability of the other fund managers. 
The ability to time the market volatility by fund managers can also be tested in 
addition to testing the market timing. The fundamental model for testing market 
volatility timing is the model by Busse (1999). The volatility timing model can be 
presented as follows when applied for hedge funds3: 
(19) Rp  Rf = p +  Rm  Rf( ) +  Rm  Rf( ) m  m( ) + ep .  
Verbally, the model captures returns which are conditional on the deviations of 
the market volatility from its mean and exposure to these returns is defined by the 
coefficient . A reformulation of this model yields the following expression: 
(20) Rp  Rf = p +  +  m  m( )( ) Rm  Rf( ) + ep ,  
where  +  m  m( )( ) is the time-varying market beta when the timing of mar-
ket volatility is considered. Verbally, the market beta is expressed in Busse’s 
                                                
 
3  In his original model, Busse (1999) also uses lagged return to control for non-synchronous 
trading.  
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(1999) model as a linear function of the difference between market volatility and 
its mean. 
The exposures of hedge funds may also be conditional on the economic informa-
tion. Following the conditional asset pricing framework by Shanken (1990) and 
assuming a single risk factor (the market factor), a simple conditional perform-
ance measurement model applied for hedge funds can be presented formally as 
follows: 
(21) Rp,t  Rf ,t = p + 0 Rm,t  Rf ,t( ) + 1 Rm,t  Rf ,t( )Zt1 + ep,t   
where  defines the return of a hedge fund at time t;  defines the risk-free 
rate at time t;  defines the market return at time t;  defines the variable 
that describes conditioning information at time t, and  defines the residual re-
turn at time t. Equation (10) can be reformulated to the following form: 
(22) Rp,t  Rf ,t = + 0 + 1Zt1( ) Rm,t  Rf ,t( ) + ept ,  
where 0 + 1Zt1( )  denotes the time-varying market risk exposure of a hedge 
fund at time t. 
A well known conditional performance measurement model for mutual fund 
management is tested by Ferson and Schadt (1996). Their results suggest that 
conditioning on public information is important in the performance measurement 
of funds and can make the performance of mutual funds look better than what it 
actually is.  
In their empirical models, several studies on hedge funds account for time-
varying exposure of hedge funds conditional on economic information (see, e.g., 
Chen 2006; Chen and Liang 2007). Gregoriou’s (2004) study in turn suggests that 
the use of conditioning information is also important when analysing the funds of 
hedge funds.   
For the market-timing ability of hedge funds, Gregoriou, Rouah, and Sedzro 
(2002) argue that hedge funds generally do not aim at market timing ability be-
cause of their drive to produce absolute returns. The authors examine the market-
timing ability of hedge funds using a sample of 1,494 live and dead offshore 
hedge funds (from the U.S. investors’ viewpoint) over the period 1990-2000. The 
results suggest that hedge fund managers have rather poor market-timing skills. 
Instead, the managers seem to have good security selection skills. 
28      Acta Wasaensia 
Fung, Xu and Yau (2002) investigate the market timing ability of a hedge fund 
and focus on hedge funds which follow the Global/Macro strategy and focus on 
equity. Their sample includes 115 hedge funds over the period 1994-2000. The 
results are analogous to those of Gregoriou et al. (2002) and suggest that hedge 
fund managers have security selection skills rather than market-timing ability.  
Gregoriou (2004) investigates the market timing ability of funds of hedge funds 
using unconditional and conditional models. In his study, Gregoriou uses data of 
437 live and dead funds of hedge funds from January 1993 to December 2001 
obtained from the Zurich database. He finds that the fund of hedge fund managers 
do not show market timing ability after the use of conditional models accounting 
for time-varying exposure on economic information. 
Do, Faff and Wickramanayake (2005) focus on investigating Australian hedge 
fund managers. Their sample includes monthly returns for 71 hedge funds over 
the period 2000-2003. The empirical evidence suggests that the Australian hedge 
fund managers do not show any significant market timing ability. 
Chen et al. (2007) examine the market timing ability of hedge funds which pro-
claim themselves to be market-timing hedge funds. The sample of the study in-
cludes 221 market timing hedge funds obtained from the CIDSM, HFR, and 
TASS databases from January 1994 to June 2005. In contrast to the studies by 
Fung et al. (2002) and Gregoriou et al. (2002), the authors find evidence for mar-
ket timing-ability of hedge funds for portfolios of hedge funds and individual 
funds. The results also show that the timing ability is more pronounced during 
high market volatility and bear markets. The results are controlled for options use, 
conditioning information, and illiquid holdings.  
Chen et al. (2007) also propose a new model for the joint evaluation of timing 
market returns and market volatility. In the model by Chen et al. (2007), volatility 
and market return timing of a hedge fund are measured using the relation of its 
returns to the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. The model can be pre-
sented for a market model formally as follows: 
(23) Rp,t  Rf ,t = p + 0 Rm,t  Rf ,t( ) + 
Rm,t  Rf ,t
m,t St 1
 
 

 
 
 
	 
  
2
+ ep,t   
where m,t St1  defines the conditional standard deviation. Positive  would imply 
joint ability of a hedge fund to time market volatility and market return. 
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Chen (2006) investigates the market timing ability of hedge funds in their focus 
market by the applying the conditional multiple market framework of Treynor et 
al. (1966) and Henriksson-Merton (1981). Specifically, the timing ability of dif-
ferent hedge fund strategies is examined against the corresponding focus market. 
In this study, Chen uses the TASS database which includes 1,471 hedge funds 
from January 1994 to June 2005. The results suggest that hedge funds show better 
market timing ability than mutual funds. As an explanation for the nonlinear 
hedge fund characteristics found by Fung et al. (1997), Chen also argues that the 
market timing ability of a hedge fund is an important source of these characteris-
tics.  
2.2.4 Asset-Based Style Analysis and Trend-Following Strategies 
Since the study by Fund et al. (1997) many studies have proven nonlinear features 
in hedge fund returns. Fung et al. (2001) study dynamic trading strategies of 
hedge funds which follow trend-following strategies. Specifically, the returns of 
the trend-following strategies are modelled using lookback straddles. A long posi-
tion on lookback straddles provides right to purchase the underlying asset at the 
lowest price or to sell the underlying asset at the highest price. Accordingly, the 
theoretical framework of the return factors for trend-followers assumes that trend-
followers buy breakouts and sell breakdowns of the market. Thus, an optimal 
payout of the primitive trend-following strategy (PTFS), , which is the re-
turn of the perfect market timing strategy (PMTS), , can be characterized 
formally using the following equation: 
(24) RPMTS = Smax  Smin ,  
where defines the maximum return over the given time interval, and  
defines the minimum return over a given time interval.  is analogous to re-
turn of a perfect market timer, for which Merton (1981) shows that the market 
timer’s return, , in the absence of short sales constraints is the following: 
(25) RMT = R t( ) + Max 0,Z t( )  R t( )} + Max 0,R t( )  Z t( )}{{ ,  
where R t( )  defines the return of a portfolio of T-bills, and Z t( )  defines the return 
of a portfolio of stocks.  
Fung et al. (2001) estimate  using the returns on options. Following Gold-
man et al. (1979), the price of a lookback straddle is replicated dynamically by 
rolling standard straddles over the life of the option. The rolling process resem-
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bles buying the breakouts and selling the breakdowns, which corresponds to the 
assumption of Fung et al. (2001) of the risk characteristics of trend-followers. 
Thus, by rolling  the return series can be calculated by rolling option prices. 
As a practical matter, Fung et al. use three-month options given their high liquid-
ity. 
The empirical evidence of Fung et al. (2001) suggests that the return factors mod-
elled using lookback straddles explain the returns of trend-following hedge funds 
better than standard asset indices. The results also suggest that characteristics of 
the returns of the trend-following hedge funds resemble the returns of the con-
structed factors. 
2.2.5 Asset-Based Style Analysis for the Risk Arbitrage and Event-Driven 
Strategies 
While the trend-following strategy seems to be related to a long position in op-
tions, some other hedge fund strategies, in contrast, resemble rather short posi-
tions in options. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) investigate the risk in risk arbitrage 
using both the returns of hedge funds which follow risk arbitrage strategy and the 
returns of the portfolio constructed by the authors of merger deals resembling the 
returns of risk arbitrage. In their analyses, Mitchell et al. (2001) use data on 4,750 
mergers and the returns from 1963 until 1998 and the HFR merger arbitrage index 
from 1990 until 1998. 
The results of Mitchell et al. (2001) characterize the returns of risk arbitrage with 
a piecewise linear regression for which the results indicate that risk arbitrage re-
turns are positively related to the market returns during bear markets but that the 
relation is flat during bull markets. Accordingly, the authors relate risk arbitrage 
returns to those of the short put option for the market index. Interestingly, while 
hedge funds may be considered as “zero-beta like” investments (see Fung et al. 
2000b), the study by Mitchell et al. (2001) actually shows evidence that the “zero-
beta” characteristic holds rather during bull market conditions.  
Anson and Ho (2003) refer to the event-driven and merger arbitrage strategies as 
short volatility strategies. The authors also consider merger arbitrage hedge funds 
as merger insurance agents as they take the risk that a merger will fail. The 
merger arbitrage funds collect the spread between the bid price and market price 
after the merger announcement which should converge to one price once the 
merger is completed. However, the underlying risk persists that the merger will 
fail and the merger arbitrage fund is exposed to a “volatility event” causing merg-
ers likely to fail.  
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Anson et al. (2003) also relate the event-driven funds to the same risk characteris-
tics as merger arbitrage funds as they invest in the same type of special corporate 
situations as merger arbitrage funds. The returns of both these strategies resemble 
short put options for the market index. The empirical evidence of Anson et al. 
confirms these expectations. 
2.2.6 Asset-Based Style Analysis and the Fixed-Income Strategies 
For fixed-income hedge fund strategies, Fung and Hsieh (2002c) propose the use 
of credit spread as a risk factor which relates the risk in fixed-income hedge funds 
to the risk of convergence trading using fixed-income instruments. Similar to the 
risk characteristics of the risk arbitrage, a fixed-income hedge fund may take a 
position for two closely related fixed-income instruments which they expect to 
converge sooner or later.  
In their empirical analysis, Fung et al. (2002c) use the HFR indices. The different 
fixed-income indices which they examine are the style indices for convertible 
bonds, high yield bonds, mortgage backed securities, arbitrage, and diversified 
styles. The authors argue that most fixed-income funds are especially vulnerable 
to large jumps in credit spreads. All in all, the study suggests that fixed-income 
hedge funds are exposed to convertible/Treasury spread, high yield/Treasury 
spread, mortgage/Treasury spread, and emerging market bond/Treasury spread. 
Moreover, the results of the study suggest that fixed-income hedge funds are not 
likely to engage convergence trading. 
2.2.7 Asset-Based Style Analysis and the Equity Long/Short Strategy 
For the equity long/short strategy, Fung and Hsieh (2004a) identify two main 
sources of the alpha of the strategy: conventional and hedge fund-like risk factors. 
Fung et al. also argue that the primary risk factor of this strategy, which is a hedge 
fund-like risk factor, is the return difference between small and large capitalized 
stocks. This risk characteristic is similar to the study by Mitchel et al. (2001) 
which also suggests that the returns on risk arbitrage are positively exposed to this 
risk factor (specifically Fama’s and French’s 1993 SMB factor). However, Fung 
et al. (2004a) do not find evidence for the market timing ability of the equity 
long/short strategy.   
The primary conventional factor for the equity long/short strategy according to 
Fung et al. (2004b) is the market return factor. The evidence also suggests that fat 
tailed returns of the equity long/short strategy are associated with the exposure of 
32      Acta Wasaensia 
this strategy to the return difference between small and large capitalized stocks. In 
their study, Fung et al. (2004b) consider the generalized autoregressive het-
eroskedasticity (GARCH) model to account for conditional heteroskedasticity in 
hedge fund returns. Specifically, they use successfully the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) 
model to capture serial correlated and fat-tailed returns of the strategy. 
Kuenzi and Shi (2007) advocate the use of volatility factors in the ABS analyses 
of hedge funds not previously stressed in the ABS analysis by Fung et al. (2004b). 
Admittedly, the study of Agarwal et al. (2004) considers volatility risk as they 
explain hedge fund returns using option prices which include a volatility compo-
nent. But Kuenzi et al. use four different approaches to capture the volatility risk 
exposure of equity-based hedge funds: 
• At-the-money call and put options on the S&P 500 index. 
• The straddle, which is the combination of at-the-money call and put op-
tions on the S&P 500 index. 
• Variance swaps. 
• VIX futures and gamma derivatives. 
In their empirical analyses Kuenzi et al. (2007) use data of hedge funds which 
follow the equity hedge, equity market neutral, and equity non-hedge strategies. 
The data is obtained from the HFR database from June 2002 to December 2005. 
The results by Kuenzi et al. suggest that volatility factors are important in ex-
plaining the returns of equity-based hedge fund strategies. The authors state that 
the choice of volatility factors does not actually matter in explaining the returns 
but for risk management purposes exchange traded instruments may be prefer-
able. 
2.2.8 Asset-Based Style Factors and Diversified Portfolios of Hedge Funds 
The risk factors for hedge funds proposed in the studies by Fung et al. (2001), 
Mitchel et al. (2001), Fung et al. (2002c), Anson et al. (2003), and Fung et al. 
(2004a) are referred to as the ABS factors of hedge fund returns (see, e.g., Fung et 
al. 2002b). Following Fung et al. (2002a) the ABS factors are important because 
they provide a reasonable link between the observed market prices and the returns 
of hedge fund strategies. Hence, as Fung et al. (1997) distinguish different factors 
(principal components) from raw hedge fund returns, the ABS factors can be used 
to analyse the source of hedge fund returns.  
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Fung et al. (2004b) use the seven factor ABS model to explain hedge fund index 
returns. Specifically, the model examined includes the factors for the returns of 
the S&P 500 index, return difference between small (the Wilshire Small Cap 
1750 Index) and large capitalized stocks (the Wilshire Large Cap 750 index), 
change in credit spread (Moody’s Investor Service Baa bonds – the yield on con-
stant-maturity T-bond), end of the month difference of the yield on constant-
maturity T-bond, and the PTFS factors for bonds, currency and commodities.  
Fung et al. (2004b) show evidence that the ABS factors can explain up to 80 per-
cent of monthly return volatility of well diversified hedge fund portfolios. Thus, 
the examined factor model can be considered as well performing and sound 
benchmark for the returns of the broad hedge fund universe. However, Fung et al. 
(2004b) still list the following limitations for their ABS model: 
1. Uniqueness of the ABS factors: other, theoretically sounder, factors could 
also be considered. 
2. Capability to explain the returns of niche hedge fund strategies: the ABS 
factors which explain well the returns of broad asset indices may not per-
form well with all hedge fund portfolios when approaching the individual 
fund level. 
The ABS model proposed by Fung et al. (2004b) is related to the APT theory of 
Ross (1976) as the returns of the portfolio of a hedge fund are replicated using 
other assets with dynamic risk factor coefficients. Thus, when assuming only one 
factor (for simplicity), the return of a hedge fund using the ABS based modeling 
can be presented formally using the following expression: 
(26) Rp = E Ri( ) +  p fABS + ei ,  
where defines the return of a hedge fund; defines the deviation of an ABS 
factor from its expected value, and is the idiosyncratic component of the return 
on a hedge fund. Thus, it can be seen in Equation (26) that the return of a hedge 
fund consists of three different components: the expected return on a hedge fund, 
deviation of an ABS factor from its expected value, and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent which is related to either the assets possessed by the hedge fund or the strat-
egy of the hedge fund.  
The return variance of a hedge fund can be explained by idiosyncratic risk and 
systematic risk as follows: 
(27) Var Rp( ) = p2Var fABS( ) +Var ep( ) ,  
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where Var fABS( ) defines the variance of the ABS factor, and Var ep( ) defines the 
idiosyncratic variance of the returns of a hedge fund. 
2.2.9 Option-Like Factors of Hedge Fund Returns 
Agarwal and Naik (2004), following the studies of Fung et al. (2001), Mitchel et 
al. (2001), and Anson et al. (2003) advocate the consideration of option-like fea-
tures of hedge funds. Agarwal et al. propose the use of buy-and-hold and option-
based strategies to explain the returns of hedge funds. The option-based risk fac-
tors which they use are the S&P 500 at-the-money and out-of-the-money call, 
S&P 500 at-the-money and out-of-the-money put options. 
In their empirical analysis, Agarwal et al. (2004) use the HFR return indices from 
January 1990 to June 2000 but also ensure the robustness of their findings using 
the Credit Suisse First Boston/Tremont (CSFB) hedge fund indices from January 
1994 to June 2000. The study follows the theoretical framework of the contingent 
claim-based specification by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) which is the follow-
ing: 
(28) Rp = + b1Rm + b2 max Rm  k1,0( ) + b3 max Rm  k2,0( )   
 +b4 max Rm  k3,0( ) +  , 
where  defines the delivery price of an option. Agarwal et al. (2004) modify 
the framework of Glosten et al. (1994) and construct a piecewise linear model 
which empirically employs both put and call options. Their model is formally the 
following: 
(29) Rp = + b1Rm + b2 max Rm  k1,0( ) + b3 max Rm  k2,0( )   
 +b4 max k1  Rm,0( ) + b5 max k3  Rm( ) +  , 
where the coefficients and capture the exposure of hedge fund returns on call 
options and   capture the exposure of hedge fund returns to put options. 
While the ABS analysis is based on the APT, the model of Agarwal et al. (2004) 
relates their asymmetric model for hedge fund analysis to the use of higher mo-
ments in the asset pricing. What their model, in fact, does is that to account for 
co-skewness of the returns of the security with the market returns which can be 
motivated by the asset pricing model of Harvey and Siddique (2000). Thus, ap-
proach of Agarwal et al. (2004) to hedge fund analysis is slightly different than 
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that of the ABS analysis (see, e.g., Fung et al. 2004b) from theoretical perspec-
tive. 
The intuitive idea of the model of Harvey et al. (2000) is that if asset returns have 
systematic skewness, it should result in higher expected return as a compensation 
for this additional risk. In theory, utility maximizing investors should dislike low-
er skewness and higher kurtosis of the return distribution of asset returns (see 
Arditti 1967; Kraus et al. 1976; Scott et al. 1980). Formally, Harvey’s et al. 
(2000) asset pricing model, which assumes that the stochastic discount factor is 
quadratic in the market return, is the following: 
(30) mt+1 = at + btRm,t+1 + ctRm,t+1
2 ,  
where  defines the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which prices all assets, 
and defines the market return. The expression for the risk premium is the 
following when the existence of a conditional risk-free asset is assumed: 
(31) E Ri,t+1[ ] = 1,tCovt Ri,t+1,Rm,t+1[ ] + 2,tCovt Ri,t+1,Rm,t+12[ ] .  
In this model,  and  should be the same for all assets. They can also be 
further defined as: 
(32) 1,t =
Vart Rm,t+1
2[ ]Et Rm,t+1[ ]  Skewt Rm,t+1[ ]Et Rm,t+12[ ]
Vart Rm,t+1[ ]Vart Rm,t+1
2[ ]  Skewt Rm,t+1[ ]( )
2  and  
(33) 2,t =
Vart Rm,t+1[ ]Et Rm,t+12[ ]  Skewt Rm,t+1[ ]Et Rm,t+1[ ]
Vart Rm,t+1[ ]Vart Rm,t+1
2[ ]  Skewt Rm,t+1[ ]( )
2 .  
Finally, Equation (31) can be rewritten as follows: 
(34) E Ri,t+1[ ] = AtEt Rm,t+1[ ] + BtEt Rm,t+1
2[ ],  
where  and  define the functions of variance, skewness, co-variance, and co-
skewness. This characterization implies that the expected returns on hedge funds 
can be explained as a function of market return and squared market return. 
Following the logic of the priced co-skewness in asset returns, the results of the 
study by Agarwal et al. (2004) suggest that the option-like risk factors are impor-
tant in explaining the returns of equity-based hedge fund strategies. These strate-
gies are found to be associated with simple strategies for writing options. 
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The study by Agarwal et al. (2004) also replicates hedge fund returns for the time 
period 1927–1989 using their systematic risk exposure and find that the time pe-
riod for which hedge fund return indices are available may not be representative 
of their long-run performance. In conclusion, the study casts doubts that the hedge 
fund industry has grown during exceptionally convenient economic and financial 
market conditions.  
2.2.10 Alternative Benchmarks for the Evaluation of Hedge Funds 
One solution for the analysis of individual hedge funds would be to use hedge 
fund strategy indices as their benchmarks. However, these benchmarks are subject 
to numerous biases. Consequently, Fung and Hsieh (2002b) advocate the use of 
fund of hedge fund returns as hedge fund benchmarks to overcome these limita-
tions of hedge fund strategy indices. The results of the study show that the survi-
vorship and backfill biases are smaller among funds of hedge funds than individ-
ual hedge funds. Further, the use of funds of hedge funds as performance bench-
marks can extract the backfill bias among individual funds. This advantage occurs 
simply because funds of hedge funds include only the return history of a hedge 
fund for their investment period. Fung et al. (2002b) relate the use of fund of 
hedge fund benchmarks to investor experience of hedge fund investors. Accord-
ingly, they should serve as a better benchmark for the market portfolio of hedge 
funds.  
Fung et al. (2004b) state that the ABS factors are free of all biases related to 
hedge fund databases, unlike hedge fund indices, as they are observable from 
market prices. Hence, these biases still limit the use of fund of hedge funds and 
hedge fund strategy indices as benchmarks for the evaluation of hedge funds. In 
conclusion, this advantage of market-based hedge fund risk factors may be gener-
alized to other possible risk factors observed in market prices. 
Fama’s and French’s (1993) factors for high minus low book-to-value (HML) 
firms and small minus big firms (SMB), and Carhart’s (1997) momentum return 
factors (UMD) are also applied to the analysis of hedge funds. For instance, Ca-
pocci et al. (2004) use these factors in their analysis of hedge fund performance. 
The authors also examine the ability of the international model which includes an 
international factor for book-to-market equity ratio. 
The sample of the study by Capocci et al. (2004) includes 2,796 hedge funds ob-
tained from the MAR and HFR databases. The data history for the funds starts in 
January 1986 and ends in June 2000. However, the authors build their conclusions 
only for the post 1993 period as survivorship and backfill biases may decrease the 
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statistical reliability of the results. The results of the study suggest that the SMB, 
HML, and UMD factors explain hedge fund returns well. The study also finds 
that a significant proportion of hedge funds are exposed to the returns of emerg-
ing market bonds. Specifically, these factor exposures found by Capocci’s et al. 
(2004) reveal that the best performing hedge funds follow momentum strategies 
and prefer to invest in low book-to-market value companies. Also, the best per-
forming funds do not invest significantly in the emerging market bonds. The 
worst performing funds, in turn, invest significantly in emerging market bonds, 
prefer low book-to-market value firms, and are momentum contrarians. 
One solution to capture the nonlinear characteristics of hedge funds (see, e.g., 
Fung et al. 1997) is to use higher moment market models. In their study, Ranaldo 
and Favre (2005) advocate the use of these models to capture co-skewness and 
co-kurtosis between hedge fund returns and the market returns. The authors esti-
mate both the three moment CAPM and four moment CAPM, which involve es-
timating the exposure of hedge fund returns to market returns using quadratic and 
cubic market models. The estimated quadratic market model is the following: 
(35) Rp,t  Rf ,t = + b1 Rm,t  Rf ,t( ) + b2 Rm,t  R m,t( )
2
+ et   
where  defines the average of market returns. In this model, accounts for 
co-skewness between hedge fund returns and market returns. The idea of this 
model is similar to that of Agarwal et al. (2004). But the key difference is that 
Agarwal et al. (2004) use option data to capture nonlinear characteristics of hedge 
funds while Ranaldo et al. (2005) use an estimation approach which can account 
for the nonlinearities.  
The quadratic model does not yet account for co-kurtosis of hedge fund returns 
and market returns, and therefore a cubic market model must be used for that pur-
pose. The estimated cubic market model by Ranaldo et al. (2005) is the following: 
(36) Rp,t  Rf ,t = 
 + b1 Rm,t  Rf ,t( ) + b2 Rm,t  R m,t( )
2
+ b3 Rm,t  R m,t( )
3
+ et . 
In this quadratic model, now accounts for co-kurtosis between hedge fund re-
turns and market returns. Ranaldo et al. (2005) use hedge fund strategy indices 
obtained from the HFR database over the period January 1990 – August 2002. 
Their results for the quadratic and cubic market models estimated suggest that 
different hedge fund strategies show different risk characteristics. The results also 
show evidence that co-skewness and co-kurtosis are important drivers of hedge 
38      Acta Wasaensia 
fund returns. Thus, the quadratic and cubic market models examined by Ranaldo 
et al. can be considered suitable tools for hedge fund analysis. 
2.3 Factors Related to Individual Funds 
After the literature analyses of performance and risk measurement it is reasonable 
to continue to review the literature on individual hedge fund characteristics which 
can be important factors of performance and risk of a hedge fund. These factors, 
which are also named “microeconomic” determinants of hedge fund performance 
by Schneeweis et al. (2005), may also indicate information of the underlying 
market-based risk factors, trading strategies, and quality of hedge funds. In prac-
tice, the information of hedge fund characteristics and their relation to the per-
formance can be important information for hedge fund investors as the time-series 
data for hedge funds may be limited. Accordingly, individual fund characteristics 
can be important indicators of hedge fund risk.  
2.3.1 Hedge Fund Size 
The size of a hedge fund may be considered as an indicator of its evolution and 
sophistication. The results of related studies, however, are somewhat contradic-
tive. Liang (1999), Edwards and Gaglayan (2001) reported that the size of a 
hedge fund is positively related to its performance. They also find that the relation 
is rather concave such that an increase in the size of a large hedge fund does not 
increase the performance as much as for the smaller hedge funds. Amenc and 
Martellini (2003) investigate the performance of hedge funds and their size using 
the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) data-
base. Their sample of hedge funds consists of 581 hedge funds. By dividing 
hedge funds into large and small sub-groups, Amenc et al. (2003) find that larger 
hedge funds outperform the smaller ones in terms of the abnormal returns esti-
mated using different factor models. 
Herzberg and Mozes (2003) show evidence contradictory to that of Liang (1999), 
Edwards et al. (2001), and Amenc et al. (2003). That is, smaller hedge funds out-
perform larger ones. Gregoriou and Rouah (2003), instead, do not find evidence 
for a size-performance-relation for hedge funds but their sample includes only 
276 hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. Hedges (2004) reports that mid-sized 
hedge funds are the poorest performers, and smaller hedge funds outperform larg-
er ones. 
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Ammann and Moerth (2005) investigate the impact of hedge fund sizes in relation 
to fund returns, standard deviations, Sharpe ratios and alphas extracted form an 
empirical factor model. The authors use the TASS database and include both live 
and dead databases of both hedge funds and Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA) 
which all together include 5,707 hedge funds. The authors find a negative size-
return relation. Larger hedge funds have lower volatilities, but Sharpe ratios simi-
lar to those of smaller ones since smaller hedge funds are able to produce better 
returns. Smaller hedge funds are also able to produce higher alphas on average. 
Further, very small funds produce weaker returns, seemingly, due to their higher 
expense ratios. 
Getmansky (2005) investigates the life cycle, size and age of a hedge fund. She 
also uses the TASS database and a sample of 3,928 hedge funds from both live 
and dead databases. She finds a concave relation between current returns of a 
hedge fund and its past size. The relation between the volatility of the return of a 
hedge fund and its size, instead, is found to be convex. But her results also sug-
gest that for different hedge fund strategies the size-asset relation assumes differ-
ent functional forms. Specifically, the relation is concave for the emerging market 
and convertible arbitrage strategies.  
The results of Getmansky (2005) also suggest that it is possible to find an optimal 
asset size for hedge funds by optimizing returns, especially for hedge funds which 
follow the emerging market and convertible arbitrage strategies. As a result, 
hedge fund investors should focus on the optimal size of a hedge fund in these 
strategy categories.  
In her recent study, Jones (2007) classifies hedge funds into three different size 
groups: small, medium and large. She uses a single combined database of Hedge 
Fund Research, HedgeFund.net, Altvest from InvestorForce and Barclays Global 
Hedge Source databases. The results suggest that, in order to maximize returns, 
investors should rather invest in smaller hedge funds to achieve better perform-
ance. 
Gupta and Liang (2005) investigate the capital adequacy of hedge funds and con-
sider fund size and age. These authors also use the TASS database. By using risk 
measures such as VaR and Expected Shortfall (ES), they show that nearly all un-
der-capitalized hedge funds are small sized. This implies that small hedge funds 
take risks more actively and with higher leverage. 
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2.3.2 Hedge Fund Age 
Beside the size of a hedge fund, its age can be another important factor to de-
scribe the evolution and sophistication. Liang (1999) finds evidence that the age 
of a hedge fund is negatively related to its performance. Gupta et al. (2005) find 
that the age of a hedge fund is negatively related to the capitalization of a fund. 
Thus, older hedge funds are more likely to be undercapitalized. In addition to the 
analysis of the relation of the size of a hedge fund and its performance, Jones 
(2007) classifies hedge funds into three different age groups: young, middle-aged, 
and older funds. The results suggest that, in order to maximize returns, investors 
should invest in younger hedge funds in addition to smaller funds. Aggarwal and 
Jorion (2008) report similar evidence to Jones (2007). The authors find that 
emerging hedge fund managers defined as having a maximum life of two years 
outperform mature ones. The abnormal return for emerging hedge fund managers 
is found to be 2.3 %. 
As the age of a hedge fund may be an important factor of hedge fund perform-
ance, similarly, there may be factors which affect the age of a hedge fund, more 
specifically, its survival time. One considerable factor of fund survival is natu-
rally its size; small hedge funds may not have adequate capital resources and may 
be more sensitive than big hedge funds to quit their action (see Gupta et al. 2005). 
Consequently, hedge fund age is endogenous in explaining hedge fund perform-
ance, as many other factors have an impact on it, which, indeed, can be very 
much the problem with hedge fund size. Therefore, one should always treat re-
sults related to hedge fund age with caution. 
The research offers many other factors than size which influence hedge fund age. 
Liang (2000) finds that poor performance is the main reason for a hedge fund 
being dissolved from the database, and thus poor performance should be an im-
portant factor of fund survival. In his analysis, Liang (2000) uses a sample com-
bined from HFR and the TASS databases. 
Amin and Kat (2002) study hedge fund attrition and survival using the TASS da-
tabase consisting of 2,183 live and dead hedge funds over the period 1994-2001. 
The analyses of the authors suggest that lack of size, and lack of performance 
associated with shorter survival of a hedge fund. For these factors, size and per-
formance seem to be the most important in explaining shorter survival of a hedge 
fund. 
Boyson (2002) shows even further evidence that size has a marked effect on sur-
vival so that smaller hedge funds die younger than larger ones. To conclude, in 
order that a hedge fund can survive longer, the manager should perform well 
 Acta Wasaensia     41 
  
enough to be able to increase its capital to a required level. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence of Baquero and Verbeek (2005) suggests that investors promptly with-
draw their money from low quality funds. 
Baquero, der Horst and Verbeek (2005) suggest that hedge fund attrition is driven 
by poor past performance in line with Liang (2000). Getmansky (2005) also sug-
gests that stiff competition among hedge funds in the same category increases the 
liquidation probability of a hedge fund. Thus, according to Getmansky (2005), 
competition among hedge funds in the same category may decrease their survival 
time when investors chase returns from the hedge funds and weakly performing 
funds are liquidated. Moreover, as the size of a hedge fund has a positive impact 
on the performance of a hedge fund in the study, the size also affects the survival 
time of a hedge fund through its impact on the returns.  
2.3.3 Leverage Use 
In fund management, leverage may be used to increase the risk of a fund. Rubin, 
Greenspan, Levitt and Born (1999:4) propose two possible ways to define lever-
age: first, if leverage is defined in balance-sheet terms, the leverage is the ratio of 
that to the net worth. Second, if leverage is defined in terms of risk, it is the eco-
nomic risk of a fund related to its capital. There are various ways to obtain eco-
nomic value, for example: repurchase agreements, short positions, and derivative 
contracts. 
Leverage, however, is not exactly the same as risk. Breuer (2002) provides an 
illustration for the distinction between leverage and risk. Following Breuer 
(2002), the risk for equity has two components: the market risk on the invested 
assets, and the leverage ratio which transforms the market risk to the equity posi-
tion. These components could be interpreted as the risk of the positions of hedge 
funds (by the present author): the risk of the underlying assets of a hedge fund, 
and the leverage ratio which transforms this risk of the assets to the position of a 
hedge fund manager. Following the analogy of Bauer (2002), the conventional 
presentation of leverage, , when applied to hedge funds, is the elasticity of the 
value of assets, , to the value of the assets, , which can be presented formally 
as:  
(37) L =
dE
E
A
dA
=
A
E
 for   E  0.  
Leverage can also be defined in multiple ways. Schneeweis et al. (2005) present 
three different ways in which the leverage can be presented: 
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1. Gross Leverage = (Longs + Shorts)/Net Asset Value. 
2. Net Leverage = (Longs – Shorts)/Net Asset Value. 
3. Gross Longs = (Longs)/Net Asset Value. 
The use of leverage is important when focusing on hedge funds as they tend to 
take leveraged and risky positions, which may lead to determination in extreme 
market conditions. Specifically, some empirical studies suggest that heavy use of 
leverage leads to a shorter life-cycle (Liang 2000; Baquero et al. 2002). However, 
an interesting contradiction arises from the results of Schneeweis et al. (2005), 
who suggest that those hedge fund strategies which have low risk use higher lev-
erage. By using data from the CIDSM and TASS databases over the period Janu-
ary 2000 – March 2003, the authors also find no statistically significant relation 
between the amount of leverage used by a hedge fund and its performance. 
Leverage may also be seen as a sign of quality. In corporate finance theory, Ross 
(1977) advocates the use of debt as a sign of the quality of the manager of a firm. 
The idea of the Ross’s model is that entering financial distress is costly for man-
agers but better firms are less likely to enter financial distress than other firms. 
Thus, the better firms can take more leverage. For example, for the costs of the 
financial distress of a hedge fund, a fund manager in the hedge fund industry may 
experience a loss of reputation if his hedge fund fails. Social reputation may be 
important for hedge funds as they are rather marketed for a smaller group of in-
vestors when compared to traditional mutual funds. Indeed, Isa and Ameer (2007) 
present evidence that social networks are important to attract wealthy investors 
for their funds.   
In conclusion, the predictions of Ross’s (1977) model can be applied to hedge 
fund managers at least to some extent and they may give some explanations why 
Schneeweis et al. (2005) find a negative relation between the leverage of a hedge 
fund and its risk. Yet, extremely high leverage may not be advantageous, as Gre-
goriou (2005) reports evidence that those event-driven hedge funds which take 
lower leverage tend to survive longer than highly leveraged event-driven funds. 
2.3.4 Management Fees and Performance Compensation 
In the investment management industry, incentive fees should in theory align the 
interests of fund managers to those of the investors according to the theoretical 
framework by Ross (1973) and Holmström (1979). Intuitively, option-like (long 
call) incentive contracts pays more for managers when the returns of the underly-
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ing assets are high and fund managers would have reason to make major efforts to 
reach high payoff. 
Instead of safeguarding investors’ interests, the option-like incentive fee may also 
lead to higher risk taking as the manager is not penalized for extremely low in-
comes due to long position in an option. Carpenter (2000) particularly shows that 
under an option-like incentive fee structure and manager’s optimal policy, the 
compensation options ends up either deep in-the-money or deep out-of-the-
money. And consistently, the volatility of the underlying asset goes to infinity 
when the value of the underlying asset goes to zero. 
The empirical study by Ackermann,  McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) investi-
gates the impact of incentive fees on hedge fund performance. The authors use 
data on 923 hedge funds obtained from the Managed Accounts Reports (MAR) 
and HFR databases over the period 1988-1995. The results of the study suggest 
that incentive fee is the most significant determinant of risk adjusted returns of 
hedge funds. Thus, incentive fee seem to be an important motivator for a hedge 
fund to be aligned to the interests of the investors. However, the study does not 
find strong evidence for the relation between the incentive fees of a hedge fund 
and its risk in contrast to the implications of Carpenter (2000). Ackermann et al. 
(1999) even find that the relation between the risk and incentive fees is negative, 
which is the opposite to the expected but not statistically significant. 
The results of Liang (1999) continue to advocate the importance of incentive fees 
of a hedge fund for its performance. He uses data on 385 hedge funds obtained 
from the HFR database over the period 1992-1996. Liang finds that incentive fees 
are positively related to the average returns of a hedge fund. However, in a recent 
study, Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009) do not find evidence that the incentive 
fee percentage itself explains a hedge fund performance. They rather emphasize 
managerial incentives including delta of option-like incentive contracts, manager-
ial ownership, and high watermark provision.  
For the management fees, the results of Kouwenberg et al. (2007) suggest that the 
management fees charged by a hedge fund are negatively related to its net-of-fees 
average returns and positively related to its risk. Thus, the results of the study also 
show evidence that higher management fees result in lower performance. How-
ever, the results of Agarwal et al. (2009) do not support the evidence of Kouwen-
berg et al. (2007) regarding the importance of management fees in explaining 
hedge fund performance. 
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2.3.5 Risk Gaming Behaviour and Option-Like Performance Compensation 
Individual managerial behaviour in hedge funds may also make the risk in hedge 
funds time-varying as an effect of behaviour caused by the pursuit of target incen-
tive fees by a hedge fund manager. This fund managers’ behaviour to shift risk 
depending upon their performances is named as risk gaming (see Chen 2009). 
The lack of transparency in hedge funds and their loose regulation leaves ample 
scope for risk gaming, which can be considered speculative risk shifting deci-
sions. Managerial compensation may also be a considerable component of risk 
gaming behaviour. 
Risk gaming in the mutual fund industry is traditionally linked to both incentive 
fees and competition among mutual fund managers. For incentive based risk gam-
ing, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) suggest that a fund manager prefers to leverage 
his positions to maximize compensation if his incentive fee can be hedged. For 
competition between mutual fund managers, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) 
suggest that when compensation of fund managers is linked to their relative per-
formance, underperformers tend to increase their risk.  
However, a fund manager may not be able to hedge his incentive fee over short 
horizons. Carpenter (2000) aims to solve the portfolio optimization problem of a 
fund manager when manager’s incentive fee cannot be hedged and assuming the 
manager to be risk averse. As already stated, the study suggests that under the 
fund manager’s optimal policy, the fund manager’s option should end up either 
deep in or deep out-of-the money, which relates to speculation. 
Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) investigate the risk of hedge funds and 
commodity trading advisors (CTA), and focus on managerial career concerns, and 
survival of hedge funds. In their study, they use the TASS database over the pe-
riod 1989-1998. The role of managerial career concerns in the mutual fund indus-
try is advocated by Chevalier and Ellison (1997). The results by Brown et al. 
(2001) showed evidence that poor performance in the first half of the year drives 
managers to increase the volatility of their portfolios. Conversely, good perform-
ance drives them to reduce volatility. The study of Brown et al. (2001) suggests 
that hedge fund managers’ risk choice is rather dependent on their relative per-
formance than the moneyness of their option-like incentive contracts. The authors 
relate this finding to managerial career concerns.  
Many hedge funds also use high watermarks. High watermarks are based on a 
hurdle rate of return which must be exceeded in order to collect performance fees. 
If the watermark is not exceeded, the returns below a certain requirement will be 
accounted and they reduce the future performance fees until the cumulative per-
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formance loss is exceeded. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) show that in-
centive fees are important for hedge funds but the high watermark contracts limit 
the value of incentive fees. Also, as high watermark contracts together with incen-
tive fee compensation form an option-like performance compensation structure, 
the manager has an incentive to increase risk when the returns fall below the wa-
termark. Thus, the characteristics of the incentive contract and high watermark of 
a hedge fund, in theory, can lead to risk gaming behaviour of a hedge fund. 
Chen (2009) finds evidence that hedge funds with poor relative performance dur-
ing the first half of the year tend to increase their risk during the second half of 
the year. In contrast to Brown et al. (2001), hedge fund managers’ risk choice is 
also found to be altered by the moneyness of their option-like incentive contracts. 
Moreover, the results of Chen (2009) suggest that past fund inflows are associated 
with lower future volatility, and that hedge fund managers who use derivatives 
engage less in risk gaming.  
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) show further evidence on the relationship between 
managers’ behaviour and hedge fund risk. They paid attention to the fact that 
managers’ compensation may potentially include both a proportional management 
fee and an incentive fee based on the return exceeding the high watermark. Their 
results suggest that the closer the value of a hedge fund is to its liquidation bar-
rier, the more likely is the manager to be willing to take risk. This result is also 
consistent with Goetzmann et al. (2003). 
Following Hodder et al. (2007), if a high watermark has been achieved, a man-
ager lowers risk taking and adopts a lock-in strategy to ensure his/her earnings. 
Thus, incentive fee contracts and high watermarks can also become a burden for 
investors. Admittedly, the analyses by Liang (2001) gives some evidence that 
hedge funds may also change their fees as an effect of bad performance, and not 
only their risk exposures.  
Kouwenberg et al. (2007) further examine the link between incentive fees and 
risk taking among hedge funds and consider the option-like fee structure. They 
use the Zurich Hedge Fund Universe Database which offers a sample of 2,078 
hedge funds and a sample of 536 funds of hedge funds. The estimation period is 
from January 1995 to November 2000. The results of the study suggests that the 
use of incentive fees decreases net-of-fee returns of hedge funds but no significant 
relation between incentive fees and the standard deviation of the returns of a 
hedge fund. Interestingly, the evidence also suggests that the first downside mo-
ment of the returns of a hedge fund has a positive relation to incentive fees, which 
indicates that incentive fees are likely to increase downside risk. 
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For funds of hedge funds, Kouwenberg et al. (2007) find a positive relation be-
tween the incentive fees and net-of-fee returns of a fund. Moreover, the relation 
between standard deviation and incentive fee seem to be positive for these funds. 
All in all, the results by Kouwenberg et al. (2007) suggest that the risk adjusted 
performance of both hedge funds and funds of hedge funds is not found to be al-
tered by the use of incentive fees. Further, Agarwal et al. (2009) find that it is 
more specifically the delta of the option value of the compensation structure for 
the hedge fund manager which affects the performance of a hedge fund and not its 
incentive fee. Consequently, the latest research on the performance compensation 
for hedge fund management proposes that the performance compensation should 
be analysed as a whole option-like contract. 
2.3.6 Share restrictions 
Hedge funds often impose restrictions on investors’ ability to withdraw money 
from the fund. Considerable share restrictions include a redemption notice period, 
payout period, and lockup period. The TASS definitions for these characteristics 
are as follows4:  
• Redemption notice period: “how much notice has to be given to the fund 
before shares can be redeemed”; 
• Payout period: “Time period before an investor will receive cash back”; 
• Lockup period: “minimum period one has to be invested in the fund”. 
These characteristics can be considered as share restrictions limiting the liquidity 
of hedge fund investors as considered by Aragon (2007). 
Liang (1999) finds that the lockup period of a hedge fund is positively related to 
its returns. Agarwal et al. (2009) investigate the impact of return discretion of a 
hedge fund on its performance. The authors use lockup period and restriction pe-
riod as proxies for the return discretion. Restriction period used by Agarwal et al. 
(2009) is the sum of a redemption notice period and a lockup period. The authors 
use a comprehensive database which consists of four large hedge fund databases: 
CIDSM, HFR, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), and TASS over the 
period 1994-2002. The combined database includes information on 7,535 hedge 
                                                
 
4  These definitions are given in the Lipper TASS questionnaire: 
http://tass.lipperweb.com/LipperTASSQuestionnaire.xls 
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funds. The results suggest that longer lockup and restriction periods which are 
proxies for managerial discretion are associated with higher returns. Following 
Agarwal et al. (2009), the profitability of using share restrictions by hedge funds 
arises from their ability to be protected against noise trader risk. Thus, hedge 
funds may take on profitable arbitrage opportunities while its assets are protected. 
Aragon (2007) also analyses the relation between the imposed restriction of a 
hedge fund and its performance. He uses a dataset of 3,354 hedge funds obtained 
from the TASS database over the period 1994-2001. The results of the study show 
that compared to hedge funds which do not impose lockup periods, the abnormal 
returns of hedge funds which impose lockup period restrictions are much higher.  
Aragon (2007) also finds a negative relation between the liquidity of the portfolio 
of a hedge fund and the share restriction that it imposes. Thus, the returns gener-
ated by hedge funds which impose share restrictions may be substituted for higher 
illiquidity risk premium. Indeed, when the share restrictions are controlled in the 
performance analysis of hedge funds, hedge fund performance is much less attrac-
tive as the average alpha of the examined funds becomes negative. Consequently, 
the study by Aragon (2007) casts serious doubts on the skills and ability to per-
form arbitrage of hedge funds.  
It is also notable that the study by Agarwal et al. (2009) takes a different perspec-
tive from the study by Aragon (2007). The first mentioned study relates share 
restrictions to managerial discretion and emphasizes noise trader risk while the 
second mentioned study relates share restrictions to illiquidity risk. 
Gibson and Wang (2008) further investigate whether the hedge fund alphas of 
various hedge fund portfolio strategies reflect compensation for illiquidity risk. 
The authors find evidence using time-series analysis that the alphas are closely 
related to compensation for bearing illiquidity risk.  
2.3.7 Personal Capital of a Hedge Fund Manager  
A considerable indication of better quality of a firm which is closely related to the 
use of leverage by a manager is risk bearing, as shown by Leland and Pyle 
(1977). Analogous to the theory of leverage by Ross (1977), the larger stake of 
equity the manager holds, the more costly it is to him as the idiosyncratic risk 
arising from holding the stock. As such, the reward-to-risk ratio of the investment 
portfolio of the manager becomes less attractive. Thus, if the manager knows his 
type as a better manager, he will be willing to bear a larger stake of equity of the 
firm that he runs at the aggregate level. The prediction of the model of Leland et 
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al. (1977) could also be applied to hedge fund managers; the more a hedge fund 
manager is willing to invest in his own fund the more likely it is that the hedge 
fund is a good hedge fund which will show good performance in future. 
Personal capital invested in the own fund of a hedge fund manager, indeed, can be 
an important driver of investor aligned hedge fund management. Hodder et al. 
(2007) show that, when an option-like incentive structure is assumed, the man-
ager of a hedge fund tends to gamble more if his share holding in the fund is 
lower. Kouwenberg et al. (2007) also study how the personal capital invested by 
the manager of a hedge fund affects its risk. Their results show that the risk taking 
of the manager is significantly lower if the manager invests a significant amount 
of money in his own fund.  
For the link between performance and managerial ownership, Agarwal et al. 
(2009) find evidence that personal capital of the manager invested in his fund is 
associated with superior performance. In conclusion, personal capital of the fund 
manager invested in his hedge fund is a good indicator of hedge fund quality in 
theory (see Leland et al. 1977) as well as empirically (see Hodder et al. 2007; 
Kouwenberg et al. 2007; Agarwal et al. 2009).  
2.3.8 Other Managerial and Fund Characteristics and Hedge Fund 
Performance 
Boyson (2002) investigates the impact of managerial characteristics on hedge 
fund performance, volatility and survival. The data for the study is obtained from 
the TASS database over the period 1994-2000. The final sample used for the em-
pirical analysis includes 288 funds. The variables for manager’s skill, experience, 
and training are manager’s age, educational indicators, for example, Certified 
Financial Analyst (CFA), Master of Business Administration (MBA), profes-
sional experience, and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score. 
Boyson’s (2002) results suggest that managers with longer professional experi-
ence, lower level of education, and managers with MBAs have lower returns but 
once the returns are adjusted for risk the effect disappears. The results also sug-
gest that managers with more professional experience tend to take less risk and 
survive longer. 
Maxam et al. (2006) is the next study after Boyson (2002) to investigate manage-
rial characteristics and hedge fund performance. These authors use a unique sam-
ple of 147 hedge funds provided by a well known investment management firm 
over the period 1994-2004. Their results suggest that managers with degrees from 
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top universities are able to outperform other managers, while the managers with 
lower degrees in economics are underperformers. In addition, the impact of 
longer work experience on the performance of a hedge fund is not evident. Thus, 
the education of a hedge fund manager seems to remain the most important factor 
of managerial characteristics for hedge fund performance. 
2.3.9 Persistence of Hedge Fund Performance 
In order to find hedge fund managers with actual extraordinary performance, the 
performance of a manager must be sustained. The reason is that “beating” the 
market or the underlying indices for some time is possible even if the financial 
markets work perfectly according to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (see 
Fama 1970).  
To illustrate further the above prediction consider that a hedge fund manager may 
be lucky and guess the direction of the market. And when many hedge fund man-
agers, for example, 1,000 managers bet whether the market is either going down 
or up each with 50% probability, it is expected that 500 of them would guess the 
direction of the market correctly. Following this logic, some lucky hedge fund 
managers would be able to produce significant abnormal returns for a while. Be-
sides, this luckiness does not require that the assumptions of the EMH would be 
violated. Instead, it means that “beating” the market is spurious. As such, the ma-
jor point here for hedge fund investors is that they would not benefit from mo-
mentary abnormal returns of the lucky asset manager as his performance may not 
persist.  
The problem in which a hedge fund manager may show false performance as a 
result of manipulation is known as the “piggy-bag” problem after Foster and 
Young (2008). These authors show that a manager who actually is not able to 
show any abnormal performance can “game” to produce spurious performance if 
there is no penalty for underperformance.  
Following Foster et al. (2008), a hedge fund manager could be able to earn incen-
tive fees to which he is not entitled by gaming. As a result, many of the academic 
studies on hedge funds investigate the performance persistent of hedge fund man-
agers. As an alternative to the “piggy-bag” problem to generate fake abnormal 
performance by a hedge fund manager, Foster et al. also mention options strate-
gies such as taking short positions on put-options which are deep out-of-the-
money.  
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Agarwal and Naik (2000) study the multi-period performance persistence of 
hedge funds. They use a sample of 746 hedge funds obtained from the HFR data-
base over the period 1982–1998. The authors find evidence for short-term per-
formance persistence of hedge funds at the quarterly horizon. Thus, the perform-
ance persistence among hedge funds does not last long while hedge funds may 
simultaneously require long lockup periods. Moreover, the study also suggests 
that the performance persistence is weaker in multiple-period framework than in 
the two-period framework. Thus, when the number of monitoring periods is in-
creased, the performance persistence is likely to disappear. 
Malkiel et al. (2005) construct a sample of 2,065 hedge funds obtained from the 
TASS database over the period 1996–2003 which they conclude to be as least 
sensitive to common hedge fund database biases. The authors find no evidence 
for the performance persistence of hedge funds at yearly horizons.  
Baquero et al. (2005) study performance persistence of hedge fund managers and 
also take multi-period sampling bias, which they call look-ahead bias, into ac-
count. Specifically, multi-period sampling bias relates to the dependence of the 
survival of a hedge fund on its past performance. The characteristics of perform-
ance persistence would be spuriously dependent on the survival of a hedge fund 
and the characteristics of the survival. This bias is a problem especially in hedge 
fund studies as the attrition rate (the ratio of funds that become dead) of hedge 
funds is high. For example, Getmansky et al. (2004) finds 8.8 % attrition rate for 
hedge funds. Baquero et al. (2005) aim to handle this bias in their study; they first 
model the liquidation by considering its dependence on the historical performance 
of a hedge fund and then use the dependence to eliminate and weight the bias in 
the analysis of performance persistence analysis. 
Baquero et al. (2005) use the TASS database which includes 1,797 hedge funds 
over the period 1994–2000. They also adjust their analysis for different invest-
ment styles of hedge funds. The analyses provide evidence for positive perform-
ance persistence in the hedge fund industry even though they account for the 
multi-period sampling bias. 
Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2006) use a Bayesian and bootstrap analysis to study 
hedge fund performance. In their study, the authors use a dataset of hedge funds 
constructed from the TASS, HFR, CIDSM, and MSCI databases which together 
provide data for 5,533 hedge funds over the period 1994–2002. The results of the 
study suggest that top hedge funds are able to produce consistently good perform-
ance at yearly horizons which are not attributed to the luck of a hedge fund man-
ager. The results are also relatively robust to backfill bias and serial correlation in 
hedge funds returns.  
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As already noted by Foster et al. (2008), option strategies, and thus option-like 
return characteristics may result as a false alpha. In their study, Jagannathan, Ma-
lakhov, and Novikov (2007) control for option-like payoffs of hedge funds using 
the data obtained from the HFR hedge fund database from May 1996 to April 
2005. Despite accounting for the option-like features, the authors still find 
evidence for significant performance persistence among superior hedge funds.  
To sum it up, the performance persistence studies on hedge funds show mixed 
evidence for the persistence. Many studies do not find performance persistence at 
yearly time horizon (see, e.g., Brown and Goetzmann 2003; Capocci et al. 2004; 
Capocci et al. 2005), while many other studies show evidence for the performance 
persistence at three-month time horizon (see, e.g. Boyson and Cooper 2004; 
Barès, Gibson, and Gyger 2003). A recent study by Kosowski et al. (2006) on a 
large sample of hedge funds also shows evidence for longer performance persis-
tence. Also, Kouwenberg (2003) shows evidence even for the performance persis-
tence at three-year time horizon. 
In conclusion of the performance persistence in hedge fund industry, the perform-
ance persistence for short-term time horizons is robust but the evidence for the 
longer persistence is not so robust. Indeed, Eling (2007) examines the perform-
ance persistence of hedge funds using different methodologies and concludes that 
performance persistence is related to the methodology adopted as well as the 
hedge fund strategy.  
2.4 Conclusion and Discussion  
Hedge funds are considered as alternative investments since their returns are dif-
ferent from those of the traditional investments as standard asset classes weakly 
explain the returns of hedge funds strategies (see Fung et al. 1997). The ultimate 
question is whether hedge funds really add value when added to the portfolios of 
investors. To address this question there are two considerations from the investor 
viewpoint:  
1. Can hedge funds produce abnormal returns for investors which are truly 
arbitrage? 
2. Do alternative risk characteristics improve the performance of investors’ 
investment portfolios? 
The second consideration does not necessarily mean that arbitrage opportunities 
exist in the market. In turn, hedge funds may “market” some risks and assets 
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which would not be available for investors otherwise. In other words, hedge funds 
may expand the investment opportunity set. Consequently, by following Markow-
itz’s (1952) MPT, one can conclude that investors are able to improve their risk-
return profiles due to better diversification arising from holding a more complete 
market portfolio which includes some hedge funds. For instance, hedge funds 
may provide illiquidity risk to be better marketed for investors as their abnormal 
returns are closely related to illiquidity risk (see Aragon 2007; Gibson et al. 
2008). 
The first step to address the above questions is to test whether returns relate 
to marketable securities and trading strategies: The factors of ABS analysis 
(see Fung et al. 2000d; Fung et al. 2004b), option-like risk factors (see Agarwal et 
al. 2004), and other market-based models (see, e.g., Capocci’s et al. 2004; 
Ranaldo et al. 2005) are extremely important in the studies of abnormal perform-
ance of hedge funds. These factors and models can explain a significant propor-
tion of hedge fund returns, and therefore provide a more reliable basis for the 
analysis of hedge fund performance and sources of hedge fund returns. However, 
abnormal and positive returns do not yet imply that a hedge fund is capable of 
performing arbitrage but their absence would strongly suggest that hedge funds 
cannot perform either arbitrage or offer significant diversification benefits. 
The second step to address the above questions is to test the performance 
persistence of a hedge fund: If performance persistence does not exist, it is 
likely that the abnormal returns may be attributed to chance and definitely not 
arbitrage. The studies on the performance persistence of hedge funds provide 
mixed evidence for longer time-horizons as contrasted between the studies by 
Brown et al. (2003), Capocci et al. (2004) and Capocci et al. (2005) against the 
performance persistence and the studies for performance persistence by Kouwen-
berg (2003) and Kosowski et al. (2006). Possibly, it is a small group of hedge 
fund managers who are able to produce superior performance consistently (see 
Kosowski et al. 2006). 
The third step to address the above questions is the examination of the “mi-
croeconomic factors” of hedge fund returns: Here, the link between perform-
ance and risk measurement and hedge fund characteristics becomes important. 
The research on share restrictions and hedge funds by Aragon (2007) implies that 
the abnormal returns of hedge funds are rather subject to alternative risks, particu-
larly illiquidity risk, which are marketed by hedge funds, than pure arbitrage. Yet, 
this statement does not imply that hedge funds would be useless from investor 
viewpoint as they may provide diversification benefits and market alternative 
risks. If one cannot explain abnormal hedge fund returns with marketable prices, 
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but they may be otherwise related to risk, then hedge funds are likely to offer in-
vestors a more complete market portfolio. As a result, their diversification would 
increase and the reward-to-risk relation would improve, but not as a result of arbi-
trage. In this case, hedge funds, indeed, could be interpreted as very important 
market participants. 
Admittedly, this possibility to improve the risk-return profile seems to be chal-
lenging; mean-variance characteristics can be improved but the higher moments 
and nonlinear characteristics of hedge fund returns makes the inclusion of hedge 
funds in investors’ portfolios less attractive (see Agarwal et al. 2004; Kat 2005). 
Therefore, the higher moments must also be considered in hedge fund analysis. 
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3 DERIVATIVES USE AND FUND PERFORMANCE 
The earlier research offers little relevant theoretical evidence on derivatives use, 
fund management, and its performance. Nevertheless, the study by Grossman and 
Zhou (1996) on the equilibrium analysis of portfolio insurance provides the start-
ing point. The study allows one to analyse the use of derivatives and fund per-
formance as the study distinguishes between portfolio insurers and non-insurers. 
Here, it is interesting that the use of options and other derivatives is originally 
much motivated by their use for risk management. However, the intention of 
hedge funds is often to hedge risk, and thus the analysis by Grossman et al. 
(1996), indeed, may have some practical relevance. 
Grossmann et al. (1996) show that risk in option markets is reallocated between 
two groups, insurers and non-insurers. The reallocation which is the trading be-
tween these groups depends on the size of insurers’ losses. When news are posi-
tive, the insurers prefer less insurance and pay lower premiums for non-insurers. 
When news are rather negative, the insurers are willing to pay more for insurance. 
The most relevant implications by Grossmann et al. (1996) for this study is that 
when the state of the economy is bad insurers’ activity offers a chance of a higher 
Sharpe ratio for non-insurers. Due to insurers, the non-insurers can receive a 
higher risk premium, which may also be a component of hedge fund returns as 
interpreted. 
The relevance of the study by Grossmann et al. (1996) is considerable for hedge 
funds as their returns resemble short put options on stock indices (see Agarwal et 
al. 2004) meaning that hedge funds behave like non-insurers. Admittedly, this 
feature does not exclude the possibility for options to be used for hedging or port-
folio insurance as in Grossmann et al. (1996), yet the insurance strategy using 
options is very likely not the dominant one for hedge funds. 
3.1 Derivatives and Mutual Funds 
The pioneering empirical evidence of Koski et al. (1999) for derivatives use and 
fund performance employed data conducted using telephone interviews with mu-
tual fund managers. The sample period for fund returns in the study is from Janu-
ary 1992 to December 1994. The results of the study suggest that equity mutual 
funds using derivatives show similar risk exposures than equity mutual funds not 
using derivatives. In addition, the performance between these groups is found to 
be similar. However, the results also suggest that mutual funds can alleviate nega-
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tive impact of past performance on fund risk. Particularly, when investors invest 
new capital in a mutual fund as a result of good past performance, the fund faces 
a problem to fully achieve its objective market exposure. Thus, mutual fund man-
agers seem to use derivatives to efficiently employ new fund capital attracted by 
fund’s performance. 
Besides investigating the impact of the use of derivatives on fund performance 
and risk of a fund, many studies on derivatives use of funds also study the causes 
of the use of derivatives. Deli et al. (2002) report such information as they inves-
tigate funds’ incentives to use derivatives. The key finding is that derivatives of-
fer transaction costs benefits. Moreover, their empirical results support the hy-
pothesis of the study that the choice of a fund to permit derivative investments is 
driven by transaction cost benefits weighted against the potential agency costs. 
Johnson et al. (2004) study the use of derivatives of 988 mutual funds in Canada 
on information of funds’ derivatives use as of September 30 1998. In general, 
their results show that the use of derivatives by Canadian mutual funds does not 
have an adverse effect on fund return and risk. The results are also heterogeneous 
for different kinds of funds. Fixed-income funds using derivatives show higher 
return and risk than derivative non users. Domestic equity funds that use deriva-
tives seem to have higher returns and bear higher risks than derivative non users. 
However, the exclusion of warrants from the derivative definition causes the risk-
return differential of domestic equity funds to disappear5. 
Pinnuck (2004) examines both the characteristics of stocks preferred by 35 Aus-
tralian equity investment managers and their use of derivatives over the period 
1990-1997. The results show that the use of derivatives by fund managers is more 
popular among large than small fund managers. Moreover, the study suggests that 
fund managers use derivatives to both increase and decrease their exposure to 
stock market risk. 
Fong et al. (2005) study the role and benefits of derivative securities in active 
equity portfolio management. The study also employs Australian data of 48 eq-
uity funds obtained from the Portfolio Analytics Database over the period 1993-
2003. In light of their results the authors conclude that the use of derivatives has a 
negligible impact on fund returns. The results for their sample also suggest that 
options are not used for informed trading. In addition, the study presents evidence 
                                                
 
5  The authors relate the effect of excluding equity warrants to natural resource bias in the Ca-
nadian stock market 
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that options trading patterns of investment managers are related to the execution 
of momentum trading strategies. 
Marín and Rangel (2006) study the use of derivatives in the Spanish mutual fund 
industry of 1,707 funds from March 1995 to March 2005. The results of the study 
relate derivatives use to larger fees, large funds, funds with low dividend yield, 
and members of fund families in which other funds also use derivatives. The au-
thors also argue that derivatives are used for speculative purposes instead of 
hedging purposes and that management of cash inflows and outflows more effi-
ciently. 
Marin et al. (2006) in line with Koski et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (2004), and 
Fong et al. (2005) find that the use of derivatives on average does not improve 
fund performance and in most of their fund categories derivatives users underper-
form nonusers. However, for fixed-income funds, the authors find weak evidence 
supporting outperformance which arises from derivatives use. 
Frino et al. (2009) investigate the impact of derivatives use on fund performance 
using a survey of derivatives use for 274 Australian fund managers. They separate 
funds that use derivatives for cash equitisation from other derivatives users6. The 
survey enquired particularly whether funds trade SPI 200 index futures for cash-
equisation. The findings of the study differ from those of Koski et al. (1999), 
Johnson et al. (2004), and Fong et al. (2005). In particular, the results of the study 
suggest that derivatives use can reduce the burden of increased fund flow and 
improve managed fund performance when derivatives are used for cash equitisa-
tion. 
3.2 Derivatives and Hedge Funds 
As the evidence discussed above concerns conventional mutual funds, five recent 
studies by Chen (2006), Chen and Liang (2007), Aragon et al. (2007), Aragon et 
al. (2008), and Chen (2009) report evidence of derivatives use of hedge funds. 
Specifically, Chen (2006) compares market timing characteristics between portfo-
lios of hedge funds that use options and do not use options. The author concludes 
that the results are not different between the option users and nonusers. Chen et 
al. (2007) also find that the results for the market timing ability of hedge funds are 
                                                
 
6  Cash equitisation refers to the use of derivatives for converting assets such as equities into 
cash more easily and with lower transaction prices. 
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not altered by the use of options but they focus only on market timing hedge 
funds and examine only a sample of 100 funds reporting their use of options. 
Aragon et al. (2007) investigates the quarterly holdings of 250 hedge fund advi-
sors over the 1999-2005 period. These advisors offer asset management for indi-
vidual hedge funds. The authors find that stock holdings have some predictive 
power but the predictive power of asset holding is found to be more pronounced 
for options. Moreover, in the sample of Aragon et al. (2007) deep out-of-the-
money options and puts exhibit the highest predictive power for future stock re-
turns. 
In following study after Aragon et al. (2007), Aragon et al. (2008) focus more on 
hedging and options use by hedge funds. The authors find that option positions by 
hedge funds are associated with higher than normal subsequent realized volatility 
on the underlying security. The evidence also suggests that option holdings are 
significantly used in hedging strategies. In the sub-sample of 179 hedge fund ad-
visors, higher Sharpe ratio and lower standard deviation are also found to be asso-
ciated with the use of equity options which adds up to the evidence. However, the 
study by Aragon et al. (2008) does not show evidence for statistically significant 
association between equity options use by a hedge fund advosor and abnormal 
returns. 
Chen (2009) investigates derivatives use and risk taking in the hedge fund indus-
try using the Lipper TASS hedge fund database with a sample period from Janu-
ary 1994 to December 2006 and an initial sample of 6,241 hedge funds. Chen 
(2009) also investigates extensively the determinants of the use of derivatives by 
hedge funds. His results suggest that higher minimum investment requirement, 
higher incentive fees, the absence of lockup provision, and effective auditing are 
associated with greater likelihood of a hedge fund using derivatives. The results 
of Chen (2009) also suggest that some hedge fund categories affect the probabil-
ity of hedge funds using derivatives. The probability of using derivatives is high-
est for the global/macro strategy (the managed futures strategy is not included in 
the analysis). 
Chen (2009) does not find a significant difference in risk-adjusted performance 
between derivatives users and nonusers. For the association between risk and de-
rivatives use, he finds that the use of derivatives is associated with lower risk of a 
hedge fund. Chen (2009) also considers the third and fourth co-moments of the 
distribution of hedge fund returns in addition to the conventional third and fourth 
moments. The results suggest that using derivatives has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the kurtosis of a hedge fund. Moreover, derivatives use is 
found to be associated with lower co-kurtosis and co-skewness. Thus, Chen’s 
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(2009) evidence for the higher moments and higher co-moments may imply that 
derivatives use is associated with less market-wide risk. 
Derivatives may also be used to manipulate performance. Chen (2009) acknow-
ledges this potential use of derivatives and uses a manipulation proof performance 
measure by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007). Chen’s (2009) re-
sults do not evince any statistically significant association between the measure 
and derivatives use by hedge funds. Accordingly, the results suggest that hedge 
funds do not manipulate their performance using derivatives.  
The study by Chen (2009) finds further evidence for responsible use of deriva-
tives by hedge funds. The study evinces that derivatives users engage less in risk 
gaming. The results also do not show statistically significant evidence for the re-
lation between fund failure likelihood and derivatives use. This result implies that 
single cases of hedge fund failures closely associated with derivatives use such as 
the collapse of the LTCM may not be generalized. 
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4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This study presents five different hypotheses regarding the derivatives use of 
hedge funds. Given the free regulation of mutual funds the hypotheses for the 
complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund also concern funds of hedge 
funds, which are likewise loosely regulated. 
4.1 Informed Trading, Options Use, and Hedge Fund 
Performance 
As related research on hedge funds and informed trading, Wermers (2000) shows 
evidence that those mutual funds which have high turnover beat the Vanguard 
Index 500 fund on a net return basis in favour of abnormal returns generated by 
informed trading. The remaining question for the interests of the present study is 
whether funds use options for informed trading. 
A potential reason for the use of derivatives by hedge funds, and especially op-
tions, is informed trading. The information on how derivatives are used by hedge 
funds should be important information from the perspective of informed trading. 
Black (1975) suggests that the higher leverage available in options markets may 
attract speculators to prefer options to their underlying assets. Several studies fol-
lowed by Black (1975), for example, Easley et al. (1998), Chakravarty et al. 
(2004), suggest that informed traders invest in option markets. Chakravarty et al. 
(2004) also suggest that the price discovery across option strike price is associated 
with leverage supporting Black’s (1975) viewpoint.  
For mutual funds, Fong et al. (2005) present evidence that there is no abnormal 
price movement in the underlying stocks after fund managers’ purchases of op-
tions. Therefore, the results of the study suggest that the managers do not engage 
in informed trading. However, Fong et al. (2005) construct their data on an invita-
tion basis to the largest Australian investment managers. Hedge funds which are 
natural arbitrageurs, instead, aim to mask their investment strategies not giving 
detailed information, making the results of Fong et al. (2005) less applicable. 
Fong’s et al. (2005) results may also be biased towards uninformed fund manag-
ers. Indeed, if fund managers have private information, it should be much more 
convenient to run a hedge fund rather than a mutual fund due to less transparency 
so that the private information would not be revealed to other market participants. 
And, considering the evidence by Wermers (2000) for an association between 
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high fund turnover and outperformance, it is plausible to expect that hedge funds 
which may have very high turnover engage in informed trading. Indeed, Aragon 
et al. (2007) find that the option holdings of hedge funds include more predictive 
power than their stock holdings, implying that hedge funds use options for in-
formed trading. 
Informed trading by a hedge fund should follow the asset specialization of a 
hedge fund and cause willingness to use higher leverage to enhance its returns 
from informed trading. This assumption should be credible, as Eichhold, Veld, 
and Schweitzer (2000) show evidence for REIT investment trusts that their prop-
erty specialization leads to outperformance. Chen (2006) also finds that hedge 
funds show market timing ability in their focus market implying that the asset 
specialization of a hedge fund is beneficial. In a close relation to the assumed per-
formance-specialization relation, the results of Teo (2008) suggest that the physi-
cal presence of a hedge fund close to their market leads to information advantage. 
The asset focus of a hedge fund would likewise lead to information advantage.  
The above evidence supports the view that asset specialization results in greater 
likelihood of information advantage. Positive impact from the use of options on 
hedge fund performance should be seen most of all when the performance associ-
ated the use of options for each asset class is examined which respect to the asset 
specialization of a fund.  
Beside the possibility of using options for informed trading, options and other 
derivatives can be used in various profitable investment and hedging strategies 
such as volatility trading. The study by Liu and Pan (2003) suggests that deriva-
tive securities are important for investors as they expand the dimension of risk-
return tradeoffs. Some studies suggest that derivative strategies can improve port-
folio performance. Board et al. (2001), Isakov et al. (2001), Whaley (2002), 
McIntyre et al. (2007), and Kapadia et al. (2007) suggest that the covered call 
strategy is profitable. Hill, Balasubramariam, Gregory, and Tierens (2006) sug-
gest that short-term index option strategies can enhance investment risk profiles. 
For a sample of hedge funds, Aragon et al. (2008) find that higher Sharpe ratio 
and lower standard deviation of hedge fund returns are associated with equity 
options use. For currencies too, Guo (2000) presents empirical evidence that dy-
namic volatility trading strategies on currency option markets may improve risk-
return profiles. These studies, together with the possibility of using options for 
informed trading, leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The asset specialized use of option enhances hedge fund performance. 
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4.2 Equity Index Futures and Hedge Fund Performance 
Considering the use of other derivatives, the use of equity index futures for cash 
management becomes relevant. The first study implying the use of this derivative 
type for cash management is the study by Koski et al. (1999) which shows evi-
dence for mutual fund managers using derivatives to alleviate the impact of new 
fund inflows on fund risk. This result may also have relevance for hedge fund 
performance, as the study by Edelen (1999) relates fund flows negatively to its 
alpha upon a rationale that new cash force mutual fund managers to engage in 
liquidity motivated trading instead of informed trading. As a result of uninformed 
trading, the alpha suffers from trading costs. Equity index futures in turn are high-
ly liquid and can be used to adjust the exposure of the fund to the desired risk 
under new cash flows. Frino et al. (2009) follow this rationale investigating the 
use of stock index futures for the management of cash flows. They find that de-
rivative-based management can prevent the negative impact of new cash on the 
alpha of a hedge fund. 
Hedge funds are different from mutual funds as they can restrict more their fund 
flows. Therefore, the use of equity index futures may not be as essential for them 
as it is for mutual funds. In the hedge fund industry, the use of equity index fu-
tures may be a substitute for share restrictions, which can be used to manage li-
quidity efficiently. For instance, some less promising hedge funds may lack bar-
gaining power to impose sufficiently restrictive redemption policy to attract in-
vestors. These funds can then use inferior financial instruments (regarding their 
strategy) to manage liquidity. Share restrictions are seen as proxies for illiquidity 
risk premium (see Aragon 2007), and the use of equity index futures would imply 
lower illiquidity risk premium as the instrument itself is highly liquid. Thus, the 
use of equity index futures is related to lower illiquidity risk premium. This ar-
gument leads to the following hypothesis which is sensible to direct at hedge 
funds which focus on equity: 
H2: The equity specialized use of equity index futures is related to lower hedge 
fund performance. 
The second hypothesis does not imply that the use of equity index futures has a 
detrimental impact on hedge fund performance or that equity index futures is not 
be used for informed trading. Instead, it implies that the use of the derivative is 
associated with activity not profitable enough for an average hedge fund. 
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4.3 Performance and Risk Characteristics of Hedge 
Funds and Derivatives Use 
The use of more complex derivative strategies by a hedge fund should lead to 
better performance statistics. Especially when considering the implications of the 
study by John et al. (2006) that when commonly used incentive characteristics are 
assumed, managers use complex derivative strategies which result in an im-
provement of performance statistics. Thus, the following hypotheses are formed: 
H3: The use of a more complex derivative strategy of a hedge fund decreases risk. 
H4: The use of a more complex derivative strategy improves hedge fund perform-
ance. 
Hypothesis 3 can also be seen as a considerable component of Hypothesis 4 as 
risk is also a component of performance. As such, these hypotheses together pre-
dict that the better performance associated with the complexity of the derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund is particularly related to risk. 
The third hypothesis especially concerns the risk measured using standard devia-
tion. However, it is already known that the return distributions of hedge funds 
have fat left tails (see, e.g., Brooks et al. 2002). There are at least three weighty 
reasons why derivatives use by hedge funds may be associated with fatter left 
tails of their return distributions: first and foremost, John et al. (2006) show that 
when commonly used incentive characteristics are assumed, managers indeed use 
complex derivative strategies which also lead to larger probability of large losses 
in addition to improved performance statistics. In relation to Liu and Pan (2003) 
who suggest that derivatives use may expand the risk-return dimension, the impli-
cations of John et al. (2006) would mean that the expanded risk-return dimensions 
from derivative strategies would be rather miss-used. 
Second, the use of options may be one cause of these hedge fund return character-
istics because options have asymmetric payoffs and hedge fund managers may 
employ derivative strategies which produce high kurtosis and negative skewness. 
Indeed, hedge fund payoffs resemble synthetic options, which may be due to the 
use of options (see, e.g., Fung et al. 1997, 2001; Mitchell et al. 2001; Agarwal et 
al. 2004). 
Third, the return distributions of popular derivative strategies such as the covered 
call strategy are empirically found to exhibit negative asymmetry and fat tails (see 
Whaley 2002). These strategies may also be popular among hedge funds given 
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their profitability (Isakov et al. 2001; Whaley 2002; McIntyre et al. 2007; Ka-
padia et al. 2007).  
Given the above mentioned arguments, it is important to account for the asymme-
try and fat tails of the return distributions of hedge funds. The arguments also lead 
to the following hypotheses: 
H5a: The asset specialized use of options has a negative impact on the skewness 
and a positive impact on the kurtosis of a hedge fund return distribution. 
H5b: The use of a more complex derivative strategy of a hedge fund has a negative 
impact on the skewness and a positive impact on the kurtosis of its return distri-
bution. 
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5 DATA 
The analysis in this study uses monthly data from January 1994 to December 
2006. Data for hedge funds is obtained from the Lipper TASS database7. This 
data includes 8,515 hedge funds consisting of both live hedge funds (4,577 funds) 
and dead hedge funds (3,938 funds) to mitigate survivorship bias in the sample. 
Data before January 1994 is not included in the sample as before this month 
TASS had not recorded data for defunct funds and the use of earlier data would 
increase survivorship bias in the sample. Data in the Lipper TASS hedge fund 
database is self-reported and updated by hedge fund managers on daily basis. 
Thus, the information may change. 
All hedge fund returns obtained are net-of-fees in percentages, reported monthly 
in U.S. dollars. Hedge funds that do not report their returns in this way are ex-
cluded from the sample. Data is downloaded in November 2007 but hedge fund 
returns between January-October 2007 are excluded from the sample to reduce 
late reporting bias (see Tiu 2005). This bias means that some hedge funds delay 
reporting their returns while some hedge funds do not, and the bias is subject to 
the return difference between these funds. Indeed, this bias may slightly alter the 
results as Schneeweis, Spurgin and Waksman (2006) find that hedge funds which 
delay reporting their returns often report poorer performance than hedge funds 
which report early. For better accuracy of performance statistics, reducing the last 
ten months of the data should eliminate the late reporting bias and offer a sample 
of hedge funds which is annually complete.  
Hedge fund databases also exhibit backfill bias, which is caused by the possibility 
for funds to include their past return history in the database when they list. How-
ever, the downloaded sample likewise does not provide clear information on 
which of the returns are backfilled. One can attempt to alleviate the bias by ex-
cluding return data prior to the inception date of a fund which is defined as “the 
date the fund became fully operational and commenced trading.” However, this 
action does not considerably exclude the bias of the database as it does not ex-
clude return data prior listing of a fund in the database8. Moreover, there are only 
                                                
 
7  Chen (2008) also reports that he uses hedge fund data 1994-2006 but in the data section he 
announces that “… as of June 2006, TASS contains information about 6,241 individual hedge 
funds…” Chen (2008) downloaded his data over one year before that this study. 
8  The Lipper TASS database used by the present study does not contain information needed to 
fully exclude backfill bias. Malkiel et al. (2004: 81) states that “Fortunately, TASS indicates 
when a hedge fund began reporting, so we were able to examine the backfilled returns and 
compare them with those returns that were contemporaneously reported to TASS.” However, 
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24 funds in the TASS database which report earlier performance start day other 
than the inception day. Chen (2009) deletes return data prior the inception date. 
All hedge funds that do not report information on asset focus and derivatives use 
are excluded from the sample. It is also feasible to separate funds of hedge funds 
(2006 funds) from the sample of hedge funds as they are different investment 
vehicles from conventional hedge funds as their primary investment focus is to 
invest in other funds. This study also includes managed futures funds in the analy-
sis, which is not done by Chen (2009). The exclusion of funds of funds and the 
inclusion of managed futures funds causes a significant difference from a closely 
related study by Chen (2009). The sample selection choices related to hedge fund 
strategies should be reasonable to validate the results for all assets and broader 
knowledge in finance. Also, the exclusion of managed futures funds from the 
sample may be reasonable when using a binary variable of derivatives use be-
cause the use of derivatives is nearly essential for these funds. However, as this 
study uses the complexity of derivative strategy as a variable, the inclusion of the 
strategy is reasonable for this study. As such, it is one of the benefits of using the 
complexity variable to also include strategies in the sample for which derivative 
trading is almost essential, but the extent and complexity of derivatives use may 
vary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
a later database used by this study does not include such information. The database used re-
ports only a “performance start date” and a “inception date.” Also, Tremont Capital Manage-
ment acquired the database in 1999 which may also have resulted in major changes in the da-
tabase. 
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Table 1. Variables of Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This table defines the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis of this study. Panel A presents 
the statistics for variables which are not related to hedge fund returns. Panel B presents the statist-
ics for variables which are related to hedge fund returns.  
 
Panel A. 
Variable Definitions             
AUDIT If a fund is audited, then 1, otherwise 0. 
AVGLEVERAGE Average leverage of a fund in percentages. 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of average fund size. 
LNAGE Natural logarithm of fund age. 
MFEE Management fee of a fund as percentages 
IFEE Incentive fee of a fund as percentages. 
HMARK If a fund has a high watermark, then 1, otherwise 0. 
IMILLS Inverse Mills ratio 
LEVERAGED If a fund is leveraged, then 1, otherwise 0. 
PERCAPITAL If a fund manager invests personal capital, then 1, otherwise 0. 
LOCKUP Lockup period of a fund denoted in months. 
RESTRICTION The sum of payout and redemption periods of a fund denoted in days. 
MIN Minimum investment in a fund in U.S. dollars. 
OPEN If a fund is open to public, then 1, otherwise 0. 
OPENENDED If a fund is open-end fund, then 1, otherwise 0. 
COMPLEXITY Complexity of the derivative strategy of a fund. 
OF If a fund invests in other funds, then 1, otherwise 0. 
E_OPTION If a fund uses equity options, then 1, otherwise 0. 
F_OPTION If a fund uses fixed-income options, then 1, otherwise 0. 
C_OPTION If a fund uses commodity options, then 1, otherwise 0. 
CUR_OPTION If a fund uses currency options, then 1, otherwise 0.     
E_WARRANT If a fund uses warrants issued with equity securities, then 1, otherwise 0. 
F_WARRANT If a fund uses warrants issued with fixed-income securities, then 1, otherwise 
0.  
E_OTHER If a fund uses other equity derivatives than options or warrants, then 1,  
 otherwise 0. 
F_OTHER If a fund uses other fixed-income derivatives than options,  
 then 1 otherwise 0.   
C_OTHER If a fund uses other commodity derivatives than options, then 1    
otherwise 0.  
CUR_OTHER If a fund uses other currency derivatives than options, then 1  
otherwise 0.  
S_CA 
 
If a fund follows Convertible Arbitrage strategy, then 1  
otherwise 0. 
If a fund follows Dedicated Short Bias strategy, then 1  
otherwise 0. 
S_DS 
 
S_ED If a fund follows Event-Driven strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
If a fund follows Equity Long/Short strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. S_ELS 
S_EM If a fund follows Emerging Market strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
S_EMN If a fund follows Equity Market Neutral strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
S_FI If a fund follows Fixed-Income Arbitrage strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
S_GM If a fund follows Global/Macro strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
S_MF If a fund follows Managed Futures strategy, then 1 otherwise 0. 
S_MS If a fund is a multi-strategy fund, then 1 otherwise 0. 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Panel B. 
Variable Definition 
SHARPE Sharpe ratio of a hedge fund. 
SHARPED Sharpe ratio with downside volatility of a hedge fund. 
ALPHA Alpha of a hedge fund. 
APPRAISAL Appraisal ratio of a hedge fund. 
VAR Value-at-Risk- of a hedge fund 
MVAR Modified Value-at-Risk of a hedge fund. 
MEAN Mean return of a hedge fund. 
STDEV Sample standard deviation of the returns of a hedge fund. 
D Downside volatility of the returns of a hedge fund. 
SKEW Skewness of the returns of a hedge fund. 
EXKURT Excess kurtosis of the returns of a hedge fund. 
CF Cornish-Fischer expansion on the returns of a hedge fund. 
SCF Cornish-Fischer expansion on the market-based returns of a hedge fund. 
ICF Cornish-Fischer expansion on the residual returns of a hedge fund. 
RSTDEV Sample standard deviation of the residual returns of a hedge fund. 
SSTDEV Sample standard deviation of the market-based returns of a hedge fund. 
RSKEW Skewness of the residual returns of a hedge fund 
SSKEW Skewness of the market-based returns of a hedge fund 
RXKURT Excess kurtosis of the residual returns of a hedge fund. 
SKURT Excess kurtosis of market-based returns of a hedge fund. 
All hedge funds that have a return history shorter than 24 months are excluded 
from the sample. This data reduction is similar to that of Bali et al. (2007), who 
also use MVaR estimates. This reduction provides a reasonable return history for 
the use of risk and performance measures. It especially ensures better robustness 
for the estimates of skewness and kurtosis, but it may also reduce backfill bias 
because funds with a short return history are weighted less. Also, all funds that do 
not report their size are excluded from the sample which then consists of 3,403 
hedge funds. Some of the funds, however, have missing data for explanatory vari-
ables, and the exclusion of these funds reduces the investigated sample in multi-
variate analysis to 3,382 funds. In addition to the entire sample, hedge funds are 
classified into four subsamples according to the hedge fund’s primary asset focus. 
The subsamples are for equity (1,841 funds), fixed-income (838 funds), commod-
ity (245 funds), and currency (363 funds)9.  
 
 
                                                
 
9 The subsamples may be overlapping as some funds have more than one asset focus. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Hedge Funds 
This table presents descriptive statistics and the Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics of the variables 
used in the cross-sectional analysis of this study. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds used in 
multivariate analysis for hedge funds of this study. Panel A. presents the descriptive statistics. 
Panel B presents mean values for the dichotomous variables used for hedge funds. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
Panel A. 
 LNSIZE LNAGE IFEE MFEE MIN RESTRICTION 
Mean 17.17 7.62 18.85 1.47 782321.30 46.71 
Median 17.24 7.60 20.00 1.50 500000.00 41.50 
Maximum 22.49 10.58 50.00 8.00 25000000.00 700.00 
Minimum 3.40 6.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 1.73 0.57 5.08 0.72 1303007.00 37.93 
Skewness -0.48 0.26 -1.57 2.49 7.96 2.69 
Kurtosis 5.22 2.47 13.01 15.76 117.33 33.99 
       
JB 824.81*** 77.19*** 15517.47*** 26440.23*** 1877679.00*** 139423.30***  
  LOCKUP STDEV MEAN VAR MVAR CF 
Mean 3.60 4.13 0.92 -8.68 -8.77 -2.46 
Median 0.00 3.19 0.85 -6.53 -6.46 -2.42 
Maximum 48.00 73.69 7.81 0.90 150.09 9.96 
Minimum 0.00 0.05 -6.68 -164.93 -86.96 -7.60 
Std. Dev. 6.22 3.64 0.89 8.25 10.06 1.07 
Skewness 1.88 4.36 0.58 -4.33 0.02 1.75 
Kurtosis 7.43 55.55 11.79 54.22 34.29 21.61 
       
JB 4741.82*** 399816.80*** 11080.25*** 380327.10*** 137931.50*** 50531.29***  
  DD SKEW EXKURT SHARPE SHARPED 
Mean 3.96 0.07 3.38 0.24 0.27 
Median 3.04 0.08 1.46 0.20 0.21 
Maximum 42.81 7.65 109.03 7.88 8.18 
Minimum 0.04 -10.11 -1.33 -0.80 -0.79 
Std. Dev. 3.31 1.27 7.20 0.36 0.44 
Skewness 2.64 -1.15 6.93 6.82 7.40 
Kurtosis 16.90 13.94 70.53 106.84 103.23 
      
JB 31134.83*** 17617.53*** 669586.60*** 1545854.00*** 1446437.00***  
  APPRAISAL ALPHA SCF ICF 
 Mean 0.26 0.50 -2.62 -2.57 
 Median 0.21 0.43 -2.34 -2.30 
 Maximum 12.35 26.96 -1.49 -1.52 
 Minimum -5.23 -11.57 -13.23 -27.95 
 Std. Dev. 0.62 1.36 1.03 1.49 
 Skewness 4.29 2.97 -3.93 -10.16 
 Kurtosis 70.36 62.04 26.79 137.17 
     
 JB 649711.30*** 496171.00*** 2595005.00*** 88484.36***  
  SSKEW SSTDEV RSTDEV RSKEW RKURT SKURT 
 Mean -0.09 2.82 2.88 0.1 1.92 1.53 
 Median -0.04 2.14 2.17 0.08 0.77 0.71 
 Maximum 4.43 53.64 50.51 6.21 82.86 31.4 
 Minimum -5.02 0.03 0.03 -8.69 -1.4 -1.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.78 2.67 2.62 0.9 5.13 2.85 
 Skewness -0.82 4.29 4.54 -1.52 8.7 4.15 
 Kurtosis 7.77 52.25 54.42 22.21 104.32 28.8 
       
 JB 3592.35*** 352125.10*** 384188.30*** 53300.29*** 1489203.00*** 103559.00*** 
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Table 2. Continued 
 
Panel B. 
 HMARK AUDIT PERCAPITAL OPEN OPENENDED LEVERAGED 
Mean 0.63 0.77 0.42 0.17 0.62 0.68  
 S_MF S_GM S_FI S_EMN S_EM S_ELS S_ED S_DS S_CA 
Mean 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.40 0.12 0.01 0.04  
Mean AE_OPTION AE_WARRANT AF_OPTION AF_WARRANT AC_OPTION ACUR_OPTION 
 0.45 0.24 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.12  
Mean AE_OTHER AF_OTHER AC_OTHER ACUR_OTHER 
 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.31  
Mean AE_PRIMARY AF_PRIMARY AC_PRIMARY ACUR_PRIMARY 
 0.54 0.25 0.07 0.11 
In the cross-sectional analysis, excess returns when used in this study are calcu-
lated over 1-month U.S. T-bill rate of return from Ibbotson Associates, Inc. Table 
1 presents definitions for the variables used in the analyses of this study. The use 
of options for different assets (equity, fixed-income, commodity, and currency) 
form variables while warrants issued with equity and fixed-income securities also 
form variables on their own due to their nonlinear characteristic. The use of other 
derivatives including forwards, futures, and swaps for the same assets are classi-
fied as other derivatives10. For example, whether a hedge fund uses fixed-income 
swaps, futures and/or forwards the variable F_OTHER. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables of the cross-sectional 
analysis. The performance and risk measures do not seem to be normally distrib-
uted. The problems, at least to some extent, may cause bias for the estimates. This 
may be difficult to control with log-transformation since many normally distrib-
uted variables have negative values. As a result, the variables are not transformed, 
but one should also consider this problem with the dataset. Also, the Cornish-
Fischer expansion measure can have large positive values and the source may be 
the sensitivity of the estimates to heavy outliers which may occur in individual 
hedge fund returns. 
The performance measures (the Sharpe ratio, the Sharpe ratio with downside 
volatility, alpha, and appraisal ratio) are heavily skewed towards the right tail of 
the distribution. This means that there are more extremely good performers than 
extremely bad performers. This characteristic, however, may be related to the fact 
that extremely bad performers soon discontinue their activities, which causes a 
survivorship bias. 
 
                                                
 
10  Interest rate swaps are considered as swaps for fixed-income and cross-currency swaps are 
considered as swaps for currency. 
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This figure presents the number of different types of derivatives used by a hedge fund for the 
sample of this study. This figure also presents descriptive statistics for the variable COMPLEX-
ITY which describes the number of different type of derivatives used by a hedge fund.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Different Type of Derivatives Used by a Hedge Fund 
Figure 1 presents an illustration and the summary statistics for the number of dif-
ferent derivatives used by a hedge fund, which is a proxy for the complexity of 
derivative strategies. The figure shows that the distribution of the complexity 
variable is positively skewed and has a high kurtosis. These characteristics are 
related to the concentration of hedge funds using different derivatives from 0 to 3. 
Also, the average of 2.534 is low, meaning that hedge funds on average do not 
use even 3 different derivatives. Thus, the density of hedge funds using multiple 
derivatives in their investment strategies is relatively small.  
Table 3 presents the correlation statistics for fund characteristics. The statistics 
indicate that the complexity of derivative strategy of a hedge fund correlates with 
many other fund characteristics. Specifically, the variable has a statistically sig-
nificant and positive correlation at least at the 10 % level with minimum invest-
ment, the use of auditing services, management fee, whether a fund is open to the 
public, whether a fund is open-ended, whether personal capital of the manager is 
invested in the fund, the use of leverage, size, and age. The variable also has a 
negative and statistically significant correlation at the 10 % level with high wa-
termark, lockup period and restriction period. The magnitude of the correlation is 
between the complexity of derivative strategy and the other variables is generally 
moderate but with the use of leverage it is relatively high (0.25). These statistics 
together imply that 
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1. Complex derivative strategies possibly do not attract and are not per-
formed by skilled managers due to the absence of a statistically significant 
and positive correlation between complexity and incentive fees. 
2. Complex derivative strategies are related to higher liquidity due to its neg-
ative correlation with restriction period following the logic that funds 
which have more illiquid assets restrict asset flow more (see Aragon 
2007).  
3. Complexity is associated with higher management fees and larger size of a 
hedge fund, suggesting that the use of complex derivative strategies is 
costly and requires resources which can be acquired via economies of 
scale. The results are similar to the comparisons between derivatives users 
and nonusers in the hedge fund industry (see Chen 2008, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72      Acta Wasaensia 
Table 3.  Correlation Statistics for Hedge Fund Characteristics 
This table presents a list of correlation statistics for fund characteristics. The probability statistics 
on the right hand side of the correlation statistics indicate significance of correlation based on the 
t-statistics. 
 
  Cor. Prob.   Cor. Prob. 
COMPLEXITY  AUDIT 0.03 0.093 RESTRICTION  AUDIT 0.03 0.110 
IFEE  AUDIT 0.02 0.162 RESTRICTION  COMPLEXITY -0.13 0.000 
IFEE  COMPLEXITY 0.00 0.989 RESTRICTION  IFEE 0.09 0.000 
MIN AUDIT 0.05 0.008 RESTRICTION  MIN 0.23 0.000 
MIN COMPLEXITY 0.10 0.000 RESTRICTION  LOCKUP 0.41 0.000 
MIN IFEE 0.10 0.000 RESTRICTION  MFEE -0.13 0.000 
LOCKUP AUDIT 0.04 0.042 RESTRICTION  OPEN -0.03 0.116 
LOCKUP COMPLEXITY -0.13 0.000 RESTRICTION  OPENENDED -0.26 0.000 
LOCKUP IFEE 0.07 0.000 RESTRICTION  HMARK 0.41 0.000 
LOCKUP MIN 0.23 0.000 RESTRICTION  PERCAPITAL -0.10 0.000 
MFEE AUDIT -0.04 0.027 LEVERAGED  AUDIT 0.02 0.238 
MFEE COMPLEXITY 0.20 0.000 LEVERAGED  COMPLEXITY 0.25 0.000 
MFEE IFEE 0.04 0.016 LEVERAGED  IFEE 0.15 0.000 
MFEE MIN -0.03 0.068 LEVERAGED  MIN -0.01 0.431 
MFEE LOCKUP -0.10 0.000 LEVERAGED  LOCKUP -0.08 0.000 
OPEN  AUDIT -0.03 0.082 LEVERAGED  MFEE 0.07 0.000 
OPEN COMPLEXITY 0.04 0.020 LEVERAGED  OPEN 0.01 0.544 
OPEN IFEE -0.03 0.104 LEVERAGED  OPENENDED 0.11 0.000 
OPEN MIN -0.04 0.031 LEVERAGED  HMARK -0.04 0.011 
OPEN LOCKUP -0.02 0.382 LEVERAGED  PERCAPITAL 0.12 0.000 
OPEN MFEE 0.09 0.000 LEVERAGED  RESTRICTION -0.11 0.000 
OPENENDED  AUDIT 0.02 0.344 LNSIZE  AUDIT 0.24 0.000 
OPENENDED  COMPLEXITY 0.14 0.000 LNSIZE  COMPLEXITY 0.10 0.000 
OPENENDED  IFEE -0.05 0.005 LNSIZE  IFEE 0.03 0.111 
OPENENDED  MIN -0.09 0.000 LNSIZE  MIN 0.29 0.000 
OPENENDED  LOCKUP -0.26 0.000 LNSIZE  LOCKUP 0.11 0.000 
OPENENDED  MFEE 0.05 0.009 LNSIZE  MFEE -0.06 0.000 
OPENENDED  OPEN 0.06 0.000 LNSIZE  OPEN -0.02 0.349 
HMARK AUDIT 0.02 0.298 LNSIZE  OPENENDED -0.02 0.162 
HMARK COMPLEXITY -0.12 0.000 LNSIZE  HMARK 0.18 0.000 
HMARK IFEE 0.21 0.000 LNSIZE  PERCAPITAL -0.05 0.002 
HMARK MIN 0.16 0.000 LNSIZE  RESTRICTION 0.22 0.000 
HMARK LOCKUP 0.31 0.000 LNSIZE  LEVERAGED -0.05 0.002 
HMARK MFEE -0.07 0.000 LNAGE  AUDIT 0.34 0.000 
HMARK OPEN 0.04 0.013 LNAGE  COMPLEXITY 0.08 0.000 
HMARK OPENENDED -0.35 0.000 LNAGE  IFEE -0.08 0.000 
PERCAPITAL AUDIT 0.04 0.031 LNAGE  MIN 0.03 0.081 
PERCAPITAL COMPLEXITY 0.09 0.000 LNAGE  LOCKUP -0.02 0.294 
PERCAPITAL IFEE 0.01 0.424 LNAGE  MFEE -0.02 0.182 
PERCAPITAL MIN -0.02 0.295 LNAGE  OPEN -0.03 0.049 
PERCAPITAL LOCKUP -0.04 0.028 LNAGE  OPENENDED 0.10 0.000 
PERCAPITAL MFEE -0.06 0.000 LNAGE  HMARK -0.14 0.000 
PERCAPITAL OPEN 0.05 0.001 LNAGE  PERCAPITAL 0.14 0.000 
PERCAPITAL OPENENDED 0.25 0.000 LNAGE  RESTRICTION -0.05 0.002 
PERCAPITAL HWMARK -0.23 0.000 LNAGE  LEVERAGED 0.00 0.905 
    LNAGE  LNSIZE 0.27 0.000 
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Table 4.  Correlation Statistics for the Complexity of Derivative Strategy, 
and Hedge Fund Risk and Performance 
This table presents a list of correlation statistics for the characteristics of hedge funds. The prob-
ability statistics to the right of the correlation statistics indicate the significance of the correlation 
based on the t-statistics. 
 
  Cor. Prob. 
CF COMPLEXITY  -0.03 0.044 
RCF COMPLEXITY  -0.02 0.188 
SCF COMPLEXITY  -0.02 0.197 
STDEV  COMPLEXITY 0.02 0.284 
SKEW COMPLEXITY -0.04 0.016 
VAR  COMPLEXITY -0.03 0.115 
MVAR  COMPLEXITY -0.02 0.166 
EXKURT  COMPLEXITY 0.04 0.019 
SSTDEV COMPLEXITY -0.02 0.293 
SSKEW COMPLEXITY 0.04 0.028 
SKURT COMPLEXITY 0.07 0.000 
RSKEW COMPLEXITY -0.04 0.028 
RKURT COMPLEXITY 0.01 0.671 
RSTDEV COMPLEXITY 0.05 0.002 
APPRAISAL COMPLEXITY  -0.04 0.022 
ALPHA COMPLEXITY  0.00 0.921 
SHARPE COMPLEXITY -0.08 0.000 
SHARPED COMPLEXITY -0.09 0.000 
 
The statistics in Table 4 suggest that the complexity of derivative strategy is 
strongly correlated with all other performance measures except alpha. The corre-
lation is statistically significant at the 5 % level for appraisal ratio. For the Sharpe 
ratio and the Sharpe ratio with downside volatility, the correlation is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. Admittedly, the correlations are relatively small but 
they imply that there is a seemingly negative association between the perform-
ance of a hedge fund and the complexity of its derivative strategy. The complex-
ity, however, is weakly correlated with traditional risk measures. 
The complexity of derivative strategy also has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant correlation with the Cornish-Fischer expansion at the 5 % level, suggesting 
that complexity of derivative strategy is associated with the fatter left tail of the 
hedge fund return distribution. Consequently, the complexity is also positively 
correlated with the excess kurtosis of the return distribution and negatively corre-
lated with the skewness of the return distribution, which supports the result for the 
Cornish-Fischer expansion. But, the complexity does not show a statistically sig-
nificant correlation between the Cornish-Fischer expansion of market-based and 
idiosyncratic risks. The correlation with the skewness of idiosyncratic risk is also 
different from that of the market-based risk. For the former the correlation is 
negative and for the latter the correlation is positive. These statistics imply that 
more weight may be given to results concerning both the market-based and idio-
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syncratic risks of a hedge fund. However, market-based risks may be different for 
different strategies, and thus the use of market-based factors is more relevant for 
some strategies. Therefore, the controls for the strategies are important in this 
case. 
In the sample of this study, which includes 3,403 hedge funds, 168 of these funds 
invest in other funds. Table 5 presents the characteristics of hedge funds investing 
in other funds for which the correlation statistics is not presented in Table 3 given 
that a separate description of the variable is more informative. The statistics in 
Table 5 suggest that hedge funds which invest in other funds use more complex 
derivative strategies. They also have higher management fees and lower incentive 
fees. They also impose less restrictive redemption policy as they have lower lock-
up and restriction periods.   
Table 5.  Characteristics of Hedge Funds Investing in Other funds 
This table presents the mean values of fund characteristics for hedge funds which invest and do 
not invest in other funds.  
 
 Invests in other funds 
 Yes No 
COMPLEXITY 4.33 2.44 
LNSIZE 17.03 17.17 
LNAGE 7.78 7.61 
MFEE 1.56 1.47 
RESTRICTION 37.49 46.95 
IFEE 13.30 19.10 
LEVERAGED 0.64 0.69 
HMARK 0.40 0.64 
MIN 522782.40 795760.10 
LOCKUP 2.49 3.64 
OPEN 0.25 0.16 
OPENENDED 0.70 0.61 
5.1 Funds of Hedge Funds 
This study also uses data on funds of hedge funds in its analysis. The use of this 
sample is important to highlight the differences between this study and the study 
by Chen (2009). Chen (2009) particularly includes funds of hedge funds in the 
sample with other hedge funds in the multivariate analysis of his study. Applying 
the same criteria as for hedge funds to select funds of hedge funds from the TASS 
database provides a sample of 763 funds of hedge funds of which 2 funds do not 
report minimum investment. Thus, 761 funds of hedge funds are used in the 
cross-sectional analysis of risk and performance of funds of hedge funds.  
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Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for funds of hedge funds. The statistics 
are very similar to that of hedge funds presented in Table 2. For instance, the av-
erage management fee 1.47 % for funds of hedge funds is approximately the same 
as for hedge funds. However, the incentive fee is 9.76 % (18.85 % - 9.09 % = 
9.76 %) lower for funds of hedge funds. The risk is significantly lower for funds 
of hedge funds when measured using the standard deviation, downside volatility, 
MVaR, and VaR. This is likely the result of diversification in different hedge 
funds. However, the average Cornish-Fischer estimate is more negative for funds 
of hedge funds implying a fatter left tail of the return distribution of a fund of 
hedge funds. It is also interesting that this estimate is lower for idiosyncratic re-
turns than for market-based returns, which is the opposite for hedge funds. The 
interesting question remains as to the cause of this distinguishing characteristic of 
funds of hedge funds.  
The statistics in Tables 2 and 6 also suggest that the performance statistics are 
weaker for funds of hedge funds than for hedge funds. This result, however, can 
be related to fewer biases in the funds of hedge funds data (see Fung et al. 2002b), 
therefore it is obvious that funds of hedge funds cannot be judged to perform bet-
ter without further evidence. 
Table 7 presents the correlation statistics between the variables of the characteris-
tics of funds of hedge funds. The correlation statistics for the complexity of the 
derivative strategy of funds of hedge funds is fairly similar to that of hedge funds. 
However, the complexity does not have statistically significant correlation with 
management fees and the correlation with the natural logarithm of the size of a 
hedge fund is also weaker. These statistics imply that the complexity would not 
be as costly for funds of hedge funds. 
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for Funds of Hedge Funds 
This table presents descriptive statistics and the Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics of the variables 
used in the cross-sectional analysis for funds of hedge funds of this study. The sample includes 
761 funds of hedge funds used in multivariate analysis of this study. See Table 1 for definitions of 
the variables. 
 
  LNSIZE LNAGE IFEE MFEE MIN RESTRICTION 
Mean 17.22 7.70 9.09 1.47 552451.40 57.75 
Median 17.23 7.65 10.00 1.50 250000.00 60.00 
Maximum 21.74 9.29 30.00 6.00 25000000.00 180.00 
Minimum 11.63 6.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 1.63 0.57 7.29 0.62 1379536.00 39.84 
Skewness -0.18 0.20 0.31 1.67 9.76 0.48 
Kurtosis 2.90 2.26 2.20 10.56 143.91 2.70 
       
JB 4.52*** 22.11*** 32.60*** 2165.36*** 641623.40*** 32.39***  
  LOCKUP STDEV MEAN VAR MVAR 
Mean 2.14 2.41 0.65 -4.96 -5.64 
Median 0.00 1.78 0.65 -3.38 -4.00 
Maximum 60.00 28.45 5.08 -0.05 85.94 
Minimum 0.00 0.22 -3.29 -63.37 -90.88 
Std. Dev. 5.34 2.13 0.49 4.99 7.25 
Skewness 3.69 4.34 -0.23 -4.21 -0.84 
Kurtosis 26.30 38.92 19.89 35.44 64.26 
      
JB 18931.48*** 43307.63*** 9051.67*** 35611.90*** 119070.10***  
  CF DD SKEW EXKURT SHARPE 
Mean -2.70 2.41 -0.19 3.28 0.24 
Median -2.55 1.82 -0.18 1.26 0.25 
Maximum 11.32 25.73 7.60 74.23 1.59 
Minimum -10.26 0.22 -8.00 -1.05 -0.66 
Std. Dev. 1.06 2.05 1.18 6.92 0.23 
Skewness 1.78 4.29 -0.85 5.11 0.41 
Kurtosis 48.04 36.88 11.61 37.48 5.83 
      
JB 64720.79*** 38716.41*** 2444.30*** 41017.28*** 274.77***  
  SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA SCF ICF 
 Mean 0.24 0.26 0.25 -2.53 -2.80 
 Median 0.23 0.24 0.26 -2.36 -2.40 
 Maximum 1.84 2.43 6.45 -1.57 -1.64 
 Minimum -0.64 -2.01 -5.76 -10.66 -20.30 
 Std. Dev. 0.24 0.42 0.71 0.75 1.54 
 Skewness 1.05 0.32 -0.56 -3.74 -5.29 
 Kurtosis 8.66 7.30 23.46 27.36 43.13 
      
 JB 1154.95*** 599.82*** 13318.02*** 20599.17*** 54616.29***  
  SSKEW SSTDEV RSTDEV RSKEW RKURT SKURT 
 Mean -0.09 1.72 1.62 -0.12 2.19 1.13 
 Median -0.05 1.32 1.16 -0.06 0.83 0.60 
 Maximum 2.52 22.57 17.33 5.97 56.81 22.54 
 Minimum -4.34 0.10 0.06 -6.56 -1.22 -1.09 
 Std. Dev. 0.61 1.56 1.52 0.92 5.10 2.04 
 Skewness -0.97 4.79 3.88 -0.90 5.48 3.93 
 Kurtosis 8.51 49.38 27.72 12.71 42.99 29.28 
       
 JB 1082.56*** 71113.55*** 21281.24*** 3090.48*** 54518.96*** 23853.10***  
  HMARK AUDIT PERCAPITAL OPEN OPENENDED LEVERAGED 
Mean 0.48 0.66 0.35 0.24 0.72 0.50 
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Table 7.  Correlation Statistics for Fund of Hedge Funds Characteristics 
This table presents a list of correlation statistics for the characteristics of funds of hedge funds. 
The probability statistics on the right hand side of the correlation statistics indicate significance of 
correlation based on the t-statistics. 
 
    Cor. Prob.     Cor. Prob. 
LNAGE  LNSIZE 0.27 0.000 PERCAPITAL  LNSIZE -0.14 0.000 
HMARK LNSIZE 0.15 0.000 PERCAPITAL  LNAGE 0.21 0.000 
HMARK LNAGE -0.20 0.000 PERCAPITAL  HMARK -0.18 0.000 
IFEE LNSIZE -0.05 0.143 PERCAPITAL  IFEE -0.06 0.081 
IFEE LNAGE -0.08 0.025 PERCAPITAL  MFEE -0.02 0.498 
IFEE HMARK 0.31 0.000 PERCAPITAL  LEVERAGED 0.14 0.000 
MFEE LNSIZE -0.08 0.021 PERCAPITAL  MIN 0.05 0.197 
MFEE LNAGE 0.10 0.007 PERCAPITAL  LOCKUP -0.04 0.225 
MFEE HMARK -0.24 0.000 PERCAPITAL  RESTRICTION -0.09 0.011 
MFEE IFEE 0.21 0.000 PERCAPITAL  AUDIT 0.14 0.000 
LEVERAGED  LNSIZE -0.11 0.004 OPEN LNSIZE 0.10 0.006 
LEVERAGED  LNAGE 0.13 0.000 OPEN LNAGE 0.03 0.350 
LEVERAGED  HMARK -0.20 0.000 OPEN HMARK -0.05 0.180 
LEVERAGED  IFEE 0.03 0.478 OPEN IFEE -0.21 0.000 
LEVERAGED  MFEE 0.08 0.022 OPEN MFEE 0.03 0.459 
MIN LNSIZE 0.19 0.000 OPEN LEVERAGED -0.06 0.109 
MIN LNAGE 0.01 0.731 OPEN MIN -0.04 0.236 
MIN HMARK 0.10 0.004 OPEN LOCKUP -0.04 0.297 
MIN IFEE -0.03 0.430 OPEN RESTRICTION 0.01 0.773 
MIN MFEE -0.14 0.000 OPEN AUDIT 0.01 0.835 
MIN LEVERAGED -0.05 0.135 OPEN PERCAPITAL  0.00 0.986 
LOCKUPP LNSIZE -0.01 0.703 OPENENDED  LNSIZE -0.04 0.308 
LOCKUPP LNAGE -0.07 0.043 OPENENDED  LNAGE 0.11 0.002 
LOCKUPP HMARK 0.22 0.000 OPENENDED  HMARK -0.25 0.000 
LOCKUPP IFEE -0.02 0.640 OPENENDED  IFEE -0.06 0.094 
LOCKUPP MFEE -0.16 0.000 OPENENDED  MFEE 0.07 0.053 
LOCKUPP LEVERAGED -0.10 0.006 OPENENDED  LEVERAGED 0.12 0.001 
LOCKUPP MIN 0.12 0.001 OPENENDED  MIN -0.10 0.006 
RESTRICTION  LNSIZE 0.23 0.000 OPENENDED  LOCKUP -0.29 0.000 
RESTRICTION  LNAGE -0.06 0.096 OPENENDED  RESTRICTION -0.26 0.000 
RESTRICTION  HMARK 0.38 0.000 OPENENDED  AUDIT 0.02 0.510 
RESTRICTION  IFEE -0.13 0.000 OPENENDED  PERCAPITAL  0.09 0.016 
RESTRICTION  MFEE -0.25 0.000 OPENENDED  OPEN 0.11 0.002 
RESTRICTION  LEVERAGED -0.11 0.003 COMPLEXITY  LNSIZE 0.07 0.067 
RESTRICTION  MIN 0.19 0.000 COMPLEXITY  LNAGE 0.09 0.012 
RESTRICTION  LOCKUP 0.30 0.000 COMPLEXITY  HMARK -0.12 0.001 
AUDIT LNSIZE 0.16 0.000 COMPLEXITY  IFEE -0.06 0.103 
AUDIT LNAGE 0.35 0.000 COMPLEXITY  MFEE 0.04 0.279 
AUDIT HMARK -0.10 0.005 COMPLEXITY  LEVERAGED 0.22 0.000 
AUDIT IFEE -0.02 0.555 COMPLEXITY  MIN 0.01 0.853 
AUDIT MFEE 0.00 0.940 COMPLEXITY  LOCKUP -0.15 0.000 
AUDIT LEVERAGED 0.08 0.023 COMPLEXITY  RESTRICTION -0.08 0.023 
AUDIT MIN 0.07 0.047 COMPLEXITY  AUDIT 0.09 0.014 
AUDIT LOCKUP 0.02 0.591 COMPLEXITY  PERCAPITAL  0.10 0.007 
AUDIT RESTRICTION -0.05 0.144 COMPLEXITY  OPEN 0.16 0.000 
      COMPLEXITY  OPENENDED 0.11 0.002 
Table 8 presents the correlation statistics for the complexity of the derivative 
strategy of funds of hedge funds and their performance and risk measures. The 
statistics suggest that the complexity is negatively correlated with the Cornish-
Fischer expansion of residual returns. Thus, the complexity seems to be associ-
ated with the fatter left tail of the residual return distribution of a fund of hedge 
funds. The statistics for VaR and the standard deviation suggest that the complex-
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ity is associated with less risk. The complexity is also negatively associated with 
the standard deviation of residual returns. The performance ratios instead do not 
seem to be correlated with the complexity. All in all, the statistics support Hy-
potheses 3 and 5b and the support for Hypothesis 5b is related to idiosyncratic 
returns of funds of hedge funds. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Table 8.  Correlation Statistics for the Complexity of Derivative Strategy, 
and Fund of Hedge Funds Risk and Performance 
This table presents a list of correlation statistics for the characteristics of hedge funds. The prob-
ability statistics to the right of the correlation statistics indicate the significance of the correlation 
based on the t-statistics.  
 
    Cor. Prob. 
CF COMPLEXITY  -0.06 0.105 
RCF COMPLEXITY  -0.07 0.043 
SCF COMPLEXITY  0.00 0.963 
STDEV  COMPLEXITY -0.07 0.049 
SKEW COMPLEXITY -0.08 0.029 
VAR  COMPLEXITY 0.07 0.050 
MVAR  COMPLEXITY 0.03 0.385 
EXKURT  COMPLEXITY 0.05 0.204 
SSTDEV COMPLEXITY -0.09 0.011 
SSKEW COMPLEXITY 0.01 0.724 
MEAN COMPLEXITY 0.00 0.953 
D COMPLEXITY -0.06 0.114 
SKURT COMPLEXITY 0.01 0.797 
RSKEW COMPLEXITY -0.10 0.006 
RKURT COMPLEXITY  0.04 0.291 
RSTDEV COMPLEXITY  -0.04 0.241 
APPRAISAL COMPLEXITY  -0.03 0.393 
ALPHA COMPLEXITY  0.00 0.891 
SHARPE COMPLEXITY  -0.02 0.583 
SHARPED COMPLEXITY  -0.03 0.473 
Figure 2 presents an illustration and the summary statistics for the complexity of 
the derivative strategies of funds of hedge funds. The distribution of the complex-
ity is clearly different from that of hedge funds as illustrated in Figure 1. The 
complexity peaks at the high and low values of the variable meaning that there are 
relatively many funds of hedge funds using either a highly complex derivative 
strategy or not using derivatives at all. 
The mean value for the complexity variable is also 109 % higher for funds of 
hedge funds than hedge funds. This statistic is also consistent with those pre-
sented in Table 5 for hedge funds which invest in other funds. Thus, funds of 
funds use more complex derivative strategies than hedge funds and have a differ-
ent profile of the use of derivatives which motivates one to investigate these funds 
separately.  
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This figure presents the number of different types of derivatives used by a fund of hedge funds for 
the sample of funds of funds. This figure also presents descriptive statistics for the variable COM-
PLEXITY. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Different Type of Derivatives Used by Funds of Hedge 
Funds 
5.2 Database Biases Related to Hedge Fund Research 
The databases of hedge fund returns also exhibit many biases which are relevant 
to empirical research. Fund and Hsieh (2002b) call biases that arising from the 
way data vendors collect hedge fund information “spurious biases.” They further 
present and discuss survivorship bias, selection bias, and instant history bias: 
Survivorship Bias: Fung et al. (2002b) explain survivorship bias as follows: 
“Survivorship bias arises when a sample of hedge funds includes only funds that 
are operating at the end of the sample period and excludes funds that have ceased 
operations during the period.” However, it is important to consider that the bias 
also may work in the opposite direction. For example, best performing funds 
close their funds to new investors and stop reporting their returns to the database 
vendor. Indeed, Ackermann et al. (1999) using monthly returns for the period 
1988-1995 find evidence that positive and negative survival-related biases offset 
each other. 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) using a sample of the TASS database from 1994 to 2003 
find that the survivorship bias causes hedge fund returns to be upward biased. 
Using the same database as Malkiel et al. (2005), Amin and Kat (2002) also find 
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that ignoring survivorship bias leads to overestimation of the standard deviation 
and kurtosis and underestimation of the skewness of the returns of hedge funds. 
Selection Bias: The sample of hedge funds provided by a database vendor is just 
a sample and not the explicit “truth” of the hedge fund industry. Thus, not all 
hedge funds are collected in the sample of the database leaving a possibility of 
selection bias. Fung et al. (2002b) define selection bias as follows: “The combina-
tion of the voluntary nature of information databases and the different inclusion 
processes of database vendors can lead to differences between the performance of 
funds in a database and that of funds in the universe of hedge funds…” For in-
stance, some best performing hedge funds which do not need additional capital do 
not need to advertise their performance to investors, and therefore they do not 
need to report their returns to the database either. Like survivorship bias, the im-
pact of selection bias on the performance may also be the opposite so that poorly 
performing funds do not want to report their returns in the database. This possibil-
ity, however, may be less credible. 
Instant History Bias (Backfill Bias): This bias exists in a sample of hedge funds 
when hedge funds are included in the database and the database vendor allows a 
hedge fund to report its instant or longer history prior to inclusion. The problem 
arising is that this data may not be fully relevant for a hedge fund after the inclu-
sion as, for example, the strategy may have changed or the size of a fund has in-
creased. Also, funds may provide backfilled returns only for good performance. 
Indeed, Fung et al. (2000) and Malkiel et al. (2005) find that the backfilled returns 
in the TASS hedge fund database are much higher than the contemporaneously 
reported returns. 
Late Reporting Bias: This bias, which is not discussed by Fung et al. (2002b) 
and is first documented by Tiu (2005), arises when hedge funds report their return 
up to 8 months late to the database vendors and these funds may appear as de-
funct funds even though they may still be running, yet not reporting returns in-
stantly. When using data which suffers from the late reporting bias, the return 
difference between funds that report their returns on time and funds that delay 
reporting their returns is subject to this bias. According to the results of Schnee-
weis, Spurgin and Waksman (2006), hedge funds which delay reporting their re-
turns often report lower performance than hedge funds which report early. This 
bias should have an impact on the performance measurement, at least to some 
extent. 
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6 METHODS 
The empirical analysis of this study begins as a multivariate analysis of the de-
terminants of derivatives use of a hedge fund. The method for this analysis is lo-
gistic regression (LR) analysis. The empirical analysis continues as a univariate 
method for asset specialized options use and hedge fund risk and performance. 
This analysis compares the average difference in the risk and performance statis-
tics between asset specialized options users and nonusers. The method of univari-
ate analysis is the conventional t-test. Similar analysis is applied on the asset spe-
cialized use of equity index futures and hedge fund performance to test Hypothe-
sis 2. The analysis continues with a multivariate analysis of the performance and 
risk characteristics of hedge funds. The methods for this analysis are Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regression analyses. The selection of control 
variables in the multivariate analyses is first motivated before the presentation of 
the analysis models. After the presentation of the control variables used this study 
presents the selected risk and performance measures. Lastly, the analysis methods 
are presented. 
6.1 Selection of Other Fund Characteristics in 
the Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Chen’s (2008) results suggest that the use of derivatives by a hedge fund is asso-
ciated with higher minimum investments, higher incentive fees, less restrictive 
redemption policy, managerial ownership, the absence of lockup periods, the ab-
sence of high watermarks, and the use of auditing services11. Therefore, manage-
ment fee, incentive fee, restriction period time, lockup period, a dummy variable 
if the manager invests personal capital in the fund, and a dummy variable indicat-
ing that a hedge fund is audited if its value is one are included as control variables 
to account for these characteristics. Other relevant hedge fund characteristics in-
cluded in the model are minimum investment in a hedge fund, natural logarithms 
of size and age, a dummy variable indicating that a hedge fund is open to the pub-
lic if its value is one, a dummy variable indicating that a hedge fund is a closed-
end fund if its value is one, a dummy variable indicating that a hedge fund uses a 
high watermark if its value is one, hedge fund strategy dummies excluding the 
                                                
 
11  In an earlier version of the study by Chen (2009), Chen (2008) uses a more extensive set of 
explanatory variables to explain derivative use by hedge funds.  
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multi-strategy
12
, dummy variables of fund’s reported asset classes, and dummy 
variables for fund’s reported asset focuses other than examined. The difference 
between closed-end fund and open-end fund is that closed- end fund has a limited 
number of shares while open-end funds can redeem existing shares and issue new 
shares. The use of asset class dummies is justified by the fact that the definitions 
for hedge fund strategies may differ and be overlapping as can be seen in Appen-
dix 1. Therefore, other classification approaches than the strategy classifications 
may also be beneficial. Chen (2009) does not include size and age variables in the 
regression analysis of derivatives use by hedge funds. The reason for dropping 
out these variables is that the relation between these variables and derivatives use 
may be biased due to look-ahead bias. Specifically, the problem is that derivatives 
use by a hedge fund may be indicated at the beginning of the sample period while 
the size variable may be based on later information. To alleviate this problem the 
size variable used in this study is the average size of a hedge fund over the period 
January 1994 – December 2006. Nevertheless, the results on the relation between 
the size of a hedge fund and its derivatives use should be interpreted with a cau-
tion. 
Incentive fees can also be important in explaining hedge fund performance. Better 
performance-based compensation which aligns investors’ interests with managers 
interests (see Holmström 1979) should attract informed managers. Thus, it is sen-
sible to control for this characteristic. If manager skill could be explained merely 
by higher incentive fees, it does not yet show that investors could benefit from 
options use by these skilled managers. From an alternative point of view, Chen 
(2008) similarly notices that higher incentive fees may attract more talented man-
agers. Therefore, management and incentive fees can be considered as indicators 
of fund quality, and therefore these variables may imply lower risk and better 
performance. In fact, Ackermann et al. (1999) and Liang (1999) find evidence 
that incentive fees can explain hedge fund performance.  
It is assumed that auditing a hedge fund and the openness of a hedge fund to pub-
lic may be substituted with higher auditing effectiveness and transparency of a 
hedge fund due to more regulations related to retail investors (see Liang 2003). 
As hedge funds do not in practice report whether they are audited but may not 
report auditing date in the TASS database, non-missing auditing dates are used as 
                                                
 
12
  Multi-strategy is used as an omitted variable category to avoid the dummy trap. Hedge fund 
strategies included as control variables are the convertible arbitrage, event-driven, dedicated 
short bias, equity long-short, emerging market, equity market-neutral, fixed-income arbitrage, 
global/macro, and managed futures. 
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a proxy for auditing similar to Liang (2003) and Chen (2009)13. Personal capital 
invested by a manager may be associated with better fund quality and as lower 
risk gaming (see Hodder et al. 2007; Kouwenberg et al. 2007) and, in theory, 
higher quality (see Leland et al. 1997). 
Two additional control variables which indicate the sophistication of a hedge fund 
and are included in the analysis are the natural logarithms of fund size and age. 
These variables can be considered to be proxies for the economies of scale, evolu-
tion and sophistication of a hedge fund.  
TASS reports the lockup, redemption notice and payout periods of hedge funds. 
These characteristics may indicate higher illiquidity risk, which may be replaced 
by higher returns through illiquidity risk premium (see, e.g. Amihud and Mendel-
son 1986). For hedge funds, the results by Aragon (2007) suggest that the share 
restrictions of a hedge fund are associated with higher risk premium in the hedge 
fund investment strategy. Thus, redemption and payout periods and lockup peri-
ods revisiting of the share restrictions, are also combined in the performance and 
risk analysis in addition to the closed-end dummy variable. Following Agarwal et 
al. (2009) and Klebanov (2008), redemption and payout periods in days are com-
bined to a single restriction variable in the analysis of this study. Lockup period in 
months is still included in the analysis as an individual variable. 
Leverage must be considered as a dummy variable in the regression analysis (1 = 
leverage) because the use of leverage may have an impact on risk. In the Lipper 
TASS hedge fund database, hedge fund managers report the average and maxi-
mum leverage that they use in addition to information on whether they use lever-
age. A dummy variable of leverage use is mainly used in this study given that 
fewer hedge funds report further information regarding their leverage use. Also, 
the information for maximum and average leverage used by hedge funds may 
vary over time, and thus the information contained in the variable may not be ful-
ly reliable. However, a complimentary analysis using the average leverage of a 
hedge fund will be presented. 
High watermarks may also have an impact on the risk of a hedge fund as manag-
ers may increase risk if their performance is under the high watermark, and vice 
versa. For instance, the analysis by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) sug-
gests that high variance strategies and strategies which are associated with higher 
                                                
 
13  Auditing date of a hedge fund refers to “financial audit date” presented in the Lipper TASS 
Questionaire. Thus, auditing of a hedge fund is not clearly defined in the questionnaire and the 
information is based on managers’ own judgement.  
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sensitivity of investors to withdraw their money especially should motivate to use 
high watermark contracts.  
The models of this study are augmented using time dummies to account for the 
time-varying performance of hedge funds. Specifically, for each year from 1994 
to 2006, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a hedge fund has a return 
history more than 6 months during the year. The choice of a 6-month threshold is 
simply compromising for selection funds for each year between their inclusions 
from 1 to 12 months. 
6.2 Performance and Risk Measures 
The first performance measure examined in cross-sectional analysis is the arith-
metic mean return of a hedge fund and the first risk measure used for cross-
sectional analysis is the sample standard deviation. The second risk measure is 
VaR that is used to measure the worst return of a hedge fund with 99% certainty. 
The VaR used in this study relies on the assumption of normally distributed hedge 
fund returns and is defined as:  
(38) VaR = μ + z ( ) ,  
where z ( )  defines the critical value corresponding to 99 % confidence level;  
defines the sample mean, and defines the sample standard deviation. The third 
risk measure, which accounts for skewness and kurtosis, is MVaR that is defined 
as: 
(39) MVaR = μ +
 
z ( ) + 1
6
z ( )2 1( )S +
1
24
z ( )3  3z ( )( )K 
1
36
2z ( )3  5z ( )( )S2
 
  
 
 	 

 
where  defines skewness,  defines excess kurtosis. MVaR is a popular risk 
measure for hedge funds (see, e.g., Liang and Park 2007; Bali et al. 2007). The 
expansion which is used in the construction of MVaR is known as the Cornish-
Fischer (CF) expansion, specifically:  
(40)  CF = 
 z ( ) + 1
6
z ( )2 1( )S +
1
24
z ( )3  3z ( )( )K 
1
36
2z ( )3  5z ( )( )S2 . 
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Lower (higher) value for the Cornish-Fischer measure of a hedge fund implies a 
fatter (thinner) left tail of its return distribution. In addition to the use of VaR and 
MVaR in the analysis of this study, the Cornish-Fischer expansion, skewness, and 
excess kurtosis of hedge fund returns are used in the cross-sectional analysis. 
These measures are needed to test Hypotheses 5a and 5b. The expansion is exam-
ined on the same variables as VaR and MVaR. This approach is interesting be-
cause these determinants should explain the differences between the results for 
the VaR and MVaR measures. The critical value of the examined CF expansion 
also corresponds to the 99 % confidence level. 
In addition to the sample standard deviation and VaR methodology, downside 
deviation of hedge fund returns is used. Formally, the downside volatility is the 
following: 
(41) Dp =
R p,t <R h
(Rp,t  R p )2
t= 0
T
 N ,  
where  defines the mean of the returns of a hedge fund, and  defines the 
return of a hedge fund at time t, and defines the downside volatility of the 
returns of a hedge fund.  
In addition to the arithmetic mean return, four different performance measures are 
used for the cross-sectional analysis. The first performance measure is the Sharpe 
ratio (1966, 1994) that is defined as 
(42) 
  
Sharpep =
1
N
Rp,t  Rf ,t( )
t= 0
T
   Rp  Rf( ) ,  
where 
  
  Rp  Rf( ) defines the volatility of excess returns of a hedge fund;  
defines the return of a hedge fund, and  defines the risk-free rate. In practice, 
the Sharpe ratio is a popular and traditional performance indicator. However, the 
Sharpe ratio relies heavily on normality of returns, yet this assumption may not be 
applied to individual hedge fund returns. Accordingly, the Sharpe ratio with 
downside volatility that considers only volatility of returns below the average 
return is used to account for the asymmetry as 
(43) SharpeDp =
1
N
Rp,t  Rf ,t( )
t= 0
T
 Dp ,  
where  is calculated from the excess returns (small difference from the risk 
analysis of downside volatility). This version of the Sharpe ratio is close to the 
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symmetric downside-risk Sharpe ratio proposed by Ziemba (2005). The particular 
difference from Ziemba’s (2005) Sharpe ratio is that he calculates the downside 
risk on the returns below zero. However, some successful hedge funds may have 
been able to sustain constantly positive returns, and thus the downside volatility 
on the returns below zero could not be calculated for all hedge funds. This prob-
lem could cause a serious bias. Therefore, Ziemba’s (2005) approach to model 
downside-risk Sharpe ratio is applied for downside volatility, which is calculated 
on returns below the mean return. This choice should be more sensible for hedge 
fund analysis. Also, the standard deviation of the downside Sharpe ratio is not 
scaled by the square root of 2, since the purpose in the analysis of this study is to 
compare the performance between hedge funds using the same measures. The 
scaling would make the downside Sharpe ratio more comparable with the ordi-
nary Sharpe ratio. 
Admittedly, the choice of performance measure does not necessarily alter the rank 
of a hedge fund according to Eling and Schuhmacher (2007), but comparison of 
these performance measures demonstrates the implications of the use of deriva-
tives with asymmetry considered and contrasted between the variables.  
A viable alternative for the Sharpe ratio with downside volatility would be the 
Modified Sharpe ratio, which applies the MVaR risk measure instead of the stan-
dard deviation, and is often used for hedge funds, for example, by Gregoriou and 
Gueyie (2003). However, the risk-return relationship for the expected return and 
the MVaR may be complicated. Bali et al. (2007) find that the relation between 
the downside risk of a hedge fund measured using the VaR methodology and its 
return is positive for live funds and negative for defunct funds. The result implies 
that the risk-return relation is positive for live funds and negative for dead funds. 
The authors’ explanation for the phenomenon is that by taking a high risk fund 
may spend fund capital and become liquidated after a poor performance resulting 
as negative risk-return relation. These characteristics may be problematic in the 
performance measurement as the risk-return relation is not conclusive. As a re-
sult, this study uses the Sharpe ratio with downside volatility which is also closely 
associated with the original Sharpe ratio. 
In addition to the conventional Sharpe ratio statistics, it is advisable to account for 
the market-based factors of hedge fund returns and focus on abnormal perform-
ance. Therefore, this study employs an empirical factor model to estimate the al-
phas (see Jensen 1967) and appraisal ratios (Treynor et al. 1973) of hedge fund 
performance. The empirical factors chosen for the model are motivated by earlier 
research. The following set of risk factors is chosen: 
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Buy-and-hold option writing strategies for put and call options. These factors 
are chosen based on the evidence of Agarwal et al. (2004) that hedge fund returns 
can resemble option writing strategies. Therefore, three different buy-and-hold 
strategies are chosen: returns in excess of risk-free rate on CBOE S&P 500 Buy-
Write Index, CBOE S&P 500 2% OTM BuyWrite Index, and CBOE S&P 500 
PutWrite Index. The first index returns replicates the performance of a strategy 
which involves buying an S&P 500 stock index portfolio and writing an at-the-
money S&P 500 index call option. The second index returns replicate the per-
formance of a strategy which involves buying a S&P 500 stock index portfolio 
and writing an out-of-the-money S&P 500 index call option. The third index re-
turns replicates the performance of a strategy which involves investing in cash 
U.S. T-Bill rate and writing an at-the-money S&P 500 index put option. 
The choice of above mentioned simple buy-and-hold indices is a reasonable 
benchmark to test whether hedge funds are able to produce performance in excess 
of the factors as the strategies could well be investable for investors. As a result, 
the use of the factors especially advocates investigating the benefits from the use 
of derivatives from the investors’ viewpoint. 
Asset-Based Style Factors: Following Fung et al. (2004b), the six-asset based 
style factors are chosen: returns in excess of risk-free rate on the U.S. stock mar-
ket, end of the month difference of the yield on constant-maturity T-bond, and 
PTFS factors for equity, interest rates, bonds, currency, and commodities14. 
Volatility Risk Factor: The end of the month difference in the VIX implied vola-
tility is chosen to account for volatility risk. This factor is extremely relevant in 
this study to capture systematic risk in hedge fund returns as the focus is on de-
rivatives. The relevance of this factor for this study is the reason for not using a 
closely related variable in the asset based style analysis, end of the month differ-
ence in the credit spread (see Fung et al. 2004a). 
Factors for Market Anomalies: The SMB, HML, and UMD factors are also cho-
sen as empirical risk factors. The factors are motivated by the Capocci’s et al. 
(2004) study which suggests that these factors are strong explanatory variables for 
                                                
 
14  The proxy for the excess return on the market is the value-weight return on stocks listed on 
the U.S. stock markets. Specifically, the stock markets are the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stock markets. Data for this factor is downloaded from Kenneth French webpage. Data for 
PTFS factors is downloaded from David Hsieh’s webpage: 
  http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Edah7/HFData.htm.  
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hedge fund returns. Data for these factors is downloaded from the Kenneth 
French data library along with the market factor15. 
In time-series analysis, all the hedge fund returns examined are in excess of risk-
free rate. The risk-free rate for this study is the 1-month U.S. T-bill from Ibbotson 
Associates. The model in the empirical time-series analysis is analogous to Equa-
tion (9) and the model is formally the following: 
(44) Rp,t  Rf ,t = p + bp,n fn,t
n=1
12
 + ep,t ,  
where defines the abnormal return of a hedge fund;  defines the return of a 
hedge fund;  defines the risk-free return; bp,n fn,t
n=1
12
 defines the set of above 
mentioned empirical risk factors; defines the residual return of a hedge fund. 
The alpha and the appraisal ratios described in Section Two are then used in the 
empirical analysis of this study. The fitted returns of regression Equation (47) are 
used to estimate the market-based risk of a hedge fund including the standard de-
viation, skewness, excess kurtosis, and Cornish-Fischer expansion. The residual 
returns of regression Equation (47) are likewise used to estimate idiosyncratic risk 
of a hedge fund including the standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, and 
Cornish-Fischer expansion. 
6.3 Determinants of Derivatives Use by Hedge Funds 
To test determinants of derivatives use by hedge funds, LR analysis is used. The 
empirical model for testing the cross-sectional analysis of options use is the fol-
lowing (Model 1): 
(45) log
Pr DERIVATIVE ji =1( )
1Pr DERIVATIVE ji =1( )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=   
  i + 1SPECIALIZATIONi +
 2LEVERAGE +  jCONTROL ji + ei
j=1
N
   
                                                
 
15  http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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where DERIVATIVE ji defines the use of derivative j by fund i; 
SPECIALIZATIONi  defines a dummy variable for the specialization for the same 
asset as the asset class ofDERIVATIVE ji, and CONTROLi  defines an additional 
control variable j of fund i. In addition to the above-mentioned fund characteris-
tics these control variables also include dummy variables for invested asset 
classes, other asset focuses than that ofDERIVATIVE ji. This model does not test 
any of the hypotheses of this study. It rather provides supportive information for 
its conclusions. The variables for the invested asset classes are important as they 
take into account if a hedge fund reports that it invests in the asset class but does 
not yet imply a focus on the asset class. The association between options use and 
asset specialization is seen particularly as a statistically significant coefficient of 
DERIVATIVE jifor the options use for the same asset as the funds in the sample 
have a focus on (asset specialization).  
6.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Performance and Risk 
The empirical analyses of this study continue with cross-sectional analysis of 
hedge fund performance after examining the determinants of options use. The 
purpose of cross-sectional performance and risk analysis is to provide a detailed 
picture of the use of options and control for other variables that may explain 
hedge fund performance and risk. The dummy variables for the use of other de-
rivatives and options for each asset class (1 = use options or other derivatives) 
form variables for asset classes respectively. These variables are used to indicate 
whether the use of particular derivatives has an impact on hedge fund perform-
ance and risk. Other primary focuses, other invested asset classes, and hedge fund 
strategies are controlled for as in the previous analysis. 
The empirical model for the cross-sectional performance and risk characteristic 
analyses of hedge funds is the following (Model 2): 
(46) MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + ei
j=1
N
 , 
where MEASURE ji  defines a risk/performance measure j of fund i; 
CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and DERIVATIVE ji 
defines a dummy variable for the use of a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative 
is used, and 0 otherwise). Model 2 is used to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 5a. Statisti-
cally significant values of  j  imply derivatives use affecting the performance and 
risk characteristics of hedge funds. 
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To test the impact of the complexity of derivative strategies on the risk and per-
formance characteristics of a hedge fund Model 2 is reformulated and the empiri-
cal model for the cross-sectional analysis of the complexity, which tests Hypothe-
ses 3, 4, and 5b, is the following (Model 3):  
(46) MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + ei, 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund 
i; CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  
defines the number of different derivatives used by a hedge fund. Statistically 
significant and positive values of   imply supportive evidence for the hypothe-
ses examined.  
The number of different derivatives used by a hedge fund is considered to be a 
proxy for complexity of derivative strategies. As there is no more detailed infor-
mation available on the use of derivatives for a sufficient sample of hedge funds, 
the variable constructed may be considered as the most reasonable proxy for the 
complexity of derivative strategy. Intuitively, the more a hedge fund uses differ-
ent types of derivatives, the more complex its derivative strategy is. The variable 
for the complexity is slightly similar to the variable for complexity of a hedge 
fund used by Tiu (2005) as the complexity variable used by Tiu (2005) counts for 
the number of significant strategy exposures of a hedge fund to 15 different in-
dices. 
Different options counted in the construction of the complexity variable are op-
tions for equity, fixed-income, commodity, and currency. Futures and forwards, 
respectively, for fixed-income, currency, and commodity are counted for the vari-
able but for equity the Lipper TASS database reports only the use of equity index 
futures. Also, warrants issued with equity securities, warrants issued with fixed-
income securities, interest rate swaps, and cross-currency interest rate swaps are 
counted for the variable. To sum up, data in the Lipper TASS database allows a 
proxy variable to be constructed for the complexity of derivative strategies by a 
hedge fund ranging from 0 to 15. As an example of the complexity, if a hedge 
fund uses equity index futures and equity index options, the strategy is assumed to 
be more complex than if the hedge fund had used only one of these two deriva-
tives. A hedge fund may have a long position on an index futures option and short 
position on the same index using index futures as an attempt to profit from price 
inefficiency between the securities. The strategy appears to be simple and hedged 
but a hedge fund may be exposed to many other risk factors such as the liquidity 
of the underlying assets. This risk may be intensified as a result of leverage use 
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once the market exposure is hedged. As such, the term “complexity” compre-
hends risks that may be unexpected or should be nonexistent as a result of hedg-
ing and diversification. A practical example of such complexity is the failure of 
the LTCM, a hedge fund, which used a wide range of different derivatives and 
derivative strategies. The fund positions were supposed to be hedged and diversi-
fied but the fund was eventually exposed to liquidity squeeze during the Russian 
Crisis 1998 (see, e.g., Lowenstein 2002). Considering the complexity from the 
viewpoint of a formal model, it appears that the more financial derivatives are 
used, the more inputs there are in the model used. For example, also investing 
also in stock options in addition to fixed-income options increases the number of 
the inputs by definition as for these options the underlying assets are different. 
The model presented above assumes a linear relation between the complexity of a 
derivative strategy of a hedge fund and its performance but the relation may also 
be nonlinear. For instance, the use of a few derivatives may be relatively less 
profitable than the use of many derivatives as a result of economies of scale. 
Therefore, a polynomial relation of degree 2 between MEASURE ji  and 
COMPLEXi  is also analysed using the following model (Model 4): 
(48) MEASURE ji =  
  i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi +2(COMPLEXi)2 + ei , 
where the only difference from Model 3 is that the series of squared numbers of 
different derivatives used is included in the model. Thus, Model 4 also tests Hy-
potheses 3, 4, 5b. Models 3 and 4 are compared with one another using the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
A disadvantage of the OLS analysis is that it can only consider the relation be-
tween the mean of performance and risk measures and the complexity of deriva-
tive strategy. However, the complexity may affect the performance and risk of a 
hedge fund differently for different segments of the sample. For instance, the 
complexity may have a relation only with best performing funds but not with 
those performing poorly. Thus, quantile regression can provide more insights into 
the analysis of this study. Thus, the results of quantile regression analysis is pre-
sented for nine equally spaced quantiles of the sample using selected risk and per-
formance measures which are alpha, appraisal ratio, the Sharpe ratio, the Cornish-
Fischer expansion and standard deviation. 
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6.5 Further Analysis 
The existing analysis on the complexity of derivative strategy and hedge fund risk 
does not separate the returns into market-based and idiosyncratic components. As 
an additional analysis, the empirical factor model of this study is used to separate 
the systematic and idiosyncratic components of hedge fund returns. These analy-
ses include skewness, standard deviation, excess kurtosis and Cornish-Fischer 
expansion of the market-based and idiosyncratic components which are estimated 
using Model 3. The idiosyncratic components are calculated using the residual 
returns of the OLS on Equation (44) and market-based components are calculated 
using the fitted returns of the OLS on the same Equation. 
6.6 Derivatives Use and Management of Hedge Fund 
Portfolios 
This study performs two separate analyses to investigate the use of derivatives in 
fund of hedge funds management: first, the relation between the complexity of the 
derivative strategy of a fund of hedge funds and its performance and risk charac-
teristics are investigated using Model 3. Second, investigate whether the impact 
of the derivatives use of a hedge fund is different when it invests in other hedge 
funds. All the above-mentioned performance and risk measures are applied to 
these funds. For the second analysis, the following model is used: 
(49) MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi   
 +2COMPLEXi *OTHERi + 3OTHERi + ei ,  
where  defines a dummy variable for investing in other funds by fund i 
(1 if the fund invests in other funds, and otherwise 0). Statistically significant 
values of   imply that the relation between the complexity of the derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund and its risk and performance is different for hedge funds 
which invest in other funds from that of ordinary hedge funds. 
6.7 Autocorrelation and Relevance of the Variable for 
the Complexity of Derivative Strategy 
There is a chance that the results may be biased due to autocorrelation in hedge 
fund returns, which may be caused most likely by illiquid investments and/or re-
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turn smoothing (see Getmansky et al. 2004). The results would be most biased if 
the use of derivatives by a hedge fund were associated with higher return persis-
tence. But the literature does not offer evident guidance for such a characteristic. 
However, the possibility of the characteristic is considered by obtaining the return 
persistence slope coefficient from the following restricted regression: 
(50) Rp,t = bpRp,t1 + ep,t ,  
where Rp,t  defines the excess return of a hedge fund at time t , and defines the 
slope coefficient for the persistence. Alternatively, the autocorrelation coefficient 
may have been used but the values of correlation variable is restricted between -1 
and 1, and thus it would not be a proper dependent variable in a regression.  
The series of slope coefficients is then regressed on the empirical models used in 
the empirical analysis of this study. Specifically, the slope coefficient for the en-
tire hedge fund sample is regressed on Model 3 and the slope coefficient for sub-
samples of hedge funds (equity, fixed-income, currency, and commodity) is re-
gressed on Model 2.  
The variable for the complexity used in this study can be seen as an expansion of 
the binary variable of derivatives use used by Chen (2009). Therefore, it is impor-
tant to consider whether such an expansion provides new information on the pre-
viously used binary variable. Thus, it is reasonable to evaluate the relevance of 
the extension using the following regression which includes the binary variable of 
derivatives use and the complexity: 
(51) MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi
 +2BINARYi + ei,  
where BINARYi  defines a dummy variable for the use of derivatives by fund i (1 
if the fund uses derivatives, and otherwise 0). Three different variations of the 
above model are investigated: a model with all parameters, a reduced form of the 
model of which the variable for the complexity of derivatives is excluded, and a 
reduced form of the model of which the binary variable of derivatives use is ex-
cluded. The adjusted R, the statistics for  and  and the AIC and SIC criteria 
are presented for the performance and risk measures of hedge funds. The statistics 
allows one to evaluate whether the inclusion of the variable for the complexity 
increases the fit of the model, and thus being a relevant component of the analysis 
of hedge fund risk and performance. 
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The leverage use may also bias the results as it can be used in replicating the re-
turns of derivatives and derivative strategies. The use of the binary variable of 
leverage use as a control variable in the previous models may not be sufficient. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the use of average leverage by a hedge fund 
in the analysis of its performance and risk. The model for the analysis of average 
leverage use by a hedge fund is the following: 
(51) MEASURE ji = ,
  +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1AVGLi + 2COMPLEXi + e, 
where  defines the average leverage of a hedge fund. If the average lever-
age is a good explanatory variable of the performance and risk of a hedge fund it 
raises a concern of a biased result for the complexity as leverage can be used to 
replicate derivative payoffs. 
6.8 Sample Selectivity Bias 
In cross-sectional analysis of asset specialized derivatives use, factors which af-
fect derivatives use may bias the derivatives use-performance relation. This prob-
lem is mitigated using the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation procedure. In 
the first stage of the estimation procedure, a probit analysis of a dummy variable 
of derivatives use indicating 1 if derivatives are used and 0 otherwise on the inde-
pendent variables is used. The independent variables are the same as in the earlier 
analysis of derivatives use by hedge funds excluding the natural logarithms of 
size and age. These variables are excluded due to possible look-ahead bias (see 
e.g. Chen 2009) minimize all bias in this further estimation procedure. The first 
stage is carried using the full sample of hedge funds.  
In the second stage of Heckman’s (1979) procedure, the predicted probabilities 
from the first-stage are used to mitigate the sample selection bias using the in-
verse Mills ratio. The inverse Mills ratio is then included in as an additional vari-
able in Model 2. The coefficient for inverse Mills ratio indicates whether the re-
sults obtained earlier may suffer from sample selectivity bias. The analysis also 
provides corrected test statistics to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5a. Regarding these 
hypotheses, the results may be interpreted in the same way as earlier. 
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7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical analysis can be divided into three parts. The first part (Chapter 7.1.) 
provides information of the determinants of options use. The first part of the em-
pirical section also provides information about hedge fund characteristics which 
may incidence with the use of other different derivatives. The second part (Chap-
ters 7.2., 7.3., 7.4 and 7.5) of the empirical analysis examines whether derivatives 
use has an impact on the performance and risk characteristics of a hedge fund. 
These performance and risk characteristics are the standard derivation, downside 
volatility, skewness, excess kurtosis, mean return, the Sharpe ratio, the Sharpe 
ratio with downside volatility, alpha, and appraisal ratio. Thus, the second part of 
the empirical section addresses the first research problem: does the use of options 
by a hedge fund for the primary asset class of a fund affect its performance and 
risk characteristics? The second part also addresses the second research problem: 
does the use of equity index futures by a hedge fund affect its performance and 
risk characteristics? 
The third part of the empirical section (Chapters 7.6. and 7.7.) examines whether 
the use of a more complex derivative strategy has an impact on the same exam-
ined performance and risk characteristics of a hedge fund as in the second. As 
such, the third part regards the third problem: does the use of a more complex 
derivative strategy affect the performance and risk characteristics of a hedge 
fund? Chapter 7.8. is devoted to examining whether the complexity of the deriva-
tive strategy of a fund of hedge funds affects the risk and performance. Lastly, 
Chapter 7.9. presents discussion and analyses on robustness, relevance and valid-
ity of the findings of this study. 
7.1 Determinants of Derivatives Use 
Table 9 presents the logistic regression statistics for the determinants of the use of 
different derivatives by hedge funds. The results are controlled for different hedge 
fund strategies. However, when the number of funds in the strategy category is 
less than 10, the strategy is not included because the variable may capture infor-
mation which only concerns just an individual hedge fund. 
The regression statistics in Table 9 provide evidence that, as the use of leverage 
and asset specialization for the underlying asset class of an option increases, so 
does the probability of a hedge fund to use the option. Excluding warrants issued 
with fixed-income securities, the use of leverage coincides statistically signifi-
cantly with the use of all derivatives by hedge funds at the 1% level. This result 
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may also support the view that these options for speculative trading are inferior to 
other derivatives in hedge funds. Asset specialization coincides statistically sig-
nificantly with the use of all derivatives examined except other derivatives for 
currency than options, at least at the 5% level. To sum up the results in Table 9, 
the use of leverage and asset specializations are important factors of the use of 
options by hedge funds, but also other derivatives. 
The results for other variables than leverage and asset specialization partly differ 
from the results of Chen (2009) suggesting that the use of derivatives by hedge 
funds is associated with higher incentive fees, less restrictive redemption policy, 
managerial ownership and effective auditing. In particular, higher incentive fee is 
only found to coincidence statistically significantly with the use of derivatives in 
the case of equity options. By contrast, higher incentive fee has a negative and 
statistically significant coincidence with derivatives use in the cases of warrants 
issued with fixed-income securities and other derivatives than options for com-
modities. If performance based compensation attracts skilled managers, those 
managers who use options for equity should be outperformers while those man-
agers who use options for commodity should be underperformers. This evidence 
is thus consistent with the expectation that equity options are used for informed 
trading, and thus also consistent with the evidence of Aragon et al. (2007). 
The evidence for the coincidence of personal capital and the use of derivatives is 
found to be fairly consistent with the results of Chen (2008) as the incidence is 
statistically significant in 4 out of 10 regressions. The use of auditing services, 
instead, is not found to have any positive coincidence with the use of derivatives 
in contrast to Chen (2009). Also, the evidence for the coincidence of less restric-
tive redemption policy and the use of derivatives is mixed in this study. Longer 
restriction periods are, in fact, associated with the use of warrants, which is a rea-
sonable finding as warrants may be highly illiquid and managers need longer re-
demption periods when investing in these assets. Consistent with Pinnuck (2004), 
the test statistics of this study also yield evidence that all options and warrants 
examined are more popular among bigger hedge funds. 
The AE_OTHER variable indicates whether a fund using equity index futures as 
the derivative is the only equity derivative reported by TASS which has a linear 
payoff. The results are consistent with the assumption related to the first hypothe-
sis that the derivative is a substitute for illiquidity risk premium. This consistency 
is the statistically highly significant and negative incidence between the use of the 
derivative and longer restriction and lockup periods which are related to higher 
illiquidity risk premium (see Aragon 2007). 
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Table 9.  Logistic Regression Statistics of Derivatives Use on Leverage 
and Asset Specialization 
This table presents parameter the estimates of cross-sectional analysis for the use of the deriva-
tives of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 1): 
 log
Pr DERIVATIVE ji =1( )
1Pr DERIVATIVE ji =1( )
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
	 
= i + 1SPECIALIZATIONi +   
 2LEVERAGEi +  jCONTROL ji + e
j=1
N

i
  
where DERIVATIVE ji defines the use of derivative j by a fund i; SPECIALIZATIONi  
defines a dummy variable for the specialization for the same asset as the asset class of 
DERIVATIVEi , and CONTROLi defines an additional control variable j of fund i. These 
control variables include dummy variables for invested asset classes, other asset focuses than same 
ofDERIVATIVEi . The standard errors are QML (Huber/White) heteroskedasticity robust z-
statistics are given in italics. The sample includes 3,382 observations. See Table 1 for definitions 
of the variables. 
 
  AE_OPTION AF_OPTION AC_OPTION ACUR_OPTION 
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
C -6.626*** -4.16 -7.862*** -4.06 -9.954*** -3.73 -6.777*** -3.19 
PRIMARY 0.369*** 3.80 0.681*** 4.82 0.990*** 3.55 0.859*** 4.36 
LEVERAGED 0.647*** 7.18 0.712*** 5.02 0.677*** 2.80 0.635*** 3.45 
S_CA -0.768*** -2.86 -1.001*** -3.32     
S_DS 0.204 0.48       
S_ED 0.028 0.13 -1.178*** -4.35     
S_ELS -0.026 -0.13 -0.575** -2.25 -0.265 -0.78 -0.157 -0.69 
S_EM -0.807*** -3.48 -0.153 -0.58 1.482*** 2.97 0.427* 1.89 
S_EMN -0.811*** -3.40 -0.187 -0.52     
S_FI -0.693* -1.83 0.189 0.66     
S_GM -0.841*** -2.90 0.031 0.10 -0.136 -0.40 0.619** 2.48 
S_MF -2.442*** -7.64 -1.739*** -5.21 -1.127*** -3.16 -0.716** -2.47 
LNSIZE 0.069** 2.42 0.071* 1.84 0.122** 1.98 0.086* 1.87 
LNAGE 0.137 0.63 0.195 0.74 0.143 0.40 0.000 0.00 
HMARK 0.007 0.06 -0.083 -0.49 -0.314 -1.13 -0.537*** -2.89 
IFEE 0.018* 1.96 0.005 0.50 0.012 0.69 -0.011 -0.90 
MFEE -0.186** -2.47 0.056 0.67 -0.002 -0.02 -0.103 -1.22 
MIN(Million$) -0.022 -0.68 0.077* 1.66 0.000 0.03 0.089 1.62 
RESTRICTION 0.001 0.70 -0.004* -1.81 0.006*** 2.78 0.001 0.28 
LOCKUP 0.016** 2.18 0.002 0.23 0.018 1.00 -0.026* -1.67 
AUDIT -0.148 -1.38 0.231 1.56 -0.106 -0.46 0.017 0.10 
PERCAPITAL 0.204** 2.26 0.027 0.22 0.106 0.55 0.063 0.45 
OPEN 0.052 0.46 -0.073 -0.49 0.028 0.12 -0.257 -1.46 
OPENENDED -0.092 -0.97 0.141 1.03 0.016 0.08 0.275 1.64 
Time-Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Log likelihood -1775.686  -1014.254  -408.884  -744.271  
McFadden R 0.238  0.357  0.536  0.411  
LR statistic (43 1106.751  1127.133  945.366  1037.465  
Probability (LR 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Obs with Dep=0 1851  2784  3136  2965  
Obs with Dep=1 1531   598   246   417   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table 9. Continued 
 AE_OTHER AF_OTHER AC_OTHER ACUR_OTHER 
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
C -8.073*** -4.52 - -2.83 -6.814** -2.10 -5.477** -2.29 
PRIMARY 0.483*** 4.03 0.415*** 4.91 1.330*** 3.57 0.285 1.15 
LEVERAGED 0.821*** 7.05 0.671*** 7.55 1.776*** 5.50 0.842*** 4.91 
S_CA -0.434 -1.48 -0.442** -2.40   -0.558 -1.29 
S_ED -0.739*** -3.00 - -4.78   -0.146 -0.41 
S_ELS 0.184 0.94 -0.408** -2.51 -0.424 -1.21 -0.216 -0.64 
S_EM -0.279 -1.15 -0.287* -1.66 -0.079 -0.15 -0.194 -0.53 
S_EMN -0.009 -0.03 -0.329 -1.55 -0.099 -0.16 -1.084** -2.42 
S_FI 0.218 0.43 0.484** 2.53   -0.631 -1.53 
S_GM 1.083*** 3.43 0.225 1.16 1.167*** 2.77 0.845** 1.97 
S_MF 1.861*** 5.99 0.880*** 4.49 2.529*** 5.95 1.014** 2.30 
LNSIZE 0.053** 1.62 0.082*** 3.34 0.037 0.52 0.089* 1.89 
LNAGE 0.138 0.56 -0.114 -0.68 0.063 0.14 -0.068 -0.21 
HMARK 0.235* 1.75 0.160 1.56 0.110 0.33 0.170 0.93 
IFEE 0.001 0.07 -0.008 -1.17 -0.023 -1.15 -0.032** -2.57 
MFEE 0.247** 2.52 0.143*** 2.83 0.000 0.00 0.046 0.38 
MIN(Million$) 0.201*** 4.67 0.216*** 4.76 0.147*** 3.00 0.271*** 5.91 
RESTRICTION -0.006*** -3.12 -0.002 -1.34 -0.003 -0.68 0.000 0.12 
LOCKUP -0.030*** -3.35 -0.008 -1.27 -0.035 -1.54 - -4.51 
AUDIT -0.236* -1.95 0.088 1.00 -0.175 -0.58 0.065 0.35 
PERCAPITAL 0.227** 2.26 0.184** 2.51 0.176 0.76 0.407** 2.65 
OPENTOPUBLIC 0.163 1.29 0.106 1.15 0.310 1.06 0.261 1.34 
OPENENDED 0.381*** 3.32 -0.011 -0.13 0.074 0.28 0.346 1.95 
Time-Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Log likelihood -1417.850  -877.697  -344.853  -718.906  
McFadden R 0.313  0.553  0.756  0.654  
LR statistic (38 df) 1291.770  2171.461  2137.032  2723.135  
Probability (LR stat) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Obs with Dep=0 2370  2478  2884  2350  
Obs with Dep=1 1012  904  498  1032  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9. Continued 
 AE_WARRANT AF_WARRANT 
Variable Coef. z Coef. z 
C -10.521*** -5.64 -10.280*** -3.92 
PRIMARY 0.765*** 6.43 0.358** 1.99 
LEVERAGED 0.447*** 4.15 0.007 0.04 
S_CA 0.988*** 3.78 0.639** 2.15 
S_ED 1.427*** 7.46 0.262 0.93 
S_ELS 0.948*** 5.94 -0.310 -0.98 
S_EM 0.878*** 4.22 -0.017 -0.06 
S_EMN   -0.331 -0.67 
S_FI -0.415 -0.78   
S_GM 0.026 0.10 -0.056 -0.16 
S_MF     
LNSIZE 0.154*** 4.45 0.105** 1.91 
LNAGE 0.045 0.18 0.010 0.03 
HMARK -0.334*** -2.58 0.312 1.55 
IFEE -0.015 -1.62 -0.030** -2.19 
MFEE -0.178** -2.26 -0.217** -2.04 
MIN(Million$) 0.012 0.38 0.105** 2.06 
RESTRICTION 0.007*** 4.16 0.009*** 4.32 
LOCKUP -0.006 -0.69 -0.024* -1.91 
AUDIT 0.059 0.48 0.296 1.43 
PERCAPITAL 0.136 1.32 0.009 0.06 
OPEN 0.143 1.12 -0.027 -0.14 
OPENENDED 0.314*** 2.84 0.521*** 2.81 
Time-Dummies Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  
     
Log likelihood -1406.788  -628.524  
McFadden R 0.241  0.329  
LR statistic (38 df) 891.461  616.016  
Probability (LR stat) 0.000  0.000  
Obs with Dep=0 2580.000  3114.000  
Obs with Dep=1 802.000  268  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
Generally, the results do not reveal any other consistent patterns for the determi-
nants of options use and other derivatives use. Admittedly, higher minimum in-
vestment seems to coincidence with the use of other derivatives than options and 
warrants at the 1% statistical significance level. 
7.2 Univariate Analysis of Derivatives Use 
Table 10 presents a univariate analysis of asset specialized options use of a hedge 
fund for its performance and risk measures. The results provide information for 
testing Hypotheses 1 and 5a. The test statistics suggest that asset specialized eq-
uity options users on average achieve better performance than nonusers which 
supports Hypothesis 1. However, the difference in performance is not statistically 
significant for alpha and the statistical significance is weaker for the appraisal 
ratio. This finding is not surprising as the Sharpe ratio cannot account for nonlin-
ear characteristics and alpha is estimated using the empirical risk factors which 
include simple option writing strategies. The results also suggest that equity op-
100      Acta Wasaensia 
tion users have lower risk and higher returns. The evidence for lower risk could 
be caused by risk management consistent use of equity options. 
For the asset specialized use of fixed-income options, the results suggest that the 
options use causes weaker Sharpe ratios but higher returns. Accordingly, this evi-
dence for asset specialized use of options and hedge fund performance does not 
support Hypothesis 1. For the asset specialized use of other options, the results do 
not yield evidence of a statistically significant difference between users and non-
users. In conclusion, the univariate analysis provides support for Hypothesis 1 
only for equity specialized use of options. 
The results for the asset specialized use of fixed-income, commodity, currency 
show that it is associated with a fatter left tail of the return distribution of a hedge 
fund, which is measured using the Cornish-Fischer expansion. The results for 
asset specialized use of equity options, instead, show weak evidence only at the 
10 % significance level that the use of equity options is associated with fatter left 
tails. All in all, these characteristics together support Hypothesis 5a.  
The results in Table 11 present the univariate analysis for the equity specialized 
use of equity index futures and the analysis is denoted for testing Hypothesis 2. 
The results suggest that equity specialized users of equity index futures show 
poorer performance statistics in the terms of the Sharpe ratio, Sharpe ratio with 
downside volatility, and appraisal ratio which is in line with Hypothesis 2. How-
ever, the results do not provide support for a statistically significant difference 
between the alpha of the users and nonusers. The users of equity index futures 
also show higher risk in the terms of VaR, MVaR, standard deviation, and down-
side volatility estimates. 
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Table 10.  Univariate Analysis of Asset Specialized Options Use 
This table presents the univariate analysis of asset specialized options use. t-statistics are given in 
italics and the level of statistical significance is presented below the t-statistics. The number of 
observations for funds using derivatives (Yes) and funds not using options (No) is presented in 
parentheses on the right of the indicator. The highest mean is given in bold face. The initial sam-
ple is 3,403 funds. 
 
AE_OPTION SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA MEAN SKEW 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (795) 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.42 0.89 0.19 
Yes (1059) 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.46 0.99 0.12 
t-statistic 5.01 4.73 1.93 0.52 2.24 1.29 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.606 0.025 0.198 
AE_OPTION STDEV VAR MVAR EXKURT CF DD 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (795) 4.92 -10.56 -10.47 2.43 -2.39 4.67 
Yes (1059) 4.46 -9.38 -9.46 3.23 -2.47 4.24 
t-statistic 2.74 -3.05 -1.96 -3.33 1.66 2.72 
Probability 0.006 0.002 0.050 0.001 0.098 0.007 
AF_OPTION SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA MEAN SKEW 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (487) 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.44 0.79 -0.12 
Yes (359) 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.61 -0.64 
t-statistic 2.54 2.96 1.61 1.21 3.17 4.58 
Probability 0.011 0.003 0.108 0.226 0.002 0.000 
AF_OPTION STDEV VAR MVAR EXKURT CF DD 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (487) 3.66 -7.71 -8.42 4.30 -2.57 3.65 
Yes (359) 3.47 -7.46 -9.29 6.18 -2.91 3.70 
t-statistic 0.78 -0.46 1.27 -2.55 4.30 -0.24 
Probability 0.435 0.646 0.205 0.011 0.000 0.813  
AC_OPTION SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA MEAN SKEW 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (132) 0.11 0.15 0.25 1.03 0.89 0.40 
Yes (117) 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.99 0.84 0.20 
t-statistic 0.72 0.97 0.65 0.13 0.41 1.88 
Probability 0.472 0.332 0.519 0.896 0.682 0.062 
AC_OPTION STDEV VAR MVAR EXKURT CF DD 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (132) 5.89 -12.81 -11.19 1.66 -2.09 5.37 
Yes (117) 6.57 -14.44 -13.23 2.20 -2.38 5.99 
t-statistic -0.85 0.91 1.81 -1.29 3.32 -1.09 
Probability 0.393 0.361 0.072 0.197 0.001 0.277 
ACUR_OPTION SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA MEAN SKEW 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (192) 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.60 0.70 0.35 
Yes (176) 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.41 0.56 0.10 
t-statistic -0.78 -0.69 -0.35 1.09 1.54 2.20 
Probability 0.437 0.488 0.728 0.275 0.124 0.028 
ACUR_OPTION STDEV VAR MVAR EXKURT CF DD 
                                         Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
No (192) 5.38 -11.82 -10.97 2.14 -2.21 4.97 
Yes (176) 4.43 -9.75 -10.02 3.24 -2.47 4.19 
t-statistic 2.33 -2.23 -1.08 -2.07 3.01 2.28 
Probability 0.020 0.027 0.281 0.039 0.003 0.023 
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Table 11.  Univariate Analysis of Asset Specialized Equity Index Futures 
Use 
This table presents the univariate analysis of asset specialized equity index futures use. t-statistics 
are given in italics and the level of statistical significance is presented below the t-statistics. The 
number of observations for funds using derivatives (Yes) and funds not using options (No) is 
presented in parentheses on the right of the indicator. The highest mean is given in bold face. The 
sample includes 1,854 funds. 
 
  SHARPE SORTINO APPRAISAL ALPHA MEAN SKEW 
No (132) 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.47 1.00 0.12 
Yes (117) 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.39 0.84 0.20 
t-statistic 5.19 4.72 1.77 1.40 3.64 -1.45 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.162 0.000 0.148  
  STDEV VAR MVAR EXKURT CF D 
No (132) 3.94 -9.51 -9.54 2.85 -2.45 3.79 
Yes (117) 4.60 -10.53 -10.51 2.96 -2.41 4.39 
t-statistic -4.82 2.55 1.83 -0.47 -0.86 -4.87 
Probability 0.000 0.011 0.067 0.639 0.391 0.000 
7.3 Derivatives Use and Risk and Return in Hedge 
Funds  
Table 12 presents the results of a multivariate analysis for the impact of the use of 
derivatives on the mean, standard deviation, VaR, MVaR, and downside volatility 
estimates of hedge funds. The results in Table 12 do not directly relate to any hy-
pothesis of this study but rather provide additional information. 
In Table 12, it is a slightly puzzling finding that the asset specialized use of op-
tions does not have a statistically significant and positive impact on the mean re-
turn of a hedge fund since informed trading could yield higher returns. However, 
risk adjusted return is more important as mean returns are not sufficient to judge 
the performance. The use of equity index futures, instead, is associated with lower 
mean return of a hedge fund. This result may be related to the lower illiquidity 
risk premium of the return of a hedge fund which is a finding supportive of Hy-
pothesis 2. 
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Table 12.  Regression Statistics of Mean Return and Risk Measures on De-
rivatives Use 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the mean return and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
2):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + e
j=1
N
 , 
where MEASURE ji  defines a mean return or a risk measure j of fund i; CONTROL jidefines 
an additional control variable j of fund i, and DERIVATIVE ji defines a dummy variable for the 
use of a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative is used, otherwise 0). Asset dummies include 
controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. This table also pre-
sents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the 
variables. 
 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers 
to a statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
104      Acta Wasaensia 
Options use for fixed-income has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
the mean return in the sample of all funds. This impact is also evident in the sub-
samples of equity, fixed-income, and commodity specialized funds. Also, in the 
samples of both equity and fixed-income specialized funds, the use of other de-
rivatives than options and warrants for equity and commodity have a statistically 
significant and negative impact on the mean return of a hedge fund. The result is 
consistent with the view that the use of these derivatives may be costly, as the 
returns are net-of-fee returns although the transaction costs are usually low for 
derivatives. In contrast, the use of other fixed-income derivatives than options has 
a statistically significant and positive impact on the mean return. In conclusion, 
the use of options and other derivatives of a hedge fund is not associated with 
higher returns but fixed-income derivatives may be cost effective. 
 
Table 12. Continued 
 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
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The regression statistics of standard deviation on derivatives use provide partial 
support for risk management consistent use of derivatives by hedge funds. How-
ever, the results show contradictory evidence for equity options and warrants is-
sued with equity securities. The results are also mixed for different samples. For 
instance, the use of equity options increases standard deviation of a fund by 1.769 
% for funds specialized in currency. But the use of these options by funds that are 
equity specialized decreases standard deviation by 0.425 %. The latter result is 
consistent with those of Aragon et al. (2008) and Chen (2009). The mixed results 
suggest that, after accounting for the heterogeneity of derivatives, the impact of 
the use of derivatives on the standard deviation of a hedge fund is not conclusive. 
Moreover, the result suggests that asset specialized use of equity options may 
decrease the risk of a hedge fund. 
 
Table 12. Continued 
Dep..: D All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 3.619* 1.83 9.482*** 4.06 3.653 1.04 4.982 0.65 3.681 0.72 
LNSIZE - -6.72 - -4.69 - -2.64 -0.501*** -2.67 -0.321** -2.36 
LNAGE 0.388 1.34 -0.328 -0.99 0.201 0.37 0.240 0.22 0.130 0.17 
HMARK - -2.64 -0.391** -2.42 0.035 0.13 1.132 1.34 -0.057 -0.11 
IFEE 0.038*** 3.93 0.021 1.61 0.079*** 3.65 0.239*** 4.08 0.142*** 3.73 
MFEE 0.181* 1.84 -0.014 -0.12 0.079 0.54 0.016 0.06 -0.036 -0.23 
LEVERAGED 0.534*** 5.62 0.828*** 6.40 0.606*** 3.06 0.173 0.25 -0.073 -0.19 
LOCKUP 0.027*** 3.36 0.039*** 3.51 0.019 1.30 0.017 0.20 0.067 1.34 
MIN(Million$) -0.073** -2.17 -0.058* -1.88 -0.124* -1.78 -0.124 -0.45 -0.148 -1.15 
RESTRICTION -0.001 -0.30 0.001 0.53 0.001 0.42 -0.001 -0.04 0.000 0.01 
AUDIT -0.166 -1.21 -0.197 -1.03 -0.512 -1.36 -1.747* -1.66 -0.706 -1.09 
PERCAPITAL 0.256** 2.47 0.370*** 2.71 0.587*** 2.71 -0.383 -0.60 -0.262 -0.62 
OPEN -0.103 -0.88 0.014 0.08 - -3.48 -1.112** -2.04 -0.866** -2.40 
OPENENDED -0.051 -0.54 -0.161 -1.19 0.255 1.22 0.216 0.37 0.385 1.02 
AE_OPTION -0.118 -0.99 -0.296* -1.83 0.338 1.01 0.239 0.26 1.118* 1.69 
AF_OPTION -0.283 -1.37 -0.502 -1.64 -0.204 -0.56 -0.999 -1.08 -0.205 -0.36 
AC_OPTION 0.328 0.97 0.151 0.35 -0.580 -1.17 1.142 1.16 0.017 0.03 
ACUR_OPTION 0.192 0.95 0.198 0.70 0.254 0.72 -0.602 -0.66 -0.771* -1.71 
AE_WARRANT 0.218 1.63 0.317* 1.87 -0.288 -0.97 -0.791 -0.43 0.178 0.20 
AF_WARRANT 0.186 0.83 0.180 0.52 0.284 0.96 2.680 1.18 0.678 0.76 
AE_OTHER -0.209 -1.51 -0.194 -1.05 -0.156 -0.41 -0.924 -0.84 -0.568 -1.05 
AF_OTHER 0.257 1.33 0.559** 1.97 -0.053 -0.14 2.031 1.53 0.165 0.24 
AC_OTHER 0.456 1.61 0.348 0.87 0.956* 1.91 1.233 1.45 1.732*** 2.60 
ACUR_OTHER -0.052 -0.32 -0.291 -1.31 0.622** 2.20 0.153 0.16 0.689 1.45 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.31  0.34  0.295  0.096  0.203  
F-statistic 29.07  19.85  8.16  1.58  3.00  
Durbin-Watson  1.87  1.90  1.89  2.21  2.02  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
In Table 12, there are some contradictions between the standard deviation and 
downside volatility. The impact of the asset specialized use of options for equity 
is -0.425 % and statistically significant (5 % level) on standard deviation while 
the impact on the downside deviation is weaker -0.296 % (10 % level) while the 
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fit of the estimated model is better for downside volatility than the standard devia-
tion (R: 34 % vs. 23 %). The same characteristic also applies to the asset special-
ized use of warrants for equity. Moreover, incentive fee seems to have a stronger 
impact on the standard deviation than the downside volatility of a hedge fund for 
the samples of all, equity, fixed-income-, commodity, and currency hedge funds. 
For the sample of equity specialized funds, the coefficient for incentive fee is sta-
tistically significant and positive when the standard deviation is fitted while the 
coefficient is not statistically significant when the downside volatility is fitted.  
 
Table 12. Continued 
Dep.: VAR All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C - -2.23 - -4.77 -10.596 -1.22 -1.255 -0.05 -3.028 -0.20 
LNSIZE 0.721*** 7.70 0.675*** 5.80 0.833*** 3.28 1.476*** 2.76 1.103** 2.67 
LNAGE -0.745 -0.96 1.219 1.55 -0.799 -0.53 -2.655 -0.76 -1.661 -0.68 
HMARK 0.774** 2.53 0.978** 2.44 -0.141 -0.23 -2.825 -1.31 0.228 0.18 
IFEE - -4.25 -0.064* -1.88 - -3.75 - -3.55 - -3.37 
MFEE -0.497* -1.92 -0.254 -0.83 -0.271 -0.71 0.225 0.32 -0.039 -0.09 
LEVERAGED - -5.12 -1.820*** -5.54 -1.048** -2.37 -0.756 -0.34 0.396 0.42 
LOCKUPPERIOD -0.070 -3.61 -0.093*** -3.30 -0.055 -1.55 -0.124 -0.57 -0.148 -1.12 
MIN(Million$) 0.177*** 2.81 0.124* 1.82 0.294* 1.92 0.153 0.20 0.169 0.49 
RESTRICTION 0.002 0.50 -0.002 -0.28 -0.002 -0.23 0.011* 0.21 -0.012 -0.30 
AUDIT 0.483 1.35 0.509 1.07 1.242 1.29 6.203 1.70 2.520 1.18 
PERCAPITAL -0.256 -0.97 -0.689** -2.10 -0.400 -0.77 2.667 1.28 1.565 1.29 
OPEN 0.042 0.15 -0.369 -0.89 1.572*** 3.07 2.734* 1.76 2.569** 2.58 
OPENENDED 0.092 0.39 0.443 1.34 -0.698 -1.24 -1.249 -0.76 -1.062 -0.99 
AE_OPTION 0.347 1.15 1.001** 2.45 -0.698 -0.79 -1.627 -0.65 -3.976** -2.04 
AF_OPTION 0.835 1.90 0.917 1.26 0.203 0.30 3.028 1.14 0.587 0.41 
AC_OPTION -0.921 -0.95 -0.646 -0.65 1.259 1.04 -3.083 -0.94 0.222 0.15 
ACUR_OPTION -0.521 -1.03 -0.829 -1.09 -0.594 -0.79 2.104 0.80 2.069* 1.79 
AE_WARRANT -0.751** -2.15 -0.957** -2.16 0.582 0.88 3.138 0.69 -0.049 -0.02 
AF_WARRANT -0.498 -0.95 -0.320 -0.38 -0.709 -1.16 -7.066 -1.18 -1.441 -0.71 
AE_OTHER 0.510 1.46 0.194 0.43 0.792 0.83 2.569 0.91 1.647 1.12 
AF_OTHER -0.244 -0.60 -0.515 -0.82 0.438 0.61 -4.505 -1.28 -0.234 -0.14 
AC_OTHER -1.416** -2.19 -1.283 -1.34 -2.815** -2.22 -3.305 -1.46 -4.627** -2.37 
ACUR_OTHER 0.048 0.13 0.629 1.15 -1.408** -2.23 -1.273 -0.49 -1.902 -1.63 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R-squared 0.29  0.33  0.326  0.078  0.216  
 F-statistic 27.49  18.93  9.25  1.46  3.17  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.89  1.91  1.98  2.13  1.99  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The results for MVaR and VaR are contradictiory. Specifically, the asset special-
ized use of options for equity decreases risk in terms of VaR estimate by 1.001 % 
and the statistical significance is at the 5 % level. However, the impact is not sta-
tistically significant when the MVaR estimate, which accounts for asymmetry and 
fat tails of hedge fund returns, is used instead of VaR estimate. The asset special-
ized use of warrants issued with equity securities also has a negative and statisti-
cally significant impact on the VaR estimates at the 5 % level but the impact on 
the MVaR estimate is not statistically significant. The results suggest that the re-
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lation between the use of options and hedge fund risk is altered by the choice of 
risk measures accounting for skewness and kurtosis of returns. 
In general, the use of options by a hedge fund, except for asset specialized use of 
options for equity and currency does not support the view that the use of deriva-
tives for risk management or that they otherwise coincidence with lower risk. The 
results for the use of the above-mentioned two derivatives also hold for the VaR 
measure, which assumes that the returns are normally distributed and does not 
account for skewness and kurtosis of the returns. This finding is significantly in-
consistent with the results of Chen (2009) for risk management motivated use of 
derivatives. 
 
Table 12. Continued 
Dep.: MVAR All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C - -2.57 - -3.59 - -1.35 - -1.29 -9.738 -0.78 
LNSIZE 0.654*** 6.05 0.632*** 3.91 0.807*** 3.13 1.233 3.07 0.777*** 2.67 
LNAGE 0.144 0.17 1.710 1.50 -0.183 -0.14 0.764 0.36 -0.436 -0.26 
HMARK 0.095 0.23 0.516 0.88 -1.283 -1.57 -2.515** -1.33 -0.241 -0.12 
IFEE -0.049 -1.58 -0.036 -0.86 -0.156** -2.14 -0.501 -3.99 - -3.42 
MFEE -0.249 -0.70 0.493 0.85 0.033 0.08 -0.438 -0.88 0.009 0.02 
LEVERAGED - -4.30 -1.883*** -4.14 -1.438** -2.14 0.379 0.24 0.151 0.14 
LOCKUP -0.054** -2.11 -0.101** -2.46 -0.001 -0.02 0.079 0.43 -0.128 -1.05 
MIN(Million$) 0.296*** 3.27 0.115 1.11 0.435** 2.19 -0.095 -0.15 0.516 1.61 
RESTRICTION 0.003 0.56 -0.003 -0.44 0.003 0.44 0.012 0.33 0.015 0.63 
AUDIT -0.095 -0.24 0.165 0.26 0.674 0.79 1.718* 1.05 1.216 0.97 
PERCAPITAL -0.642** -2.00 -1.016** -2.16 -1.570** -2.46 -0.493 -0.41 0.731 0.71 
OPEN 0.542 1.36 0.672 0.97 2.081*** 3.43 2.473** 2.02 1.984** 2.14 
OPENENDED -0.178 -0.57 0.047 0.10 -0.855 -1.38 -0.344 -0.27 -1.486 -1.64 
AE_OPTION 0.052 0.13 0.372 0.65 -0.718 -0.67 -0.190 -0.10 -2.335 -1.59 
AF_OPTION -0.177 -0.23 1.007 0.67 -0.463 -0.49 0.898 0.48 0.721 0.50 
AC_OPTION -1.431 -1.59 -1.474 -1.15 1.077 0.82 -2.034 -1.19 -0.353 -0.25 
ACUR_OPTION 0.059 0.07 0.118 0.07 -0.192 -0.19 0.214 0.11 0.876 0.61 
AE_WARRANT 0.014 0.03 0.089 0.16 0.641 0.57 -2.225 -0.37 -1.388 -0.44 
AF_WARRANT -0.435 -0.46 0.154 0.09 -1.374 -1.45 -2.420 -0.37 -1.212 -0.39 
AE_OTHER 0.370 0.80 0.356 0.50 0.084 0.07 3.025 1.03 0.385 0.26 
AF_OTHER -0.894 -1.49 -3.026*** -2.96 0.229 0.21 -5.833* -1.74 0.227 0.10 
AC_OTHER -0.854 -0.94 -0.827 -0.60 -2.848* -1.70 -3.197 -1.53 - -2.88 
ACUR_OTHER 0.510 0.83 1.343 1.36 -1.084 -1.15 0.719 0.29 -1.695 -1.13 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.23  0.22  0.272  0.179  0.136  
F-statistic 19.79  11.28  7.39  2.19  2.24  
Durbin-Watson 1.86  1.89  1.94  2.35  1.95  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
7.4 Derivatives Use and Hedge Fund Performance 
Table 13 presents the results for the impact of derivatives use on the Sharpe ratio, 
the Sharpe ratio with downside volatility, alpha, and appraisal ratio of a hedge 
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fund. The results are denoted for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results support 
Hypothesis 1 only in the case of hedge funds which are equity specialized, and 
thus have a primary asset focus on equity. More specifically, the impact of the 
asset specialized use of equity options increases the Sharpe ratio of a hedge fund 
by 0.023 % and the impact is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In relation to the study by Holmström (1979), the positive impact on the Sharpe 
ratio is consistent with a characteristic that performance based-compensation of 
managers attracts skilled managers which is also considered by Chen (2008). But 
this study does indeed find further evidence. More specifically, the use of options 
is consistent with higher incentive fees only when the performance is higher in 
the terms of Sharpe ratios. Thus, the results so far provide an explanation that 
informed hedge funds seem to use equity options and receive higher incentive 
fees. The other explanation, which is also consistent with the results by Aragon et 
al. (2008), is that equity options are used for risk management. This use can better 
explain Sharpe ratio associated with equity options use, and therefore investors 
may reward equity options users with higher incentive fees for better risk man-
agement. 
Table 13 also presents the results for the impact of option use on the Sharpe ratio 
with downside volatility of a hedge fund. The asset specialized use of options for 
equity does not have a positive and statistically significant impact on the perform-
ance measure.  
The results for alpha and appraisal ratio are different in relation to the results of 
the Sharpe ratio. Specifically, the asset specialized use of equity options does not 
have a statistically significant impact on the performance and the impact is rather 
negative according to these statistics. This result clearly implies that the empirical 
factor model is capable of accounting for the positive performance impact of the 
asset specialized use of equity options. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported for equity 
specialized use of options only when the Sharpe ratio is used. Overall, the results 
for the multivariate analysis of hedge fund performance are consistent with those 
of the univariate analysis.  
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Table 13.  Regression Statistics of Performance Measures on Derivatives 
Use 
This table presents parameter estimates of cross-sectional analysis for performance estimates of 
hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 2):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + e
j=1
N
 ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a performance measure j of fund i; CONTROL jidefines an addi-
tional control variable j of fund i, and DERIVATIVE ji defines a dummy variable for the use of 
a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative is used, otherwise 0). Asset dummies include controls 
for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. This table also presents the 
Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. t-statistics are given in italics. The stan-
dard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 
for definitions of the other variables. 
 
Dep.: SHARPE All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.634** -2.24 -0.904*** -4.75 0.323 0.47 -0.618* -1.71 -0.543** -2.04 
LNSIZE 0.034*** 11.52 0.032*** 8.42 0.040*** 5.25 0.019*** 2.75 0.025*** 4.22 
LNAGE 0.052 1.30 0.087*** 3.20 -0.096 -0.96 0.071 1.37 0.039 1.13 
HMARK 0.000 -0.03 0.022* 1.93 0.048 0.80 0.009 0.26 0.012 0.40 
IFEE 0.000 -0.08 0.001 1.09 -0.003 -0.75 -0.003 -0.74 -0.004* -1.92 
MFEE -0.001 -0.15 0.002 0.30 0.011 1.01 -0.018 -1.84 -0.013 -1.54 
LEVERAGED 0.008 0.60 -0.003 -0.32 0.031 0.80 -0.016 -0.31 0.001 0.02 
MIN(Million$) -0.004 -0.96 0.003 0.82 -0.018 -1.47 -0.034* -1.86 0.004 0.28 
RESTRICTION 0.001*** 3.86 0.001** 2.50 0.001* 1.88 0.003*** 2.64 0.002*** 3.13 
LOCKUP 0.002** 2.18 -0.001 -0.62 0.006** 2.51 0.008 1.57 0.003 1.13 
AUDIT -0.009 -0.63 -0.013 -0.91 0.018 0.43 -0.031 -0.99 -0.041 -1.41 
PERCAPITAL 0.009 0.81 0.016 1.70 -0.001 -0.04 -0.010 -0.35 0.010 0.49 
OPEN -0.051*** -3.54 -0.033*** -2.62 -0.042 -0.98 -0.048 -1.37 -0.054** -1.98 
OPENENDED 0.013 0.89 -0.001 -0.05 0.019 0.41 -0.014 -0.45 0.006 0.26 
AE_OPTION -0.003 -0.26 0.023** 2.00 -0.037 -1.54 -0.036 -0.90 0.001 0.02 
AF_OPTION -0.041 -1.53 -0.024 -1.15 -0.083 -1.40 0.012 0.21 -0.027 -0.63 
AC_OPTION 0.044 1.94 -0.015 -0.61 0.093** 2.20 -0.020 -0.49 -0.024 -0.80 
ACUR_OPTION -0.026 -1.62 -0.015 -0.76 -0.019 -0.67 -0.013 -0.22 0.016 0.48 
AE_WARRANT -0.007 -0.59 -0.001 -0.09 0.069** 2.36 0.214 1.65 0.044 0.95 
AF_WARRANT -0.019 -0.94 -0.004 -0.18 -0.071** -2.26 -0.164 -1.20 -0.083 -1.24 
AE_OTHER 0.015 1.26 -0.018 -1.52 0.062* 1.83 0.007 0.12 0.037 1.03 
AF_OTHER -0.025 -1.00 -0.009 -0.46 -0.025 -0.44 -0.056 -0.73 0.028 0.67 
AC_OTHER -0.049** -2.23 -0.032 -1.07 -0.097* -1.85 0.055 0.92 -0.038 -1.13 
ACUR_OTHER 0.000 0.03 -0.032* -1.77 0.054* 1.84 -0.051 -0.92 -0.016 -0.39 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.227  0.333  0.212  0.406  0.311  
F-statistic 19.76  19.39  5.60  4.70  4.56  
Durbin-Watson 1.95  1.86  2.02  2.03  1.83  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table 13. Continued 
Dep.: SHARPED All  Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.585* -1.85 -0.940*** -4.49 0.483 0.65 -0.768 -1.74 -0.571** -2.03 
LNSIZE 0.036*** 10.27 0.033*** 7.75 0.041*** 4.59 0.023** 2.34 0.026*** 3.98 
LNAGE 0.050 1.12 0.090*** 3.02 -0.101 -0.94 0.076 1.21 0.043 1.14 
HMARK -0.020 -0.90 0.021 1.61 0.007 0.09 -0.006 -0.11 0.007 0.23 
IFEE 0.000 0.22 0.002 1.59 -0.005 -0.86 -0.004 -0.86 -0.004 -1.60 
MFEE -0.002 -0.23 0.009 1.02 0.010 0.82 -0.020 -1.64 -0.014 -1.56 
LEVERAGED 0.007 0.42 -0.008 -0.62 0.054 1.10 0.045 0.51 0.001 0.02 
MIN(Million$) -0.002 -0.31 0.003 -0.65 -0.013 -0.84 - -2.22 0.004 0.28 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 3.93 0.001** 2.44 0.001* 1.93 0.006** -2.53 0.002*** 2.90 
LOCKUP 0.003** 2.36 -0.001 -0.84 0.007** 2.27 0.015* 1.80 0.004 1.09 
AUDIT -0.008 -0.45 -0.020 -1.27 0.026 0.52 -0.037 -0.93 -0.047 -1.48 
PERCAPITAL 0.003 0.26 0.020 1.78 -0.008 -0.24 -0.031 -0.80 0.012 0.52 
OPEN -0.053*** -3.31 -0.029* -1.96 -0.029 -0.65 -0.073 -1.45 -0.044 -1.50 
OPENENDED 0.009 0.51 -0.005 -0.34 0.006 0.11 -0.012 -0.26 0.000 0.01 
AE_OPTION -0.010 -0.79 0.022 1.65 -0.042 -1.57 -0.030 -0.59 0.003 0.09 
AF_OPTION -0.053* -1.77 -0.029 -1.20 -0.095 -1.50 0.057 0.69 -0.037 -0.80 
AC_OPTION 0.038 1.34 -0.012 -0.44 0.111*** 2.26 -0.061 -1.05 -0.020 -0.59 
ACUR_OPTION -0.010 -0.52 -0.011 -0.47 -0.017 -0.54 -0.018 -0.22 0.019 0.51 
AE_WARRANT -0.006 -0.44 0.006 0.39 0.073** 2.24 0.227 1.41 0.047 0.85 
AF_WARRANT -0.020 -0.84 0.005 0.20 -0.081** -2.36 -0.149 -0.88 -0.084 -1.13 
AE_OTHER 0.027* 1.70 -0.016 -1.11 0.078** 2.10 0.046 0.58 0.029 0.73 
AF_OTHER -0.059* -1.91 -0.026 -1.14 -0.075 -1.07 -0.117 -1.07 0.040 0.89 
AC_OTHER -0.047* -1.74 -0.043 -1.23 -0.118** -1.99 0.060 0.72 -0.069* -1.72 
ACUR_OTHER 0.005 0.29 -0.032 -1.55 0.059* 1.76 -0.049 -0.63 -0.010 -0.22 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.198  0.299  0.199  0.392  0.272  
F-statistic 16.72  16.67  5.24  4.49  3.94  
Durbin-Watson 1.98  1.88  2.01  1.94  1.87  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
The asset specialized use of these derivatives has a statistically significant and 
negative impact so that the use of these derivatives decreases the alpha of a hedge 
fund by -0.188 %. Consequently, the statistics for alpha suggest that the equity 
specialized use of index futures is associated with poorer performance providing 
support for Hypothesis 2. The result may be explained by the primary use of these 
securities for uninformed trading and their substitute for share restrictions, and 
thus less illiquidity risk premium. Admittedly, appraisal ratio, the Sharpe ratio 
and the Sharpe ratio with downside volatility of hedge funds are not associated 
with the use of equity index futures, which may be explained by the affect of risk 
characteristics associated with equity index futures on the denominator of these 
performance measures. 
The lack of support for Hypothesis 2 in the univariate analysis is a concern of bias 
associated with the inclusion of variables in the multivariate analysis. As a further 
analysis it is tested whether dropping the asset and strategy dummies results in an 
insignificant relation between the use of equity index futures and the alpha of a 
hedge fund. The logic of this test is that the use of equity index futures and its 
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liquidity characteristic has no relevance for some strategies which use the futures 
primarily to perform their trading. For example, managed futures funds may use 
only futures to perform trend-following strategies and the use of equity index fu-
tures has less implication regarding their liquidity management. Consequently, 
the statistical significance of the results may be weak when hedge fund strategies 
are not controlled. The further analysis is performed by testing the use equity in-
dex futures separately for two subsamples. The first group of strategies (GROUP 
1) includes all equity-based strategies which more likely manage their liquidity 
using equity index futures. These strategies are the dedicated short bias, event-
driven, equity long/short, emerging market, and equity market neutral strategies. 
The second group of strategies (GROUP 2) includes the remaining strategies 
which may use equity index futures for their primary strategy or do not invest 
heavily in equities. These strategies are the managed futures, global/macro, con-
vertible arbitrage, and fixed-income strategies. The result for these groups and 
hedge fund performance are presented in Appendix 2, which clearly demonstrates 
that the negative relation between the index futures and the alpha of a hedge fund 
is negative and statistically significant for the first group which potentially may 
use these derivatives for cash management. 
The results in Table 13 also provide some evidence for other type of use of de-
rivatives than that of asset specialized use. In contrast to the use of equity options, 
the use of other currency derivatives than options has a statistically significant 
(10% level) and negative impact on the Sharpe ratio of equity specialized funds. 
Equity specialized funds may use these derivatives to hedge currency related risk, 
and therefore this finding is slightly surprising. Alternatively, the result may sug-
gest that risk management by derivatives is not efficient for fund performance. It 
may also imply that hedging is expensive. For fixed-income specialized funds, the 
use of options for commodity has also a statistically significant and positive im-
pact on the Sharpe ratio of a hedge fund.  
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Table 13. Continued 
 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 13. Continued 
 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Fixed-income specialized hedge funds seem to benefit from the use of other de-
rivatives than options and warrants for both equity and currency as the use of 
these variables is associated with better performance of these funds. They also 
seem to benefit from the use of warrants issued with equity securities. This result 
is the opposite in the case of warrants issued with fixed-income and commodity 
derivatives other than options which are associated with poorer performance. In 
general, the asset specialized use of options has an impact on the Sharpe ratios of 
hedge funds but only in the case of equity specialized hedge funds. This finding is 
indeed interesting as the use of equity options as the only derivative instrument 
coincidences with higher incentive fees (see Table 5) in accordance with the first 
hypothesis concerning informed trading. 
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In relation to the study by Aragon (2007), it is an interesting finding that lockup 
period has a statistically significant affect on the alpha of a hedge fund only when 
using the sample of all hedge funds. Restriction period also has a statistically sig-
nificant affect on the alpha of a hedge fund only when using the samples of all 
funds and equity specialized funds. Moreover, the result suggests that lockup pe-
riod does not have statistically significant affect on the appraisal ratio of a hedge 
fund. These findings may imply that controlling for asset specialization of hedge 
funds can explain much of illiquidity risk premium in hedge fund returns. 
7.5 Derivatives Use and Higher Moments of Hedge 
Fund Returns 
Investigation of the impact of derivatives use on the higher moments of hedge 
fund returns can provide information on factors contrasting the results of different 
risk measures such as VaR and MVaR. Table 9 presents the results for the impact 
of derivatives use on skewness, excess kurtosis, and the Cornish-Fischer expan-
sion with 99 % confidence level, which accounts for both skewness and excess 
kurtosis. The results are denoted for testing Hypothesis 5a. 
The results in Table 14 support Hypothesis 5a. The regression statistics of the 
skewness of hedge fund return distribution on derivatives use suggest that the 
asset specialized use of options is generally associated with lower skewness al-
though the result is statistically significant only for equity specialized and com-
modity specialized use of options. Specifically, equity specialized use of options 
has an impact of -0.153 on skewness. Commodity specialized use of options in 
turn has an impact of -0.395 on skewness. For commodity specialized hedge 
funds, the asset specialized use of options, for instance, has a statistically signifi-
cant and negative (-0.215) impact on skewness of hedge fund returns. Clearly, the 
results for the association between the asset specialized use of options for com-
modity and equity show similar pattern to the case of asset specialized use of op-
tions and skewness of return distributions. The use of options for equity also de-
creases skewness of fixed-income specialized funds. Incentive fee and manage-
ment fee, by contrast, positively increases the skewness for equity specialized 
funds. As hedge fund returns are found to exhibit negative skewness (see Brooks 
et al. 2002), these findings provide evidence that asset specialized use of options 
may be associated with the asymmetry. 
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Table 14.  Regression Statistics of Higher Moments on Derivatives Use 
This table presents the parameter estimates of cross-sectional analysis for Value-at-Risk estimates 
of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 2):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + e
j=1
N
 ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure j associated with higher moments of the returns of fund 
i; CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and DERIVATIVE ji defines 
a dummy variable for the use of a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative is used, otherwise 0). 
Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report invest-
ing. This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The stan-
dard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are given in italics. t-statistics 
are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Dep.: SKEW All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 0.348 0.49 -0.015 -0.02 2.986** 2.38 -1.705 -1.08 0.588 0.37 
LNSIZE -0.025* -1.93 -0.007 -0.52 -0.038 -1.13 0.036 0.86 -0.042 -1.14 
LNAGE -0.062 -0.61 -0.060 -0.52 -0.338* -1.87 0.183 0.90 -0.086 -0.39 
HMARK -0.092 -1.40 -0.081 -1.10 0.015 0.06 -0.101 -0.60 0.237 1.17 
IFEE 0.013*** 3.02 0.017*** 3.64 -0.006 -0.63 0.003 0.27 0.001 0.06 
MFEE 0.060 1.83 0.111** 2.45 0.043 0.79 -0.084* -1.78 -0.012 -0.26 
LEVERAGED -0.018 -0.39 -0.062 -1.11 0.105 0.96 -0.128 -0.67 0.081 0.53 
MINMillion$) -0.026 -1.12 -0.020 -1.48 -0.150** -1.98 -0.013 -0.24 0.053 1.06 
RESTRICTION 0.002** 2.45 0.001 1.03 0.002 0.80 0.008** 2.11 0.002 0.59 
LOCKUP 0.007* 1.81 0.001 0.16 0.004 0.37 0.013 0.67 -0.018 -0.88 
AUDIT -0.024 -0.47 0.010 0.15 0.065 0.47 -0.051 -0.29 0.040 0.24 
PERCAPITAL -0.072 -1.52 -0.011 -0.20 -0.245** -2.08 -0.261** -2.27 -0.169 -1.36 
OPEN -0.003 -0.05 0.108 1.38 0.018 0.13 0.020 0.14 -0.440** -2.66 
OPENENDED -0.091* -1.91 -0.020 -0.34 -0.272** -2.05 0.083 0.56 -0.091 -0.68 
AE_OPTION -0.068 -1.42 -0.153** -2.57 -0.253** -2.04 0.285 1.52 0.171 0.98 
AF_OPTION -0.235** -2.52 -0.011 -0.09 -0.230 -1.45 0.193 0.99 0.009 0.05 
AC_OPTION 0.032 0.32 0.074 0.57 0.303 1.64 -0.396** -2.08 0.085 0.49 
ACUR_OPTION 0.052 0.56 -0.014 -0.11 0.083 0.50 -0.058 -0.25 -0.217 -1.24 
AE_WARRANT 0.095* 1.69 0.111 1.66 0.100 0.71 -0.089 -0.27 -0.466 -1.10 
AF_WARRANT 0.013 0.13 -0.084 -0.59 -0.059 -0.41 -0.255 -0.69 -0.047 -0.10 
AE_OTHER 0.056 1.09 0.126* 1.94 -0.043 -0.28 -0.102 -0.42 -0.268 -1.25 
AF_OTHER -0.110 -1.33 -0.185* -1.79 -0.095 -0.59 -0.183 -0.62 0.102 0.41 
AC_OTHER 0.094 0.78 -0.076 -0.42 -0.219 -0.89 -0.003 -0.01 -0.273 -1.14 
ACUR_OTHER 0.039 0.50 -0.037 -0.35 -0.037 -0.21 0.277 1.02 -0.077 -0.36 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.12  0.08  0.218  0.062  0.119  
F-statistic 9.49  4.21  5.77  1.36  2.06  
Durbin-Watson 1.84  1.88  1.83  1.92  1.71  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
116      Acta Wasaensia 
Table 14. Continued 
Dep.: EXKURT All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -7.553** - -7.510** - - - -4.470 -0.89 -7.267 -
LNSIZE 0.045 0.67 0.014 0.20 0.181 0.95 0.210 1.37 -0.003 -
LNAGE 1.590*** 3.34 1.028** 2.12 2.054** 2.05 0.308 0.50 1.571* 1.71 
HMARK -0.877** - -0.306 - -2.925 - -0.401 -0.65 -1.413 -
IFEE 0.066*** 3.43 0.082*** 4.14 0.087* 1.70 0.038 0.83 0.139* 1.85 
MFEE 0.058 0.34 0.180 0.75 -0.056 - -0.137 -0.77 -0.320* -
LEVERAGED 0.042 0.17 0.168 0.63 0.248 0.45 -0.053 -0.07 -1.342 -
MIN(Million$) -0.279 1.43 - - 1.140* 1.69 -0.014 -0.06 -0.239 -
RESTRICTION 0.003 0.72 0.000 0.09 0.018 1.27 0.048*** 3.16 -0.011 -
LOCKUP -0.022 - -0.012 - -0.042 - 0.069 1.12 0.136 0.97 
AUDIT -0.082 - -0.384 - 0.651 0.93 -0.944 -1.26 -0.728 -
PERCAPITAL 0.400 1.40 0.107 0.39 0.840 1.04 -0.626 -1.30 -0.038 -
OPEN -0.013 - 0.430 1.02 -0.790 - -1.121*** -2.81 0.951 1.14 
OPENENDED 0.258 0.95 -0.004 - 1.375 1.46 1.263** 2.30 0.641 1.27 
AE_OPTION 0.497** 2.03 0.344 1.15 0.952 1.37 0.965 1.36 1.101 1.39 
AF_OPTION 0.414 0.69 -0.233 - 0.426 0.36 1.416** 2.02 1.828** 2.01 
AC_OPTION -0.110 - 0.233 0.43 -0.481 - -0.215 -0.34 -1.356 -
ACUR_OPTION 0.454 0.95 0.711 1.16 -0.392 - -0.880 -1.10 0.061 0.08 
AE_WARRANT 0.126 0.49 0.218 0.74 0.521 0.68 -1.814 -1.48 1.611 0.63 
AF_WARRANT -0.809 - -0.073 - -1.408 - -0.678 -0.53 -3.184 -
AE_OTHER 0.140 0.57 0.060 0.19 0.491 0.59 0.417 0.57 0.743 0.77 
AF_OTHER 0.194 0.42 -0.009 - 0.242 0.23 0.412 0.51 -0.936 -
AC_OTHER -1.060 - 0.418 0.53 -1.858 - -0.600 -0.67 1.443 1.32 
ACUR_OTHER -0.446 - -0.189 - 0.052 0.05 0.633 0.71 1.681 1.65 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.05  0.175  0.094  0.123  
 F-statistic 9.66  2.99  4.62  1.56  2.11  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.83  1.94  1.71  2.13  1.90  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The use of equity options is found to have a positive impact on kurtosis in the 
sample of all funds but not in the subsamples, which are sorted according to the 
asset specialization of a hedge fund. In conclusion, the association between kurto-
sis of the return distribution of a hedge fund and the use of options is heterogene-
ous. 
In Table 14, the asset specialized use of options for fixed-income, commodity, 
and currency has a statistically significant and negative impact on the Cornish-
Fischer expansion which supports Hypothesis 5a. The coefficient for the asset 
specialized use of equity options is also negative but not statistically significant. 
Thus, the aggregate impact of the asset specialized option use is negative on the 
Cornish-Fischer expansion (increases the left tail of the return distribution) even 
though the impact on the excess kurtosis is not statistically significant. Intuitively, 
the test statistics of the Cornish-Fischer expansion on the option use implies that 
the asset specialized use of options is related to hidden risks in the left tail of the 
return distribution of a hedge fund. In the samples of all funds and equity special-
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ized funds, higher incentive and management fees, instead, are rather associated 
with less fat left tails. 
 
Table 14. Continued 
Dep.: CF All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C - -3.84 - -2.91 -1.106 -1.11 - -2.35 -1.331 -0.99 
LNSIZE -0.006 -0.54 0.005 0.39 -0.009 -0.37 0.037 1.14 -0.007 -0.27 
LNAGE -0.012 -0.14 -0.054 -0.51 -0.169 -1.18 -0.013 -0.08 -0.242 -1.30 
HMARK - -3.23 -0.093 -1.38 - -2.79 -0.117 -0.83 0.017 0.08 
IFEE 0.010*** 2.65 0.008** 2.09 -0.004 -0.50 0.006 0.58 0.008 0.70 
MFEE 0.069** 2.48 0.093** 2.15 0.066* 1.86 -0.034 -0.93 0.029 0.72 
LEVERAGED -0.040 -0.94 -0.056 -0.97 0.197** 2.06 -0.054 -0.31 -0.024 -0.19 
MIN(Million$) 0.034** 1.98 -0.008 -0.67 0.044 0.98 -0.043 -0.85 -0.047 1.15 
RESTRICTION 0.001** 2.13 0.000 0.28 0.003* 1.93 0.007** 2.03 0.002 0.80 
LOCKUP 0.003 0.90 -0.001 -0.11 0.003 0.40 0.017 1.00 -0.006 -0.38 
AUDIT -0.018 -0.41 -0.017 -0.29 0.099 1.02 0.063 0.48 0.080 0.66 
PERCAPITAL -0.031 -0.80 -0.040 -0.76 -0.078 -0.96 - -2.22 -0.018 -0.19 
OPEN 0.027 0.54 0.127 1.58 0.020 0.22 0.060 0.50 -0.178 -1.58 
OPENENDED -0.078* -1.89 -0.036 -0.61 -0.159* -1.86 0.030 0.23 -0.156 -1.49 
AE_OPTION -0.066 -1.50 -0.093 -1.53 -0.176* -1.70 0.147 0.96 -0.020 -0.16 
AF_OPTION - -2.71 0.025 0.19 -0.209** -2.04 0.014 0.09 0.129 0.84 
AC_OPTION -0.070 -0.84 -0.050 -0.44 0.104 0.76 - -2.07 0.023 0.18 
ACUR_OPTION 0.066 0.77 -0.050 -0.38 0.095 0.78 -0.041 -0.22 -0.262* -1.67 
AE_WARRANT 0.095* 1.88 0.126** 2.09 0.065 0.54 -0.149 -0.42 -0.126 -0.40 
AF_WARRANT -0.037 -0.38 -0.017 -0.11 -0.184 -1.60 0.088 0.24 -0.038 -0.11 
AE_OTHER 0.042 0.88 0.064 1.00 0.043 0.34 0.056 0.26 -0.198 -1.14 
AF_OTHER -0.115* -1.67 -0.245** -2.49 -0.104 -0.85 -0.362 -1.35 0.070 0.33 
AC_OTHER 0.001 0.01 -0.090 -0.51 -0.294 -1.46 -0.117 -0.45 - -2.00 
ACUR_OTHER 0.038 0.54 0.002 0.02 -0.065 -0.49 0.349 1.48 -0.011 -0.06 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R-squared 0.092  0.065  0.215  0.087  0.095  
F-statistic 7.44  3.55  5.67  1.51  1.83  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.90  1.94  1.93  1.99  1.76  
N 3382  1841  838  245  363  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
7.6 Complexity of Derivative Strategies and Hedge 
Fund Risk and Performance 
Table 15 presents the results for the impact of complexity of derivative strategies 
on fund risk and performance characteristics assuming a linear relation between 
the complexity and dependent variables which describe hedge fund risk and per-
formance characteristics. The results are denoted for testing Hypotheses 3, 4 and 
5b. The complexity of a derivative strategy of a hedge fund does not have a statis-
tically significant impact on its risk measured in terms of standard deviation, 
downside volatility, VaR, and MVaR Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported and the 
result is different from a closely related study by Chen (2009). The following rea-
sons may explain the difference: the exclusion of funds of hedge funds from the 
sample, the inclusion of managed futures funds in the sample of this study, up-
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dated dataset, the use of complexity variable instead of binary variable of deriva-
tives use, and the use of asset class dummies. The regression statistics suggest 
that the impact of the use of a more complex derivative strategy is negative and 
statistically significant on the performance, mean returns, and skewness of the 
returns of a hedge fund. The impact on the excess kurtosis of the returns of a 
hedge fund is positive and statistically significant.  
The impact of the use of a more complex derivative strategy on the Cornish-
Fischer expansion of the returns of a hedge fund is also negative and statistically 
significant. This result is also consistent with the results for skewness and kurtosis 
as higher kurtosis and lower skewness would decrease the value of this expansion 
as is also found in Table 15. To quantify the impact of a fatter left tail resulting 
from the use of 10 different derivatives for a hedge fund which has the mean 
standard deviation 4.13, the impact on the MVaR would be (-0.023*10*4.130 = -
0.949) nearly -1 %. The impact of the use of 15 different derivatives would be  (-
0.023*15*4.130 = -1.425) nearly -1.5 %. Taken all in all, these statistics show 
evidence that a more complex derivative strategy of a hedge fund causes fatter 
left tails of its return distribution. This finding is consistent with the prediction of 
John et al. (2006) that managers prefer to employ complex derivative strategies 
which result in a higher probability of sustaining large losses. Consequently, the 
results support Hypothesis 5b, which implies that the more complex derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund is associated with fatter left tails of its return distribution. 
This result again contradicts the view of risk management motivated use of de-
rivatives as evidenced by Chen’s (2009). These results imply that those complex 
derivative strategies play a minor role in risk management and are rather related 
to managers’ incentives to hide risk in the left tail. 
The results for performance ratios are not consistent with Hypothesis 4 of this 
study and the findings of John et al. (2006). The impact of the complexity of the 
derivative strategy of a hedge fund is negative and statistically highly significant 
for the three performance measures used in this study: the Sharpe ratio, the 
Sharpe ratio with downside volatility, and appraisal ratio. The only performance 
measure for which the impact is not statistically significant is the alpha. Thus, the 
complexity of derivative strategy does not seem to have a strong impact on ab-
normal returns of a hedge fund alone. Nevertheless, the result is consistent with 
the empirical study by Tiu (2005). Tiu’s (2005) results provide evidence for a 
negative relation between complexity of a hedge fund and its performance. 
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Table 15. The Impact of Complexity of Derivative Strategies on Hedge 
Fund Performance 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of performance and risk 
estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing.  The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.653** -2.33 -0.608* -1.94 -4.251*** -3.97 -0.962* -1.78 
LNSIZE 0.034*** 11.59 0.036*** 10.33 0.068*** 3.98 0.049*** 7.37 
LNAGE 0.053 1.33 0.052 1.17 0.433*** 2.85 0.048 0.62 
HMARK -0.001 -0.05 -0.022 -0.97 0.036 0.60 0.015 0.54 
IFEE 0.000 -0.09 0.000 0.19 0.016*** 3.19 0.002 0.77 
MFEE -0.001 -0.09 -0.002 -0.24 0.117** 2.28 0.028** 2.14 
LEVERAGED 0.008 0.60 0.006 0.35 0.101** 2.16 0.034 1.46 
MIN(Million$) -0.036 -0.95 -0.017 -0.32 0.000** -2.08 0.000 0.06 
RESTRICTION 0.001*** 3.91 0.002*** 3.99 0.002** 2.47 0.002*** 3.41 
LOCKUP 0.002** 2.14 0.002** 2.26 0.007** 2.11 0.002 1.18 
AUDIT -0.011 -0.78 -0.011 -0.63 -0.057 -0.78 -0.011 -0.38 
PERCAPITAL 0.009 0.83 0.003 0.24 0.039 0.80 0.014 0.73 
OPEN -0.050*** -3.51 -0.053*** -3.29 -0.151*** -2.58 -0.110*** -4.30 
OPENENDED 0.014 0.94 0.011 0.62 0.048 1.03 0.041 1.54 
COMPLEXITY -0.009*** -3.41 -0.011*** -3.64 -0.017 -1.54 -0.014** -2.45 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.227  0.196  0.068  0.118  
 F-statistic 23.55  19.77  6.59  11.28  
Durbin-Watson. 1.94  1.97  1.89  1.91  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The regression statistics in Table 15 also imply that the performance loss in terms 
of the Sharpe ratio is associated with lower mean return but not with higher stan-
dard deviation. This characteristic is revealed by the statistically significant im-
pact at the 1 % level of the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund 
on its mean return. Thus, the poorer performance associated with the complex 
derivative strategy is closely related to weaker returns of the users of complex 
derivative strategies. 
The weakness of the impact of complexity of derivative strategy on the alpha of a 
hedge fund is different from the statistically significant impact of the complexity 
on the mean returns of a hedge fund. Indeed, the results are seemingly different 
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when the empirical risk factors are considered. However, the result for the ap-
praisal ratio should be weighted more as it also considers idiosyncratic risk (see 
Treynor et al. (1973). The idiosyncratic risk may be especially important for some 
hedge funds as they may not be well diversified and have focused investment 
strategies. 
The results in Table 15 for the use of leverage and hedge fund performance sug-
gest that the use of leverage would imply higher alpha of a hedge fund. This result 
is consistent with the prediction arising from Ross’s (1977) study that skilled 
managers who know their type would use leverage. But the result is inconsistent 
with Schneeweis et al. (2005) who find that the use of leverage does not have an 
impact on hedge fund performance. The result in this study, however, should be 
treated with caution as the use of leverage does not have a statistically significant 
impact on the appraisal ratio of a hedge fund which considers idiosyncratic risk of 
a hedge fund. Intuitively, leveraged hedge funds may focus on more specific 
strategies which may require the use of leverage to boost returns while hedging 
systematic risk. This possibility could also explain the results. 
When compared to the other hedge fund characteristics, the use of derivatives and 
the openness of a fund to the public is considered, the impact of using one more 
type of derivative on performance ratios is relatively small respect to whether a 
hedge fund is open to the public. Clearly, the openness of a hedge fund to public 
is related to weaker performance beside the complexity of the derivative strategy 
of a hedge fund. In summary, important factors which have an impact on hedge 
fund performance according to the results measured using the appraisal ratio and 
the Sharpe ratio of this study are the following: 
1. size (positive) 
2. restriction period (positive) 
3. management fee (positive) 
4. lockup period (positive) 
5. complexity of derivative strategy (negative) 
6. openness to public (negative) 
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Table 15. Continued 
 MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -2.737*** -4.7 3.850* 1.68 3.668** 1.86 
LNSIZE 0.066*** 6.42 -0.279*** -6.85 -0.235*** -6.67 
LNAGE 0.298*** 3.78 0.448 1.32 0.384 1.34 
HMARK -0.008 -0.19 -0.361** -2.59 -0.343*** -2.76 
IFEE 0.009*** 2.81 0.047*** 4.33 0.037*** 3.83 
MFEE 0.037 1.44 0.221* 1.92 0.177* 1.80 
LEVERAGED 0.078** 2.54 0.549*** 5.39 0.537*** 5.77 
MIN(Million$) -0.295*** -3.10 -0.870*** -3.16 -0.690** -2.12 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 4.62 0.001 0.29 0.000 -0.08 
LOCKUP 0.011*** 4.08 0.034*** 3.84 0.026*** 3.34 
AUDIT -0.007 -0.16 -0.204 -1.28 -0.157 -1.15 
PERCAPITAL 0.074** 2.55 0.148 1.26 0.263** 2.54 
OPEN -0.063 -1.55 -0.037 -0.28 -0.097 -0.82 
OPENENDED 0.003 0.10 -0.029 -0.28 -0.048 -0.51 
COMPLEXITY -0.019*** -2.85 0.006 0.22 0.014 0.55 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.171  0.279  0.304  
F-statistic 16.82  30.70  34.62  
Durbin-Watson 1.90   1.89   1.87    
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 0.289 0.41 -7.505** -2.37 -2.282*** -3.93 -11.694** -2.25 -15.292*** -2.61 
LNSIZE -0.08 -1.87 0.043 0.64 -0.005 -0.50 0.715*** 7.69 0.646*** 5.93 
LNAGE -0.056 -0.55 1.575*** 3.27 -0.007 -0.08 -0.746 -0.97 0.157 0.18 
HMARK -0.102 -1.54 -0.903** -2.20 -0.184*** -3.43 0.832*** 2.71 0.076 0.18 
IFEE 0.012*** 2.81 0.071*** 3.66 0.010 2.47 -0.101*** -4.10 -0.050 -1.62 
MFEE 0.058* 1.81 0.049 0.28 0.068** 2.49 -0.476* -1.84 -0.254 -0.75 
LEVERAGED -0.017 -0.36 0.041 0.16 -0.043 -0.99 -1.200*** -5.27 -1.368*** -4.60 
MIN(Million$) -0.245 -1.05 2.480 1.28 0.345** 2.07 1.730*** 2.86 2.850*** 3.24 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 2.66 0.003 0.65 0.001** 2.34 0.001 0.23 0.002 0.54 
LOCKUP 0.006 1.59 -0.016 -0.76 0.002 0.65 -0.068*** -3.55 -0.055** -2.19 
AUDIT -0.030 -0.60 -0.091 -0.39 -0.023 -0.53 0.467 1.30 -0.122 -0.31 
PERCAPITAL -0.069 -1.47 0.387 1.37 -0.030 -0.78 -0.270 -1.02 -0.657** -2.06 
OPEN 0.003 0.05 -0.039 -0.13 0.031 0.63 0.023 0.08 0.540 1.34 
OPENENDED -0.080* -1.67 0.220 0.79 -0.069* -1.66 0.071 0.30 -0.155 -0.50 
COMPLEXITY -0.021* -1.78 0.112* 1.77 -0.023** -2.56 -0.032 -0.53 -0.061 -0.84 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.115  0.119  0.088  0.291  0.227  
F-statistic 10.96  11.41  8.37  32.58  23.60  
Durbin-Watson. 1.83   1.82   1.90   1.89   1.85   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Thus the results of this study suggest that there are five significant factors of 
hedge fund performance. The result for the size is very likely too naïve and the 
characteristic may vary for different strategies (see Getmansky 2005). The impact 
of the restriction and lockup periods may be related to the premium of illiquidity 
risk following the study by Aragon (2007). The impact of openness to the public 
can be explained simply; hedge funds which are open to the public focus more on 
marketing which aims to compensate for lower performance. The result for this 
characteristic may also relate to the transparency of a hedge fund (see Liang 
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2003). This result also implies that those hedge funds which are open to the pub-
lic and therefore closer to small investors yield weaker performance. These results 
for performance are also otherwise similar to the results in Table 11 when appli-
cable. 
Many other factors than the complexity of derivative strategy also have an impact 
on the Cornish-Fischer expansion of the returns of a hedge fund. Specifically, the 
results in Table 15 suggests that both minimum investment and the restriction 
period of a hedge fund have a positive impact on the Cornish-Fischer expansion 
in the distribution of its returns, and thus these fund characteristics are associated 
with a less heavy left tail of the return distribution. The use of a high watermark 
and open to the public status in turn are associated with a heavier left tail of the 
return distribution of a hedge fund. A reasonable explanation for these results is 
protection against heavy losses resulting from investors’ fire liquidations; a longer 
restriction period can be seen as a protection against changes in investor senti-
ment while the open-end status of a hedge fund to the public makes it more ex-
posed to the changes. The result for minimum investment also implies that hedge 
funds for more wealthy investors have less heavy left tails of their return distribu-
tions. Better performance statistics associated with the restriction period are seen 
as a compensation for illiquidity risk (see, e.g., Aragon 2007). 
Table 16 presents the regression statistics estimated using Model 4, which also 
accounts for the nonlinear impact of the complexity of the derivative strategy of a 
hedge fund on its risk and performance characteristics. The regression statistics 
suggest that the complexity has a statistically significant and nonlinear impact 
only on the performance of a hedge fund in terms of both the Sharpe ratio and the 
Sharpe ratio with downside volatility. Thus, the statistics imply that this impact is 
convex and it decreases with the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge 
fund. For instance, this characteristic implies that when the number of different 
derivatives used by a hedge fund is increased, for example, from the use of 1 to 2 
derivatives, the impact is much more severe than when the number of different 
derivatives is increased from 5 to 6. Admittedly, the convex relation between the 
complexity of derivative strategy and hedge fund performance is not supported 
for appraisal ratio due to the test statistics in Table 16. This result implies that 
once the abnormal returns with idiosyncratic risk of a hedge fund are considered 
alone the relation is not asymmetric. 
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Table 16.  Nonlinear Impact of Complexity of Derivative Strategies on  
Hedge Fund Performance 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of performance and risk 
estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 4):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi +   
 2(COMPLEXi)2 + e , 
 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. This table 
also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. Asset dummies include 
controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report to investing. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.030*** -4.37 -0.038*** -4.49 -0.014 -0.62 -0.033** -2.41 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.002*** 3.63 0.003*** 3.84 0.000 -0.14 0.002 1.33 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.230  0.200  0.068  0.119  
F-statistic 23.47  19.80  6.45  11.13  
Durbin-Watson 1.94  1.967  1.90  1.91   
  MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.020 -1.37 0.063 1.11 0.035 0.68 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.000 0.12 -0.006 -1.17 -0.002 -0.45 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.170  0.279  0.304  
F-statistic 16.44  30.05  33.84  
Durbin-Watson 1.90   1.90   1.87    
  SKEW EXKURT CF  VAR MVAR  
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.004 -0.18 0.136 1.04 -0.023 -1.13 -0.167 -1.31 -0.141 -0.87 
COMPLEXITY^2 -0.002 -0.73 -0.002 -0.20 0.000 -0.02 0.013 1.23 0.008 0.58 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.115  0.119  0.087  0.291  0.227  
F-statistic 10.73  11.16  8.18  31.89  23.08  
Durbin-Watson 1.83   1.82   1.90   1.89   1.86   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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To compare differences between live and dead hedge funds Models 3 and 4 are 
estimated for the samples of these hedge funds. Table 17 presents the results for 
Model 3 estimated for live hedge funds. The results for the complexity of the de-
rivative strategy of a hedge fund and its performance are likewise similar to the 
model estimated for the full sample. The use of a more complex derivative strat-
egy has a statistically highly significant and negative impact on the Sharpe ratio 
of a hedge fund. The impact is also statistically significant for the Cornish-Fischer 
expansion and skewness of the returns of a hedge fund. Nevertheless, the impact 
on excess kurtosis is not statistically significant as it is for the sample of all funds. 
Table 17.  Impact of Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on Live Hedge 
Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. The sample includes 2,070 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C - -3.21 -0.686*** -2.96 -2.102 -1.32 -0.796* -1.79 
LNSIZE 0.033*** 9.45 0.035*** 8.47 0.068*** 3.16 0.047*** 6.03 
LNAGE 0.050* 1.82 0.055* 1.81 0.110 0.51 0.024 0.41 
HMARK -0.040* -1.74 -0.071** -2.13 -0.004 -0.05 -0.069** -2.01 
IFEE 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.2 0.017*** 2.75 0.002 0.85 
MFEE 0.002 0.32 -0.002 -0.25 0.077 1.34 0.021 1.56 
LEVERAGED 0.000 0 0.009 0.41 0.075 1.28 0.033 1.17 
MIN(Million$) -0.004 -0.94 -0.004 -0.58 0.000 -1.29 0.000 0.55 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 4.82 0.003*** 4.75 0.001 1.16 0.002*** 3.25 
LOCKUP 0.002** 2.04 0.002* 1.79 0.006 1.53 0.003 1.48 
AUDIT -0.023 -1.24 -0.018 -0.74 -0.086 -0.78 -0.029 -0.80 
PERCAPITAL 0.009 0.67 -0.001 -0.05 0.062 1.02 0.012 0.53 
OPEN -0.035* -1.84 -0.037* -1.73 - -2.71 -0.095*** -2.97 
OPENENDED 0.021 1.09 0.016 0.64 0.101* 1.78 0.050 1.55 
COMPLEXITY - -3.07 -0.012*** -3.1 -0.012 -0.89 -0.010* -1.87 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.291  0.234  0.087  0.20  
 F-statistic 20.34  15.39  5.49  12.36  
Durbin-Watson 1.97   2.01   1.94   1.50   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 17. Continued 
  MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -1.312* -1.8 6.604* 1.85 6.317** 2.22 
LNSIZE 0.060*** 4.87 -0.269*** -5.13 -0.220*** -4.98 
LNAGE 0.085 0.85 0.092 0.18 0.028 0.07 
HMARK -0.006 -0.11 -0.063 -0.37 -0.042 -0.27 
IFEE 0.009** 2.27 0.053*** 3.83 0.039*** 3.24 
MFEE 0.034 1.19 0.065 0.49 0.04 0.37 
LEVERAGED 0.027 0.70 0.270** 2.07 0.254** 2.22 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.026** -2.31 -0.093*** -2.69 -0.090*** -2.69 
RESTRICTION 0.003*** 3.65 -0.001 -0.56 -0.002 -0.99 
LOCKUP 0.010*** 3.21 0.026** 2.44 0.022** 2.28 
AUDIT -0.007 -0.12 -0.236 -0.96 -0.066 -0.36 
PERCAPITAL 0.067** 1.98 0.097 0.65 0.200* 1.62 
OPEN -0.087* -1.93 0.037 0.23 -0.027 -0.19 
OPENENDED 0.036 0.93 0.047 0.36 0.000 0.000 
COMPLEXITY -0.022*** -2.72 0.006 0.18 0.015 0.49 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.207  0.255  0.304  
 F-statistic 13.30  17.11  21.56  
Durbin-Watson 1.89   1.94   1.91    
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.147 -0.14 -2.398 -0.54 -3.022*** -3.88 -16.676** -2.06 -21.150** -2.49 
LNSIZE -0.022 -1.36 0.088 1.06 0.001 0.10 0.685*** 5.73 0.605*** 4.37 
LNAGE 0.000 0.00 0.821 1.30 0.063 0.58 -0.128 -0.11 0.794 0.66 
HMARK -0.125 -1.28 -0.944 -1.39 -0.206*** -2.81 0.141 0.37 -0.422 -0.80 
IFEE 0.012** 2.43 0.068*** 2.90 0.008* 1.83 -0.114*** -3.64 -0.059 -1.56 
MFEE 0.007 0.19 0.167 0.89 0.055* 1.73 -0.118 -0.39 0.172 0.43 
LEVERAGED 0.049 0.86 0.244 0.82 0.020 0.41 -0.600** -2.08 -0.576 -1.51 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.022 -1.01 0.139 0.81 0.023 1.47 0.191** 2.54 0.271** 2.43 
RESTRICTION 0.002 1.53 0.007 1.16 0.002** 2.09 0.006 1.09 0.009 1.56 
LOCKUP 0.006 1.34 -0.028 -1.01 -0.001 -0.15 -0.051** -2.20 -0.069** -2.05 
AUDIT -0.097 -1.38 0.226 0.67 -0.009 -0.17 0.542 0.98 -0.142 -0.29 
PERCAPITAL -0.063 -1.03 0.348 0.92 -0.018 -0.36 -0.159 -0.47 -0.487 -1.22 
OPEN 0.051 0.72 0.022 0.05 0.061 0.92 -0.174 -0.49 0.726 1.36 
OPENENDED -0.074 -1.21 0.075 0.20 -0.041 -0.77 -0.073 -0.25 -0.124 -0.30 
COMPLEXITY -0.026* -1.83 0.124 1.43 -0.022** -1.97 -0.036 -0.46 -0.042 -0.44 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.150  0.150  0.110  0.274  0.228  
F-statistic 9.27  9.29  6.82  18.76  14.86  
Durbin-Watson 1.84   1.78   1.95   1.94   1.92   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Table 18 presents the results for Model 3, which is estimated for the sample of 
dead hedge funds. In the case of dead hedge funds, the use of a more complex 
derivative strategy does not seem to have a statistically significant impact on the 
Sharpe ratio of a hedge fund but the impact on the Sharpe ratio with downside 
volatility is still statistically significant at the 10 % level. However, these results 
are significant only for a linear relation between the complexity of a derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund and its performance. The results for the Cornish-Fischer 
expansion are similar for both live and dead hedge funds. For dead hedge funds, 
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however, a more complex derivative strategy does not seem to result as lower 
skewness but in turn as higher excess kurtosis, which differs from the 
characteristics of live hedge funds. 
Table 18.  Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on Dead 
Hedge Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing.  The sample includes 1,312 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.434 -0.58 -0.27 -0.33 -8.358*** -4.28 -1.224 -0.87 
LNSIZE 0.034*** 6.41 0.033*** 5.54 0.064** 2.47 0.047*** 4.14 
LNAGE 0.021 0.19 0.011 0.09 1.072*** 3.84 0.078 0.38 
HMARK 0.022 1.18 0.009 0.40 0.055 0.49 0.064 1.46 
IFEE 0.000 -0.07 0.001 0.26 0.013 1.45 0.001 0.35 
MFEE -0.009 -0.52 -0.003 -0.16 0.237* 1.87 0.038 0.98 
LEVERAGED 0.022 1.04 0.006 0.25 0.137* 1.68 0.048 1.12 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.008 -1.11 -0.002 -0.21 0.000** -1.97 0.000* -1.84 
RESTRICTION 0.000 1.20 0.001 1.59 0.002** 1.99 0.001 1.53 
LOCKUP 0.001 0.87 0.002 1.31 0.010 1.51 -0.001 -0.35 
AUDIT 0.013 0.55 0.009 0.32 -0.032 -0.34 0.025 0.50 
PERCAPITAL 0.013 0.73 0.015 0.79 -0.001 -0.01 0.024 0.62 
OPEN -0.080*** -3.34 -0.091*** -3.30 -0.070 -0.61 -0.157*** -3.19 
OPENENDED 0.017 0.67 0.021 0.73 -0.041 -0.53 0.038 0.79 
COMPLEXITY -0.008 -1.60 -0.009* -1.75 -0.037* -1.77 -0.023* -1.79 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.133  0.132  0.040  0.045  
F-statistic 5.56  5.52  2.24  2.41  
Durbin-Watson 1.90  1.91  1.87  1.89  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
The impact of complexity of derivative strategy on the appraisal ratio is similar 
for both live and dead hedge funds. However, the results are different for live and 
dead hedge funds for alpha. Specifically, the impact of the complexity of deriva-
tive strategy on the alpha is statistically significant and negative for dead hedge 
funds but it is not statistically significant for live hedge funds. This result may 
imply that dead hedge funds have employed derivative strategies rather unsuc-
cessfully. This poor skill is not related to their exposure to market-based risk fac-
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tors. All in all, the results do not support Hypothesis 4 either for dead or live 
hedge funds. 
 
Table 17. Continued 
  MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -5.027*** -4.51 2.279 0.62 1.897 0.52 
LNSIZE 0.073*** 4.38 -0.286*** -4.72 -0.251*** -4.34 
LNAGE 0.659*** 4.19 0.603 1.05 0.611 1.10 
HMARK -0.015 -0.2 -0.449* -1.95 -0.414** -1.97 
IFEE 0.008 1.43 0.029 1.60 0.024 1.52 
MFEE 0.081 1.33 0.602*** 2.66 0.535** 2.21 
LEVERAGED 0.125** 2.52 0.915*** 5.31 0.879*** 5.41 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.042** -2.14 -0.025 -0.36 0.035 0.35 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 2.69 0.002 0.91 0.002 0.85 
LOCKUP 0.013** 2.59 0.049*** 3.32 0.034*** 2.64 
AUDIT 0.002 0.03 -0.150 -0.75 -0.237 -1.14 
PERCAPITAL 0.086 1.61 0.163 0.85 0.293 1.56 
OPEN 0.028 0.32 -0.034 -0.14 -0.072 -0.32 
OPENENDED -0.058 -1.08 -0.231 -1.36 -0.211 -1.36 
COMPLEXITY -0.014 -1.11 -0.002 -0.06 0.010 0.23 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.125  0.319  0.311  
F-statistic 5.25  14.94  14.43  
Durbin-Watson 1.95   1.83   1.84     
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 0.084 0.06 -6.850 -1.11 -1.602 -1.33 -10.329 -1.24 -11.750 -1.18 
LNSIZE -0.033 -1.48 -0.065 -0.57 -0.017 -0.87 0.738*** 5.37 0.710*** 4.22 
LNAGE -0.037 -0.17 2.026* 1.84 -0.061 -0.30 -0.745 -0.58 0.028 0.02 
HMARK -0.131 -1.35 -0.431 -0.91 - -2.06 1.030** 2.02 0.023 0.03 
IFEE 0.016** 1.98 0.043 1.23 0.012 1.65 -0.059 -1.49 -0.031 -0.60 
MFEE 0.211** 2.57 -0.228 -0.49 0.108 1.70 - -2.69 -1.424** -2.07 
LEVERAGED -0.085 -1.04 -0.478 -1.05 -0.145* -1.75 - -5.16 - -4.89 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.027 -0.41 0.578 1.14 0.065 1.53 0.015 0.10 0.200 1.16 
RESTRICTION 0.002** 2.16 -0.001 -0.10 0.001 1.15 -0.004 -0.58 -0.005 -0.97 
LOCKUP 0.007 1.06 0.010 0.33 0.007 1.23 - -3.14 -0.042 -1.06 
AUDIT 0.036 0.47 -0.510 -1.46 -0.049 -0.68 0.350 0.77 -0.238 -0.37 
PERCAPITAL -0.076 -0.98 0.456 1.06 -0.044 -0.70 -0.293 -0.68 -0.809 -1.52 
OPEN -0.108 -1.08 -0.455 -1.03 -0.027 -0.34 0.107 0.20 0.033 0.05 
OPENENDED -0.086 -1.12 0.487 1.30 -0.093 -1.35 0.479 1.27 0.127 0.28 
COMPLEXITY -0.021 -1.11 0.192** 2.46 - -1.96 -0.008 -0.09 -0.122 -1.04 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.060  0.082  0.041  0.323  0.227  
F-statistic 2.89  3.68  2.27  15.23  9.74  
Durbin-Watson 1.85   1.95   1.81   1.82   1.77   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 19.  Nonlinear Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on 
Live Hedge Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
4):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi +  
 2(COMPLEXi)2 + e ,  
 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. The sample includes 2,070  hedge funds. This table 
also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust.  t-statistics are given in italics. Asset dummies include 
controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. See Table 1 for defi-
nitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.031*** -3.710 -0.042*** -3.800 0.001 0.03 -0.043*** -3.21 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.002*** 3.070 0.003*** 3.270 -0.001 -0.57 0.003*** 2.96 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.295  0.238  0.087  0.198  
F-statistic 20.23  15.39  5.37  12.32  
Durbin-Watson 1.97   2.01   1.94   1.95    
  MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.022 -1.28 0.057 0.8 0.028 0.45 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.000 0.00 -0.005 -0.81 -0.001 -0.21 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.207  0.255  0.304  
F-statistic 13.00  16.74  21.07  
Durbin-Watson 1.89   1.94   1.91    
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.034 -1.12 0.245 1.32 -0.056** -2.14 -0.155 -0.96 -0.213 -0.99 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.001 0.28 -0.012 -0.70 0.003 1.50 0.012 0.84 0.017 0.94 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.149  0.150  0.111  0.274  0.228  
 F-statistic 9.07  9.10  6.72  18.35  14.55  
Durbin-Watson 1.84   1.77   1.96   1.94   1.92   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 19 reports the results for the nonlinear relation between the use of a more 
complex derivative strategy and the performance characteristics of live hedge 
funds. Table 20 in turn reports the results for dead hedge funds. The results sug-
gest that the nonlinear relation between the use of a more complex derivative 
strategy of a hedge fund and its performance is also advocated for the samples of 
both live and dead hedge funds.  
Table 20.  Nonlinear Impact of the Complexity of a Derivative Strategy on 
Dead Hedge Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
4):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi +  
 2(COMPLEXi)2 + e , 
 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. The sample includes 1,312 hedge funds. This table 
also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. Asset dummies include 
controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. See Table 1 for defi-
nitions of the variables. 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.028** -2.41 -0.032** -2.52 -0.039 -0.88 -0.020 -0.73 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.002** 2.07 0.002** 2.15 0.000 0.06 0.000 -0.10 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.135  0.134  0.039  0.045  
F-statistic 5.56  5.52  2.19  2.36  
Durbin-Watson 1.90   1.91   1.87   1.89    
  MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.011 -0.40 0.073 0.75 0.056 0.61 
COMPLEXITY^2 0.000 -0.11 -0.007 -0.95 -0.005 -0.60 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.124  0.319  0.31  
 F-statistic 5.13  14.62  14.11  
Durbin-Watson 1.95   1.83   1.84   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 20. Continued 
 
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY 0.037 1.01 0.024 0.15 0.019 0.61 -0.181 -0.84 -0.150 -0.57 
COMPLEXITY^2 -0.006 -1.61 0.017 1.23 -0.005* -1.71 0.017 0.99 0.003 0.12 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.061  0.083  0.042  0.323  0.226  
F-statistic 2.91  3.62  2.29  14.91  9.52  
Durbin-Watson 1.85   1.95   1.81   1.82   1.77   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The results in Tables 19 and 20 are markedly different for appraisal ratios. The 
test statistics show that the nonlinear impact of complexity of derivative strategy 
is statistically significant for live hedge funds. The same relation, however, is not 
statistically significant for dead hedge funds. One explanation for the result is that 
the evolution of hedge funds may have an impact on the result (live funds are bi-
ased toward new funds). The other explanation for the result is the possibility that 
live hedge funds have different performance characteristics associated with the 
use of derivatives in contrast to dead hedge funds. 
Table 21 presents AIC and SIC statistics for the comparison of Models 3 and 4 
which are presented in the previous tables. For these statistics, model having the 
lowest information criteria is considered having the best fit. Moreover, the values 
of SIC suffer more from the use of additional variables. For the conclusions of the 
analysis, the alpha statistics may be emphasized less due to their weak relation to 
the complexity of derivative strategy.  
In general, the statistics in Table 21 suggest that the nonlinear relation is better 
suitable for the performance of a hedge fund and the complexity of its derivative 
strategy than the linear relation. In the case of dead hedge funds, the SIC statistic 
suggests that the linear relation is more suitable for the Sharpe ratio and the 
Sharpe ratio with downside volatility. The SIC statistic also implies that the rela-
tion between the appraisal ratio and the complexity of the derivative strategy is 
linear in contrast to that of the AIC statistic. Nevertheless, more emphasise may 
be given to the AIC statistics as the parameters in the analysis of nonlinear rela-
tion exhibit remarkably higher statistical significance. For the dependent variables 
examined other than performance ratios, the statistics suggest that the linear rela-
tion is more suitable between the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge 
fund and the risk measure.  
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Table 21. Information Criteria 
This table presents the values of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Infor-
mation Criterion (SIC) for the linear regression analyses presented in Tables 11, 13, and 14 (de-
noted as Linear) and the quadratic regression analyses presented in Tables 12, 15, and 16 (denoted 
as Quadratic). Panel A presents the results for the entire sample, Panel B presents the results for 
live hedge funds, and Panel C presents the results for dead hedge funds. See Table 1 for defini-
tions of the variables. 
 
Panel A. 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN STDEV 
Linear       
AIC 0.5430 0.9683 3.3946 1.7641 2.4234 5.1061 
SIC 0.6245 1.0498 3.4762 1.8456 2.5050 5.1876 
       
Quadratic       
AIC 0.5390 0.9639 3.3952 1.7635 2.4240 5.1063 
SIC 0.6223 1.0472 3.4786 1.8469 2.5074 5.1897 
  DD SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Linear       
AIC 4.8815 3.2141 6.6717 2.8965 7.2112 6.7265 
SIC 4.9630 3.2956 6.7532 2.9780 7.2927 6.8081 
       
Quadratic      
AIC 4.8820 3.2145 6.6723 2.8971 7.2117 6.7267 
SIC 4.9653 3.2978 6.7556 2.9804 7.2950 6.8101 
 
Panel B. 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN STDEV 
Linear       
AIC 0.4602 1.0122 3.3670 1.5199 2.3153 5.1355 
SIC 0.5827 1.1347 3.4895 1.6424 2.4378 5.258 
       
Quadratic       
AIC 0.4558 1.0074 3.3679 1.5166 2.3163 5.1362 
SIC 0.5810 1.1327 3.4931 1.6418 2.4415 5.2614  
 DD SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Linear       
AIC 4.7925 3.2393 6.8178 2.8594 6.7519 7.2229 
SIC 4.9150 3.3618 6.9403 2.9819 6.8744 7.3454 
       
Quadratic       
AIC 4.7935 3.2402 6.8185 2.8592 6.7525 7.2235 
SIC 4.9187 3.3655 6.9437 2.9845 6.8778 7.3487 
 
Panel C. 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN STDEV 
Linear       
AIC 0.6617 0.8968 3.4552 2.0639 2.5781 5.0875 
SIC 0.8393 1.0744 3.6328 2.2415 2.7558 5.2651 
       
Quadratic       
AIC 0.6593 0.8945 3.4567 2.0654 2.5796 5.0884 
SIC 0.8409 1.0761 3.6383 2.2469 2.7612 5.2699  
  DD SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Linear       
AIC 5.0300 3.1909 6.3739 2.9878 6.7111 7.2261 
SIC 5.2077 3.3685 6.5515 3.1654 6.8887 7.4037 
       
Quadratic       
AIC 5.0313 3.1898 6.3745 2.9870 6.7120 7.2276 
SIC 5.2129 3.3714 6.5561 3.1686 6.8935 7.4092 
 
 
 
132      Acta Wasaensia 
The results for the quantile regression analysis, which considers different seg-
ments of the risk and performance measures of the sample of hedge funds, are 
presented in Table 22. This analysis is devoted for complimenting the results of 
OLS analysis for Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5b. Therefore, the analysis is limited to the 
most relevant variables of performance and risk of a hedge fund used in this 
study. The variables are alpha, appraisal ratio, the Sharpe ratio, the Cornish-
Fischer expansion, and standard deviation. 
The results in Table 22 provide further support for Hypothesis 5b as a negative 
relation between the Cornish-Fischer expansion and the complexity of the deriva-
tive strategy of a hedge fund is still found. The results provide evidence for a 
negative relation between the complexity and hedge fund performance. Further, 
the results provide evidence for negative relation between the complexity and the 
alpha, a relation not seen using OLS analysis. The reason is also seen in Table 22. 
That is, only the lower segment of the performers in the hedge fund industry has a 
negative association with the complexity. This result implies that investing in a 
hedge fund using complex derivative strategy on average does not perform worse 
than the others. Instead, by investing in such a hedge fund one takes a higher risk 
the fund being even worse performer in the terms of abnormal returns. For ap-
praisal and Sharpe ratios, the evidence suggests that the negative complexity-
performance relation is also statistically significant for higher performance seg-
ments. The relation between risk and the complexity is not found to be signifi-
cant, which is a characteristic to OLS analysis. 
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Table 22. Quantile Regression Analysis 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
4):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Only the coefficient for the “COMPLEX” is pre-
sented for nine different quantiles. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. The standard errors 
and covariance are Huber-Sandwich heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. In-
dependent variables in the model also include, time dummies, strategy dummies, and asset dum-
mies. Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report 
investing. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
Quantile ALPHA APPRAISAL SHARPE CF STDEV 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
0.1 -0.022** -2.13 - -3.50 -0.004 -1.11 -0.019 -1.15 -0.021 -1.40 
0.2 - -3.41 - -3.22 -0.003* -1.70 -0.024** -2.16 -0.020 -1.40 
0.3 -0.016** -2.50 - -3.05 -0.004** -2.39 -0.022** -2.52 0.005 0.30 
0.4 -0.017** -2.47 - -2.62 -0.004** -2.52 - -2.94 0.005 0.30 
0.5 -0.011 -1.59 -0.007** -2.33 -0.003 -1.56 -0.017** -2.33 0.017 0.89 
0.6 -0.011 -1.50 -0.005 -1.45 -0.004* -1.89 - -2.78 0.022 1.01 
0.7 -0.008 -0.94 -0.003 -1.00 -0.004* -1.78 - -2.66 0.032 1.10 
0.8 -0.005 -0.49 -0.008** -2.11 - -2.86 -0.013 -1.33 0.038 1.06 
0.9 -0.023 -1.61 -0.013** -2.28 -0.009** -2.34 0.005 0.35 0.033 0.50 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
7.7 Further Analysis of the Complexity of Derivative 
Strategy and Hedge Fund Risk 
Table 23 presents the regression statistics for the market-based and idiosyncratic 
components of hedge fund risk. The regression statistics presented in Table 23 
clearly imply that the impact of the complexity of the derivative strategy of a 
hedge fund is related to the market-based risk of a hedge fund. This result is seen 
as the complexity has statistically significant association with the skewness, kur-
tosis, and the Cornish-Fischer expansion of market-based returns. Therefore, the 
result also suggests that the empirical model used in this study is capable of cap-
turing nonnormality in hedge fund returns arising from their derivative strategies. 
The skewness and kurtosis of residual returns and the Cornish-Fischer expansion 
estimated on these returns are weakly explained by Model 3. Thus, the results 
apparently suggest that the complexity of derivative strategy increases the fat left 
tails for market-based returns rather than idiosyncratic returns. 
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Table 23.  Market-Based and Idiosyncratic Components of Hedge Fund 
Risk 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL jidefines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italic. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SSTDEV 

SSKEW 

SKURT 

SCF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 6.048*** 3.63 0.484 0.83 -5.547** -2.14 -0.544 -0.59 
LNSIZE - -6.40 -0.013 -1.62 0.052* 1.72 -0.022** -2.06 
LNAGE -0.127 -0.53 -0.114 -1.38 0.932** 2.50 -0.302** -2.33 
HMARK - -3.39 -0.005 -0.14 -0.208 -1.55 0.045 1.00 
IFEE 0.022*** 2.96 0.009*** 2.76 0.023 1.53 0.001 0.20 
MFEE 0.091 1.15 0.098*** 4.09 -0.084 -0.82 0.092** 2.49 
LEVERAGED 0.434*** 5.75 -0.025 -0.92 -0.014 -0.15 -0.015 -0.45 
MIN(Million$) - -2.64 0.014 1.51 -0.063** -2.34 0.025** 2.47 
RESTRICTION 0.000 0.28 0.002*** 3.74 -0.002 -1.51 0.002*** 3.46 
LOCKUP 0.023*** 3.69 0.000 -0.23 -0.011* -1.70 0.002 0.98 
AUDIT -0.197* -1.70 0.015 0.46 0.088 0.75 -0.009 -0.22 
PERCAPITAL 0.110 1.29 -0.026 -0.98 0.057 0.57 -0.033 -0.94 
OPEN -0.042 -0.44 -0.025 -0.74 0.064 0.48 -0.034 -0.72 
OPENENDED -0.096 -1.26 -0.012 -0.47 -0.020 -0.22 -0.004 -0.14 
COMPLEXITY 0.004 0.22 -0.015* -1.93 0.064** 2.00 -0.026** -2.26 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes           
Adjusted R 0.276  0.182  0.143  0.202  
F-statistic 30.34  18.15  13.80  20.41  
Durbin-Watson 1.89  1.89  1.89  1.90   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
It is also an interesting characteristic that Model 3 is better capable of explaining 
the Cornish-Fischer expansion estimated for market-based and idiosyncratic com-
ponents than the expansion estimated for raw returns. The adjusted R-squares in 
the estimation of market-based and idiosyncratic components respectively are 
0.202 and 0.105 against the adjusted R-square 0.088 in the estimation of raw re-
turns. The results also suggest that higher management fees, higher minimum 
investment, and restriction periods can be important components which can re-
duce fat left tails of the distribution of market-based hedge returns.  
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Table 23. Continued 
  RSTDEV 

RSKEW 

RKURT 

ICF 
  Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -1.119 -0.67 0.762 1.62 - -4.79 0.849 1.23 
LNSIZE - -6.48 -0.017* -1.88 0.005 0.12 -0.014 -1.06 
LNAGE 0.786*** 3.07 -0.116* -1.69 1.722*** 5.05 - -4.67 
HMARK -0.152 -1.47 -0.074 -1.56 -0.215 -0.72 -0.004 -0.05 
IFEE 0.045*** 5.17 0.007*** 2.84 0.040*** 3.36 -0.004 -1.11 
MFEE 0.214** 2.43 0.018 0.79 0.028 0.20 0.007 0.17 
LEVERAGED 0.325*** 4.33 -0.027 -0.79 -0.020 -0.11 -0.015 -0.31 
MIN(Million$) - -3.48 -0.026 -1.35 0.258* 1.68 -0.079* -1.71 
RESTRICTION 0.000 0.29 0.001 1.55 0.004 1.43 0.000 -0.48 
LOCKUP 0.025*** 3.79 0.004 1.34 -0.018 -1.19 0.007 1.54 
AUDIT -0.092 -0.81 -0.036 -1.05 -0.062 -0.38 -0.012 -0.31 
PERCAPITAL 0.083 0.95 -0.031 -0.87 0.373* 1.74 -0.110 -1.73 
OPEN -0.004 -0.04 -0.024 -0.62 -0.104 -0.55 0.007 0.13 
OPENENDED 0.062 0.80 -0.035 -0.97 0.222 1.07 -0.077 -1.29 
COMPLEXITY 0.000 0.00 -0.002 -0.23 0.016 0.44 -0.005 -0.46 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes           
Adjusted R 0.266  0.079  0.105  0.105  
F-statistic 28.82  7.57  10.01  10.06  
Durbin-Watson 1.88  1.85  1.79  1.76  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
7.8 Complexity of Derivative Strategy and 
Management of Hedge Fund Portfolios 
To investigate the use of derivatives in the management of hedge funds’ portfo-
lios this study tests Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5b using the samples of hedge funds and 
funds of hedge funds. Table 24 presents the results for funds of funds. In contrast 
to the results for hedge funds, the results for funds of hedge funds provide support 
for Hypothesis 3. The complexity of derivative strategy has a statistically signifi-
cant and negative impact on the standard deviation of the returns of a fund of 
hedge funds implying that the complexity is associated with less risk. The statis-
tics for the standard deviation of both residual and market-based returns suggest 
that the impact can be related to both market-based and idiosyncratic components 
of the returns. The results for downside volatility, VaR and MVaR provide com-
plimentary evidence for this complexity-risk relation. Thus, only the results for 
funds of hedge funds are consistent with the risk management use of derivative 
found by Chen (2008), who does not distinguish between funds of hedge funds 
and hedge funds in multivariate analysis. This seemingly explains different results 
for multivariate analysis of hedge funds, other than funds of hedge funds, from 
the study by Chen (2009). In conclusion, only funds of hedge funds seem to use 
derivatives consistent with risk management. This is very reasonable as funds of 
funds may need to hedge exchange rate risk from foreign currency denominated 
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funds. They are also able to monitor risk characteristics of hedge funds in their 
portfolios and hedge some of the risk exposures if they desire to do so. 
The results in Table 24 do not provide any statistically significant evidence that 
the complexity of the derivative strategy of a fund of hedge funds affects its per-
formance. Thus, the results do not provide support for Hypothesis 4. They are 
also different from hedge funds for which a negative and statistically significant 
relation is found for performance and the complexity of derivative strategy. 
Table 24. Complexity of Derivative Strategy and Funds of Hedge Funds  
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the performance and 
risk estimates of funds of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following 
(Model 3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. The sample includes 761 funds of hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italic. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.779** -2.53 -0.813** -2.63 -1.858 -1.54 -1.615** -2.20 
LNSIZE 0.037*** 8.11 0.036*** 7.44 0.062*** 3.79 0.055*** 5.70 
LNAGE 0.045 0.97 0.052 1.11 0.118 0.67 0.134 1.27 
HMARK -0.017 -0.88 -0.010 -0.50 -0.015 -0.30 -0.062* -1.77 
IFEE 0.001 1.09 0.002 1.23 0.010** 2.23 0.005** 2.33 
MFEE -0.044*** -3.64 -0.041*** -3.34 -0.055 -1.21 -0.060** -2.46 
LEVERAGED -0.016 -1.06 -0.017 -1.01 0.006 0.11 -0.004 -0.12 
MIN(Million$) 0.000 0.69 0.000 1.06 0.000 0.14 0.000 0.24 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 7.87 0.002*** 6.85 0.001* 1.66 0.002*** 4.76 
LOCKUP 0.000 -0.20 0.000 -0.20 -0.009*** -2.79 -0.005* -1.84 
AUDIT 0.014 0.86 0.013 0.70 0.061 1.04 0.036 1.07 
PERCAPITAL 0.050*** 3.22 0.059*** 3.34 -0.024 -0.50 0.041 1.33 
OPEN -0.028* -1.78 -0.016 -0.84 -0.053 -1.08 -0.035 -1.13 
OPENENDED -0.022 -1.34 -0.020 -1.11 0.002 0.05 -0.027 -0.82 
COMPLEXITY 0.000 0.15 0.000 -0.23 -0.002 -0.39 -0.003 -1.06 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.378  0.319  0.152  0.259  
    F-statistic 18.09  14.17  6.03  10.86  
Durbin-Watson 1.78  1.77  2.01  2.00  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 24. Continued 
 MEAN STDEV D 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.936 -1.02 2.826 0.76 3.180 1.03 
LNSIZE 0.051*** 4.82 -0.190*** -4.63 -0.185*** -4.77 
LNAGE 0.057 0.42 0.494 0.89 0.428 0.95 
HMARK 0.068* 1.73 0.092 0.48 -0.001 -0.01 
IFEE 0.004 1.18 -0.001 -0.08 0.006 0.37 
MFEE -0.061** -2.05 0.289** 2.51 0.244** 2.38 
LEVERAGED 0.061* 1.72 0.361*** 2.66 0.384*** 3.02 
MIN(Million$) -0.001 -0.18 -0.004 -0.15 -0.030 -1.47 
RESTRICTION 0.002*** 3.49 -0.008*** -3.93 -0.007*** -4.00 
LOCKUP -0.001 -0.40 0.002 0.27 0.001 0.15 
AUDIT 0.040 1.00 -0.150 -1.10 -0.205 -1.42 
PERCAPITAL 0.059 1.53 0.226 1.39 0.212 1.42 
OPEN -0.071** -2.13 -0.194 -1.43 -0.266** -2.19 
OPENENDED 0.029 0.87 0.204* 1.74 0.185 1.65 
COMPLEXITY -0.002 -0.67 -0.040*** -3.48 -0.032*** -2.90 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.172  0.277  0.274  
    F-statistic 6.86  11.78  11.62  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.90   1.97   1.89    
  SKEW EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -2.475 - - - - - -7.511 - -6.587 -
LNSIZE -0.035 - - - 0.009 0.37 0.494*** 5.13 0.713*** 5.36 
LNAGE 0.387* 1.67 1.311 1.25 0.038 0.21 -1.091 - -1.833 -
HMARK 0.245** 2.22 0.124 0.17 0.282** 2.55 -0.147 - 0.869 1.20 
IFEE 0.002 0.25 - - -0.006 - 0.007 0.19 -0.060 -
MFEE 0.064 0.96 - - 0.153** 2.38 - - -0.337 -
LEVERAGED 0.002 0.03 - - 0.059 0.76 -0.778** - -0.967** -
MIN(Million$) 0.058* 1.72 0.000 0.00 0.058 1.20 0.009 0.13 0.349 1.23 
RESTRICTION 0.000 - 0.001 0.14 -0.001 - 0.020*** 4.25 0.014** 2.42 
LOCKUP 0.009 1.13 - - 0.014* 1.65 -0.006 - 0.054 1.20 
AUDIT 0.037 0.38 - - 0.067 0.83 0.387 1.22 0.720 1.53 
PERCAPITAL -0.024 - 0.344 0.62 0.082 0.89 -0.468 - 0.105 0.17 
OPEN 0.247** 2.20 0.634 0.98 0.064 0.59 0.379 1.20 0.725 1.17 
OPENENDED -0.020 - 0.466 0.89 0.048 0.48 -0.447 - -0.164 -
COMPLEXITY - - 0.037 0.91 -0.009 - 0.091*** 3.46 0.072* 1.84 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R-squared 0.055  0.083  0.068  0.293  0.186  
F-statistic 2.65  3.55  3.07  12.69  7.45  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.98   1.92   1.92   1.97   1.90   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 24. Continued 
  SSTDEV SSKEW SKURT SCF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 3.617 1.27 -2.131 -1.97 -4.420 -1.30 -2.730** -2.20 
LNSIZE -0.118*** -3.99 -0.039** -2.36 0.081 1.47 -0.047** -2.26 
LNAGE 0.122 0.29 0.369** 2.29 0.571 1.15 0.138 0.77 
HMARK 0.111 0.74 0.119** 2.19 0.021 0.11 0.083 1.20 
IFEE -0.005 -0.41 0.004 0.90 -0.001 -0.06 0.003 0.50 
MFEE 0.158** 1.99 0.077 1.64 0.050 0.30 0.045 0.67 
LEVERAGED 0.245** 2.44 0.008 0.19 -0.005 -0.04 0.007 0.13 
MIN(Million$) -0.012 -0.67 0.009 1.13 -0.062** -2.08 0.022** 2.05 
RESTRICTION -0.006*** -3.67 0.000 -0.11 0.001 0.41 0.000 -0.33 
LOCKUP 0.005 0.81 0.001 0.26 0.009 0.90 -0.001 -0.37 
AUDIT -0.088 -0.89 -0.025 -0.50 -0.235 -1.28 0.037 0.56 
PERCAPITAL 0.141 1.20 -0.033 -0.68 -0.064 -0.40 -0.010 -0.16 
OPEN -0.177* -1.89 0.058 1.10 0.109 0.68 0.017 0.29 
OPENENDED 0.119 1.32 -0.004 -0.09 0.217 1.53 -0.054 -1.09 
COMPLEXITY -0.032*** -3.81 0.004 0.96 -0.003 -0.21 0.003 0.69 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.266  0.073  0.103  0.097  
F-statistic 11.22  3.22  4.22  4.02  
Durbin-Watson 1.93   1.91   1.98   1.99   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The results in Table 24 also provide support for Hypothesis 5b as the complexity 
of derivative strategy has a statistically significant impact on the Cornish-Fischer 
expansion of residual returns of a fund of hedge funds. But the relation is statisti-
cally significant only at the 10 % level. In line with Hypothesis 5b, the results 
suggest that the complexity has a negative relation with the skewness of the dis-
tribution of residual returns of a fund of hedge funds. The result is different from 
hedge funds as the complexity of their derivative strategy is rather related to mar-
ket-based returns while for funds of hedge funds it is related to idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Table 24. Continued 
  RSTDEV RSSKEW RKURT ICF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C 0.022 0.01 0.614 0.56 -3.249 -0.80 -0.986 -0.71 
LNSIZE -0.145*** -4.71 -0.027 -1.12 -0.157 -1.19 0.017 0.39 
LNAGE 0.604 1.57 -0.058 -0.35 0.937 1.47 -0.262 -1.24 
HMARK 0.012 0.09 0.140 1.54 -0.098 -0.17 0.126 0.76 
IFEE 0.003 0.29 -0.004 -0.79 0.020 0.73 -0.008 -0.94 
MFEE 0.244*** 2.68 0.117** 2.38 -0.654** -2.11 0.239*** 2.72 
LEVERAGED 0.266*** 2.73 0.018 0.25 0.121 0.33 -0.015 -0.14 
MIN(Million$) 0.002 0.06 0.052* 1.81 0.112 0.69 0.012 0.35 
RESTRICTION -0.005*** -3.83 -0.001 -0.53 0.006 1.15 -0.002 -1.08 
LOCKUP -0.003 -0.41 0.007 1.09 -0.048 -1.40 0.016* 1.81 
AUDIT -0.114 -1.13 0.048 0.60 -0.474 -1.13 0.146 1.07 
PERCAPITAL 0.163 1.35 0.032 0.41 0.524 1.20 -0.099 -0.77 
OPEN -0.103 -0.96 0.242*** 2.81 0.559 1.27 0.047 0.39 
OPENENDED 0.156 1.85 -0.010 -0.13 0.393 0.92 -0.099 -0.87 
COMPLEXITY -0.023*** -2.78 -0.020*** -3.21 0.013 0.47 -0.018* -1.85 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.260  0.029  0.056  0.041  
F-statistic 10.90  1.83  2.68  2.22  
Durbin-Watson 2.01   1.95   1.89   1.85   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 25 presents the results for the sample of hedge funds analysed using Model 
4. The results are denoted to test whether investing in other funds alters the rela-
tion between the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund and its 
performance and risk. The results suggest that investing in other funds is associ-
ated with weaker performance. This result is evinced by the Sharpe ratio, Sharpe 
ratio with downside volatility, and alpha. Investing in other funds results as -
0.199 % lower monthly alpha. However, the result for the alpha is statistically 
significant only at the 10 % level.  
Table 25. Complexity of Derivative Strategy and Investing in Other Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
4):  
 MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi ,  
 +2COMPLEXi *OTHERi + 3OTHERi + ei   
 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i; COMPLEXi  defines the num-
ber of different derivatives used fund i, and  defines defines a dummy variable for in-
vesting in other funds by fund i (1 if the fund invests in other funds, and 0 otherwise). Asset 
dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. The 
sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-
order serial correlation. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics 
are given in italic. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.010*** -3.65 -0.013*** -3.90 -0.017 -1.44 -0.017*** -2.77 
COMPLEXITY*OF 0.011** 2.08 0.014** 2.30 0.013 0.65 0.022** 2.48 
OF -0.057* -1.87 -0.082** -2.16 -0.199* -1.73 -0.056 -1.10 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         
Adjusted R 0.227  0.197  0.068  0.118 
F-statistic 22.59  19.00  6.35  10.88 
Durbin-Watson 1.94   1.97   1.89   1.91    
  MEAN STDEV D SKEW 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY -0.018** -2.56 0.027 0.96 0.030 1.16 -0.020* -1.66 
COMPLEXITY*OF 0.013 0.93 -0.101** -2.13 -0.088* -1.69 0.022 0.94 
OF -0.269*** -3.74 -0.270 -1.04 -0.074 -0.30 - -3.23 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         
Adjusted R 0.173  0.280  0.305  0.117 
F-statistic 16.36  29.64  33.28  10.71 
Durbin-Watson 1.90   1.90   1.87   1.83 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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The results for the complexity of derivative strategy and hedge fund performance 
do not change significantly when Model 4 is used instead of Model 3. However, 
the coefficient on the joint effect of the complexity of the derivative strategy and 
investing in other funds is negative and statistically significant for the Sharpe ra-
tio, Sharpe ratio with downside volatility and the appraisal ratio. Practically, the 
joint effect cancels out the negative relation between the complexity and hedge 
fund performance. For example, when a hedge fund invests in other funds, the use 
of 10 different derivatives affects the appraisal ratio positively by 0.050 (-
0.017*10+0.022*10). The results compliments those presented for funds of hedge 
funds and hedge funds in Tables 15 and 24. In these tables, the complexity-
performance relation is found to be negative and significant only for the sample 
of hedge funds. Accordingly, it is even more evident that the complexity of the 
derivative strategy of a hedge fund affects only those hedge funds which do not 
invest in other hedge funds. 
The complexity-performance relation is not the only characteristic found in Table 
25 complimenting the differences for funds of hedge funds and hedge funds. The 
complexity-risk relation is also altered by the consideration of funds investing in 
other funds. While the analyses presented earlier in this study suggests that there 
is no evidence for the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund to be 
consistent with risk management, the evidence clearly suggest that once a hedge 
fund invests in other funds the complexity is associated with lower risk. The joint 
coefficient of the complexity and investing in other funds is negative (positive) 
and statistically significant for the standard deviation and downside volatility (the 
VaR and MVaR measures). Moreover, the results suggest that the negative stan-
dard deviation-complexity relation is related to the residual return of a hedge 
fund. In conclusion, Hypothesis 3 is supported only when investing in other 
funds. 
Investing in other funds also alters the relation between the left tail of the return 
distribution of a hedge fund and the complexity of its derivative strategy. While 
the complexity increases the left tail of the return distribution of market-based 
returns of a hedge fund, investing in other hedge funds mitigates the relation. In 
fact, the joint effect of the use of 10 different derivatives increases the value of 
the Cornish-Fischer expansion of market-based hedge fund returns by 0.120 (-
0.033*10 + 0.045*10). Thus, the relation between complexity and the left tail of 
the return distribution of market-based returns is significantly different once a 
hedge fund invests in other hedge funds. Yet the evidence is different for funds of 
hedge funds for which the complexity seems to increase the left tail of the returns 
distributions of their residual returns, but not that of their ordinary returns. 
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Summarizing the results in Tables 24 and 25, derivatives use is more beneficial 
for investors when derivatives are used in the management of hedge fund portfo-
lios. In relation to ordinary hedge funds, their use is also consistent with risk 
management by funds of hedge funds and funds which invest in other funds. 
 
Table 25. Continued   
  EXKURT CF VAR MVAR 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY 0.114* 1.69 -0.023** -2.44 -0.080 -1.27 -0.104 -1.33 
COMPLEXITY*OF 0.019 0.18 0.023 1.24 0.248** 2.28 0.346** 2.51 
OF -0.456 -0.80 - -3.29 0.359 0.61 -1.673** -2.19 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R 0.119  0.090  0.293  0.228  
F-statistic 10.92  8.25  31.41  22.67  
Durbin-Watson 1.82   1.90   1.89   1.86    
  RSTDEV RSKEW RKURT ICF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY 0.016 0.73 -0.001 -0.18 0.007 0.17 -0.003 -0.23 
COMPLEXITY*OF -0.081** -2.32 0.014 0.90 0.076 1.20 -0.007 -0.34 
OF -0.098 -0.48 -0.245*** -2.68 -0.364 - -0.095 -0.68 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         
Adjusted R 0.267  0.080  0.105  0.105 
F-statistic 27.80  7.40  1.79  9.64 
Durbin-Watson 1.89  1.85  9.58  1.76  
  SSTDEV SSKEW SKURT SCF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Fund Characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
COMPLEXITY 0.017 0.87 -0.001 -0.18 0.086** 2.42 -0.033*** -2.61 
COMPLEXITY*OF -0.054 -1.56 0.014 0.90 -0.124*** -2.95 0.045*** 2.84 
OF -0.287 -1.51 -0.245*** -2.68 0.048 0.18 -0.101 -0.99 
        
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         
Adjusted R 0.278  0.183  0.105  0.203 
F-statistic 29.26  17.42  9.58  19.70 
Durbin-Watson 1.89   1.89   1.79   1.90   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
7.9 Robustness, Validity and Relevance of the Findings 
of this Study 
The results are also decidedly robust for time as the time-effect is controlled for 
using dummy variables that describe the annual listing of a hedge fund in the da-
tabase. Thus, a financial crisis such the Russian debt crisis should not necessarily 
bias the results. The controls for the time-effect are especially important as sys-
tematically large losses across hedge funds at a certain time point could bias the 
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estimates for skewness and excess kurtosis used in this study. Also, hedge fund 
strategies and the invested asset classes (also primary asset classes) reported by a 
hedge fund manager are controlled for. 
Return smoothing and other reasons which may cause serial correlation in hedge 
fund returns may inflate the results. The results presented in Table 26 suggest that 
the variables in the cross-sectional analysis explain little of the persistence in 
hedge fund returns. Only for few variables the results suggest that the use of de-
rivatives has an impact on the persistence of hedge fund returns. What is more, 
the complexity of derivatives use is not found to have an impact on persistence. In 
conclusion, the chances that the results are biased due to return smoothing and 
illiquid securities of hedge funds are very small. 
Similar findings for the impact of the asset specialized use of options on the 
higher moments of the return distribution of a hedge fund across different sub-
samples also ensure the robustness of the results to some extent. In other words, 
the findings may not only be attributed to chance as they are similar for more than 
one sample. The results for the relation between the use of a more complex strat-
egy by a hedge fund and the characteristics of a hedge fund examined are fairly 
similar for the samples of live and dead funds. As the result for the complexity is 
also robust for live and the “past” dead hedge funds, the results are replicable, and 
thus the conclusions based on them are more objective. Specifically, these charac-
teristics are the nonlinear relation between complexity and hedge fund perform-
ance, and the linear relation between complexity and the left tails of the return 
distribution measured using the Cornish-Fischer expansion. 
The univariate analysis for asset specialized options use and the correlation statis-
tics for the complexity of derivative strategy also mainly yield evidence similar to 
the multivariate analyses in this study. This consistency further implies that the 
rejection of the null hypotheses related to derivatives use and the complexity of 
derivative strategies are not false. However, the correlation statistics for complex-
ity and market-based versus the idiosyncratic risk characteristics of a hedge fund 
are slightly different from the multivariate tests. Also, the results for the use of 
equity index futures and hedge fund performance are different for the univariate 
and multivariate analysis of this study. As such, these results should be treated 
with greater caution. Admittedly, these characteristics can still be seen as the di-
rection on which the use of complex derivative strategy has the greatest impact. 
However, hedge fund strategies are also considered in multivariate analysis which 
should be extremely relevant controls for the kind of risk of a hedge fund. 
A potential problem related to the results of the study is endogeneity of the com-
plexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund as previous records of fund in-
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formation in the Lipper TASS database is overwritten when the database is up-
dated. When the endogeneity problem is present, derivatives use may not be the 
cause of risk and performance, but, instead, it may be the result of performance 
and risk. Intuitively, hedge funds which have a good performance may decrease 
the complexity which may explain the negative relation between the complexity 
and hedge fund performance. Also, hedge funds which have heavy left tails of 
their return distributions may increase the complexity leading to a fault result that 
complexity is related to fat left tails of hedge fund return distributions. Fortu-
nately, hedge funds do not change the status of their derivatives use much. Chen 
(2009) investigates potential endogeneity using the TASS database which is used 
in this study. He finds that only about 1.5 % of hedge funds changed their status 
of derivatives use between 2002 and 2006. Moreover, the above-mentioned biases 
are not very likely strong as the results are found for both live and dead hedge 
funds. Dead hedge funds usually have experienced poor performance before their 
liquidations, and therefore finding the result only for dead hedge funds would be a 
cause for serious caution. Liang (2000), for example, studies live and dead hedge 
funds and shows empirical evidence that poor performance is the main for hedge 
funds to be liquidated. The study by Getmansky et al. (2004) also suggests that 
dead hedge funds are performing poorly. As the results are robust for both live 
and dead hedge funds in the present study, the problem of endogeneity is very 
likely not serious.  
To further address the problem of endogeneity hedge funds are divided into two 
subsamples according on whether their inception date is before the year 1999. 
The impact of the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund on its 
average return, performance measures and the Cornish-Fischer expansion of its 
return distribution is then examined using these samples. The year 1999 is chosen 
as a cut-point as the year of 1998 was dramatic for the hedge fund industry and 
caused some hedge funds to change their characteristics (see Liang 2001). Gupta 
et al. (2005) find a steep decline in the capitalization of hedge funds during the 
fall of 1998. As a result of the year many hedge funds may have changed their 
statuses and the more recent sample should be less exposed to the endogeneity 
problem.  
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Table 26.  Derivatives Use and Return Persistence 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the mean return and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis of entire sample (3,382) 
and funds of hedge funds (761) is the following (Model 3):  
 
 SLOPEi = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
 
 and the model for the cross-sectional analysis of subsamples is the following (Model 2):  
 SLOPEi = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + e
j=1
N
 ,  
where  defines the slope coefficient for persistence of fund i; defines an 
additional control variable j of fund i, and  defines a dummy variable for the 
use of a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative is used, otherwise 0). Asset dummies include 
controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. This table also pre-
sents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the 
variables. 
 
 All Equity Fixed-Income Commodity Currency 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C - - -0.175 -1.18 - -2.71 0.169 0.54 0.006 0.03 
LNSIZE 0.011*** 4.69 0.006** 2.06 0.020*** 4.35 0.000 -0.01 0.012** 2.06 
LNAGE 0.037** 2.16 0.022 1.06 0.061** 1.98 -0.020 -0.47 -0.019 -0.62 
HMARK -0.002 - 0.016 1.54 0.029 1.51 -0.045 -1.34 -0.021 -0.73 
IFEE 0.001 0.85 0.001 1.34 0.000 0.23 -0.003 -1.37 -0.002 -0.89 
MFEE 0.005 1.09 0.006 0.99 0.001 0.08 -0.003 -0.43 -0.003 -0.44 
LEVERAGED 0.002 0.33 0.009 1.04 0.002 0.10 0.035 1.05 -0.025 -0.80 
LOCKUP 0.000 - 0.000 0.24 0.003** 2.44 0.006 1.58 0.004 1.46 
MIN(Million$) -0.004 1.44 0.000 -0.14 -0.011 -1.58 -0.003 -0.18 - -2.04 
RESTRICTION 0.001 1.02 0.000 -0.42 0.000 0.61 0.000 0.53 0.001 1.14 
AUDIT -0.003 - -0.007 -0.61 -0.021 -1.16 0.040 1.34 0.029 1.17 
PERCAPITAL -0.004 - -0.010 -1.19 -0.001 -0.05 - -1.84 -0.001 -0.04 
OPEN -0.018** - 0.000 0.02 -0.017 -1.03 -0.006 -0.24 -0.013 -0.60 
OPENENDED 0.000 0.01 0.002 0.21 -0.007 -0.42 -0.017 -0.64 0.008 0.36 
COMPLEXITY 0.001 0.66         
AE_OPTIONS   0.001 0.09 -0.004 -0.19 -0.013 -0.41 -0.057* -1.86 
AF_OPTIONS   0.025 1.56 -0.002 -0.13 0.013 0.33 0.019 0.68 
AC_OPTIONS   0.014 0.67 0.022 0.90 -0.028 -1.04 0.013 0.49 
ACUR_OPTIONS   -0.009 -0.57 0.012 0.61 0.062 1.61 0.040 1.54 
AE_WARRANTS   0.018* 1.79 0.014 0.68 0.010 0.12 0.072* 1.72 
AF_WARRANTS   0.007 0.39 -0.015 -0.72 0.043 0.52 -0.081 -1.58 
AE_OTHER   -0.004 -0.35 0.029 1.36 0.020 0.38 -0.015 -0.41 
AF_OTHER   -0.018 -1.09 - -2.76 -0.074 -1.20 -0.016 -0.45 
AC_OTHER   -0.017 -0.64 -0.021 -0.67 0.005 0.11 - -2.01 
ACUR_OTHER   -0.031* -1.93 0.035 1.30 -0.049 -0.95 0.038 1.03 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
Adjusted R 0.203  0.178  0.329  0.032  0.118  
F-statistic 20.56  8.99  9.36  1.18  2.05  
Durbin-Watson 1.90  1.88  1.93  1.83  1.82  
N 3382   1841   838   245   363   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 26. Continued 
  All Funds of Hedge Funds 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.312** -2.57 0.336 1.36 
LNSIZE 0.011*** 4.79 -0.060 -1.63 
LNAGE 0.033* 1.92 0.015*** 3.41 
HMARK -0.001 -0.09 0.010 0.54 
IFEE 0.001* 1.69 -0.001 -1.18 
MFEE 0.005 1.14 0.000 0.02 
LEVERAGED 0.003 0.39 0.021 1.51 
LOCKUP 0.001 0.95 -0.001 -0.89 
MINMillion$) -0.004 -1.21 -0.012 -1.10 
RESTRICTION 0.000 1.36 0.001** 2.46 
AUDIT -0.001 -0.07 -0.009 -0.57 
PERCAPITAL -0.004 -0.61 0.016 0.91 
OPENTOPUBLIC 0.000 -0.02 -0.028 -1.39 
OPENENDED -0.019** -2.30 -0.016 -0.81 
COMPLEXITY 0.000 -0.13 -0.001 -1.26 
OF 0.044** 2.00   
COMPLEXITY*OF 0.004 1.35   
Strategy Dummies Yes  No  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  No  
     
Adjusted R 0.21  0.04  
F-statistic 20.21  2.09  
Durbin-Watson 1.90  1.90  
N 3382   761   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
To evaluate the significance of endogeneity for the results two additional sub-
samples are analysed. Table 27 presents the results for funds which have an in-
ception date before the year 1999 and Table 28 presents the results for funds with 
inception after the year 1998. For funds which have inception time before 1999, 
the result for the relation between the complexity and performance measures are 
similar for the analysis of entire sample only for the Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe 
ratio with downside volatility. The impact of the complexity on the Cornish-
Fischer expansion is not statistically significant for this period. For hedge funds 
with an inception date after the year 1998, the results are similar to the analysis 
using the full sample. In fact, the complexity is a relatively important factor in 
explaining the Cornish-Fischer expansion for the latter sample period as incentive 
fee is the only variable in addition to the complexity which has statistically sig-
nificant impact on the expansion. Given that the more recent sample period con-
firms the results found in the previous analysis, it is very unlikely that the results 
presented in this study are solely biased due to endogeneity. Also, when com-
pared to the relation between the lockup period and the alpha of a hedge fund, this 
relation is found to be significant only for the inception period after 1998 when 
endogeneity can be assumed to bias the results less.  
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Table 27. Analysis of Ex-1999 Incepted Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of average return and 
performance estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following 
(Model 3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing.  The sample includes 1,554 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard 
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.368** -2.21 -0.363** -2.02 -0.926** -2.02 
LNSIZE -0.003 -0.15 -0.006 -0.24 0.030 0.54 
LNAGE 0.031*** 9.16 0.032*** 7.83 0.044*** 7.08 
HMARK -0.009 -0.51 -0.026 -1.10 -0.003 -0.14 
IFEE 0.001 1.31 0.002 1.49 0.005*** 2.92 
MFEE 0.002 0.25 0.001 0.09 0.007 0.54 
LEVERAGED 0.018 1.50 0.019 1.31 0.031 1.39 
MINIMUM(Million$) 0.002 0.41 0.004 0.56 0.002 0.36 
RESTRICTION 0.001** 2.35 0.001*** 2.41 0.001*** 2.59 
LOCKUP 0.001 1.28 0.001 1.10 0.000 -0.19 
AUDIT -0.020 -1.28 -0.020 -1.22 -0.045 -1.33 
PERCAPITAL -0.004 -0.32 -0.009 -0.57 -0.002 -0.12 
OPEN -0.055*** -4.16 -0.049*** -3.22 -0.068** -2.49 
OPENENDED -0.002 -0.12 -0.001 -0.07 -0.027 -1.10 
COMPLEXITY -0.007** -2.30 -0.008** -2.26 -0.011 -1.57 
Strategy Dummies                             Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies                                  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies                                 Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.303  0.251  0.113  
F-statistic 16.35  12.80  5.49  
Durbin-Watson 2.09  2.11  2.10  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
When compared to the two recent studies by Aragon (2007) and Agarwal et al. 
(2009), the results of these studies are consistent with the statistics for the more 
recent sample used in this study. Restriction period and lockup period which are 
important determinants of hedge fund performance in these studies do not explain 
the alpha of a hedge fund in the earlier sample of this study. As such, the results 
for the earlier sample are not consistent with the other significant findings in the 
scholarly research on hedge funds. 
In comparison to the complexity variable, a potential characteristic of endogene-
ity in Tables 27 and 26 is a positive association between incentive fee of a hedge 
fund and its performance (alpha and appraisal ratios) only for the earlier inception 
period. Hedge funds which demonstrated better performance through the 1997 
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Asian Crisis and the 1998 Russian Debt Crisis may have been able to sustain their 
high incentive fees while the other funds may have not been able to increase their 
incentive fees or they have been forced to reduce them to be more attractive for 
new capital. Indeed, Liang (2001) finds that relatively many hedge funds died in 
1998. He also presents evidence  that some funds lowered their incentive fees as a 
result of poor performance. In conclusion, the positive relation between incentive 
fee and the alpha of a hedge fund as indicated in Table 14 may be biased.  
 
Table 27. Continued 
  ALPHA MEAN CF 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -2.726* -1.77 -0.984 -1.36 -2.132*** -2.79 
LNSIZE 0.252 1.18 -0.002 -0.02 -0.060 -0.54 
LNAGE 0.074** 2.48 0.081*** 5.02 -0.006 -0.33 
HMARK 0.120** 1.99 0.113** 2.41 -0.176** -2.20 
IFEE 0.016*** 2.78 0.007* 1.90 0.008* 1.77 
MFEE 0.053 0.75 0.052 1.53 0.069* 1.80 
LEVERAGED 0.117 1.62 0.093** 2.00 -0.114 -1.47 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.007 -0.35 -0.020 -1.25 0.028 1.00 
RESTRICTION 0.001 1.49 0.002*** 2.99 0.002** 2.45 
LOCKUP 0.001 0.28 0.005 1.37 -0.004 -0.62 
AUDIT -0.061 -0.42 0.059 0.75 -0.012 -0.16 
PERCAPITAL 0.019 0.25 0.055 1.28 -0.016 -0.26 
OPEN -0.058 -0.58 -0.085 -1.29 0.018 0.23 
OPENENDED -0.059 -0.78 -0.010 -0.19 -0.088 -1.12 
COMPLEXITY -0.018 -1.07 -0.025** -2.59 -0.018 -1.32 
Strategy Dummies                             Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies                                  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies                                  Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.064  0.175  0.125  
F-statistic 3.42  8.51  6.05  
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.17  2.04  1.74  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 28. Analysis of Post-1998 Incepted Funds 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of average return and 
performance estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following 
(Model 3):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i, and COMPLEXi  defines the 
number of different derivatives used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and 
primary assets in which hedge funds report investing. The sample includes 1,824 hedge funds. 
This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. Time dum-
mies start from 1999. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics 
are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -1.206 -1.25 -1.338 -1.26 -1.715 -0.99 
LNSIZE 0.159 1.09 0.192 1.18 0.202 0.77 
LNAGE 0.035*** 8.17 0.037*** 7.29 0.049*** 4.77 
HMARK -0.008 -0.27 -0.029 -0.69 0.004 0.08 
IFEE -0.003 -0.91 -0.002 -0.47 -0.004 -0.66 
MFEE -0.008 -0.60 -0.012 -0.68 0.044* 1.68 
LEVERAGED 0.003 0.16 0.001 0.02 0.044 1.24 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.008 -1.49 -0.007 -0.94 -0.002 -0.13 
RESTRICTION 0.001*** 2.85 0.002*** 2.99 0.002** 2.37 
LOCKUP 0.001 1.20 0.002 1.37 0.002 0.65 
AUDIT -0.002 -0.07 0.000 0.00 0.019 0.43 
PERCAPITAL 0.021 1.26 0.012 0.64 0.046 1.40 
OPEN -0.052** -2.37 -0.062** -2.52 -0.156*** -3.94 
OPENENDED 0.026 1.24 0.023 0.93 0.083** 2.19 
COMPLEXITY -0.010** -2.22 -0.015*** -2.69 -0.017* -1.92 
Strategy Dummies                              Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies                                   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies                                   Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.201  0.180  0.117  
F-statistic 12.73  11.24  7.18  
Durbin-Watson 1.99  1.88  1.95  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
It must also be noted that endogeneity may not just be a cause of false of rejection 
of the null hypothesis. It may also be a cause of accepting a false null hypothesis. 
For example, well performing funds may increase the complexity of their deriva-
tive strategies causing a positive bias in the complexity-performance relation. If 
fact, it is sensible to assume that hedge funds which existed during the 1997 
Asian Crisis and the 1998 Russian Debt Crisis changed their risk management 
and derivatives use as a result from the lessons learned from the crises. If the 
complexity is likely to increase after good performance, the negative complexity-
performance relation found in this study should not be biased. 
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Table 28. Continued 
  ALPHA CF MEAN 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -7.972*** -4.22 -2.040 -1.56 -5.962*** -4.71 
LNSIZE 1.043*** 3.59 -0.004 -0.02 0.849*** 4.49 
LNAGE 0.054*** 2.63 -0.003 -0.23 0.050*** 3.73 
HMARK -0.028 -0.24 -0.150* -1.82 -0.155** -2.15 
IFEE 0.010 1.05 0.007 1.07 0.008 1.38 
MFEE 0.218*** 2.75 0.038 0.94 0.061 1.42 
LEVERAGED 0.071 1.14 -0.008 -0.16 0.050 1.20 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.039** -2.36 0.030 1.52 -0.040*** -3.41 
RESTRICTION 0.002** 2.17 0.001 0.67 0.003*** 3.40 
LOCKUP 0.009* 1.86 0.004 1.13 0.012*** 3.54 
AUDIT -0.033 -0.44 0.001 0.03 -0.041 -0.85 
PERCAPITAL 0.077 1.18 -0.062 -1.27 0.090** 2.24 
OPEN -0.222*** -3.31 0.044 0.70 -0.057 -1.15 
OPENENDED 0.074 1.31 -0.063 -1.28 0.004 0.09 
COMPLEXITY -0.022 -1.54 -0.035*** -2.99 -0.011 -1.22 
Strategy Dummies                            Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies                                 Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies                                 Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Adjusted R 0.079  0.018  0.202  
F-statistic 5.02  1.84  12.81  
Durbin-Watson 1.71  1.74  1.88  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The relevance of the variable for the complexity of the derivative strategy of a 
hedge fund is considered by analysing a binary variable indicating whether a 
hedge uses derivatives with the complexity variable. This analysis allows one to 
evaluate whether the present study provides relevant evidence after the earlier 
studies, particularly the study by Chen (2009). Table 29 presents the results of 
these analyses. The statistics include the adjusted R, and the AIC and SIC infor-
mation criteria. 
The results for hedge funds presented in Table 29 provide somewhat mixed re-
sults on the relevance of the complexity variable. The model without the binary 
variable has ultimately the best fit in explaining the alpha of a hedge fund sug-
gesting that the variable is relevant. However, the fit of the model without com-
plexity variable outperforms the model without the binary variable in explaining 
the Sharpe ratio and appraisal ratio in the terms of AIC and SIC. A reasonable 
conclusion is that a different result from the study by Chen (2009) for the com-
plexity-performance relation is related to the exclusion of funds of hedge funds 
from the sample of hedge funds rather than the use of a new variable. For the 
analysis of standard deviation, both variables of derivatives use explain little this 
risk measure. Yet the complexity variable can still be considered as a relevant 
variable explaining hedge fund performance as there is a nonlinear relation be-
tween the complexity and the Sharpe ratio (see Table 21). 
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The relevance of the complexity variable is seemingly marked for the negative 
relation between the Cornish-Fischer expansion and the variable. This characteris-
tic is suggested by two characteristics: first, only the coefficient for the complex-
ity is statistically significant in explaining the expansion. Second, the model 
without the binary variable has the lowest AIC and SIC suggesting its fit outper-
forming that of the other models. The results indeed implies, in line with John et 
al. (2006), that it is the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund 
which matters in explaining the left tail in its return distribution. 
The results for funds of hedge funds in Table 29 includes two surprising findings: 
first, the regression statistics suggest that the binary variable (the complexity vari-
able) has a positive (negative) relation with the alpha and appraisal ratio of a 
hedge fund. The results suggests that the use of derivatives increases, which char-
acterizes the binary variable used, the alpha of a fund of hedge funds by 0.137 % 
while the coefficient for the complexity variable is not statistically significant. As 
such, the use of derivatives is positively associated with the performance of a 
fund of hedge funds while the complexity of derivatives use has a negative and 
weak association with the performance. Second, the binary variable (the complex-
ity variable) has a positive (negative) relation with the Cornish-Fischer expansion. 
This result actually presents evidence for Hypothesis 5b. This result is in fact 
found for both hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. Thus, the complexity of 
derivative strategy is associated with fatter left tails of the return distributions of 
funds of hedge funds as well. A difference to hedge funds is that funds of hedge 
funds seem to take this risk idiosyncratically while for hedge funds the risk is 
related to market-based factors of their returns (cf. Tables 23 and 24). Given this 
additional and different information in the binary and complexity variables of 
derivatives use, the relevance of the complexity variable is ample. 
The complexity factor also has relevance in explaining the risk of a fund of hedge 
funds as the model without the binary variable of derivative has the best fit in the 
terms of the AIC and SIC information criteria. Thus, while the complexity in-
creases the left tail of the return distribution of a hedge fund, it also decreases the 
value of conventional risk measures. In conclusion, the relevance of the complex-
ity variable is considerable in explaining the standard deviation for funds of hedge 
funds as well. 
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Table 29. Relevance of the Complexity of Derivative Strategy 
This table presents the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC) and the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of hedge fund performance and 
risk on its derivatives use and complexity of derivative strategy. The model for the cross-sectional 
analysis is the following:  
 MEASURE ji = i +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1COMPLEXi +   
 2BINARYi + ei,  
 
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i; COMPLEXi  defines the num-
ber of different derivatives used by fund i, and defines a dummy variable for the use of 
derivatives by fund i (1 if the fund invests in other funds, and 0 otherwise). The model also in-
cludes asset-, strategy-, and time dummies. Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary 
assets in which hedge funds report investing. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. The stan-
dard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. The highest 
(lowest) value for Adjusted R (information criteria) is in boldface. 
 
Panel A: Hedge Funds 
     1 2 
  Adj. R SIC AIC Coef. t Coef. t 
ALPHA Full model 0.06759 3.4786 3.3952 -0.016 -1.32 -0.014 -0.24 
 No complex 0.06743 3.4766 3.3951   -0.046 -0.85 
 No binary 0.06785 3.4762 3.3946 -0.017 0.01   
APPRAISAL Full model 0.11805 1.8477 1.7644 -0.011* -1.78 -0.029 -0.90 
 No complex 0.11725 1.7941 1.8465   -0.052* -1.80 
 No binary 0.11803 1.8456 1.7641 -0.014** -2.45   
SHARPE Full model 0.22833 0.6248 0.5414 -0.005* -1.92 -0.041** -2.23 
 No complex 0.22787 0.6232 0.5417   -0.052*** -3.06 
 No binary 0.22687 0.6245 0.5430 -0.009*** -3.41   
STDEV Full model 0.27860 5.1899 5.1066 0.000 0.00 0.071 0.50 
 No complex 0.27882 5.1875 5.1060   0.072 0.55 
 No binary 0.27877 5.1876 5.1061 0.006 0.22   
CF Full model 0.08733 2.9803 2.8970 -0.021** -2.15 -0.030 -0.59 
 No complex 0.08644 2.9792 2.8977   -0.070 -1.50 
 No binary 0.08751 2.9780 2.8965 -0.023** -2.56   
Panel B: Funds of Hedge Funds 
     1 2 
  Adj. R SIC AIC Coef. t Coef. t 
ALPHA Full model 0.1546 2.1937 2.0171 -0.008 -1.51 0.137* 1.83 
 No complex 0.1536 2.1876 2.0170   0.080 1.36 
 No binary 0.1516 2.1899 2.0194 -0.002 -0.39   
APPRAISAL Full model 0.2624 1.0061 0.8295 -0.007* -1.94 0.079** 2.00 
 No complex 0.2591 1.0032 0.8326   0.032 1.01 
 No binary 0.2594 1.0028 0.8323 -0.003 -1.06   
SHARPE Full model 0.3777 -0.3434 -0.5200 -0.001 -0.42 0.018 0.88 
 No complex 0.3784 -0.3519 -0.5224   0.014 0.84 
 No binary 0.3778 -0.3510 -0.5215 0.000 0.15   
STDEV Full model 0.2780 4.2376 4.0610 -0.027** -1.98 -0.283 -1.12 
 No complex 0.2763 4.2326 4.0621   -0.472** -2.24 
 No binary 0.2770 4.2317 4.0612 -0.040*** -3.48   
CF Full model 0.0731 3.0906 2.9140 -0.020** -2.47 0.242** 2.54 
 No complex 0.0681 3.0887 2.9182   0.097 1.29 
 No binary 0.0685 3.0883 2.9177 -0.009 -1.39   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Leverage use is also a potential cause of bias in the results of this study. There-
fore, it is sensible to extend the leverage variable use. The Lipper TASS database 
provides information for the average leverage use of a hedge fund which is self-
reported by hedge fund managers. The problem using the variable is that it re-
duces the sample size to 2,996 funds. The results for the impact of the average 
leverage of a hedge fund used on its performance and risk measures are presented 
in Table 30. The results do not provide evidence that the inclusion of the variable 
alters the analysis of the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund and 
its performance and risk. Further, the average leverage explains relatively weakly 
hedge fund performance and risk when compared to the dummy variable of lever-
age use. Moreover, the average leverage variable does not have statistically sig-
nificant impact on the dependent variables associated with the complexity of de-
rivative strategy. For example, the dummy variable of leverage use has a statisti-
cally significant impact on the standard deviation of the returns of a hedge fund 
while the average leverage does not have an impact on this explanatory variable. 
As a result, it may be concluded that the bias in the results of this study arising 
from the leverage use is not severe although it cannot be ignored. 
The earlier analysis of asset specialized derivatives use presented in Tables 12, 
13, and 14 may be biased as a result of selectivity bias as explained in Section 5. 
To assess the effect of the sample selectivity bias on the results presented in Ta-
bles 12, 13, and 14, the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage correction procedure is used. 
Table 31 presents the corrected results. The results do not change significantly 
after consideration of selectivity bias. The most considerable change is found for 
hedge funds which focussing on currency. In the analysis of this strategy, the co-
efficient for the asset specialized use of options is not statistically significant at 
the 10 % level after consideration of the selectivity bias. However, the change in 
t-statistics is only 0.04. 
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Table 30. Leverage Effect 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis of performance and risk 
estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following:  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 + 1AVGLi + 2COMPLEXi + e ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
CONTROL ji  defines an additional control variable j of fund i: defines the average 
leverage of fund i in percentages, and COMPLEXi  defines the number of different derivatives 
used by fund i. Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds 
report investing.  The sample includes 2,996 hedge funds. This table also presents the Durbin-
Watson test for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroske-
dasticity robust. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
  SHARPE SHARPED APPRAISAL ALPHA 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.496* -1.69 -0.503 -1.58 -0.830 -1.50 - -3.36 
LNSIZE 0.034 0.82 0.040 0.89 0.033 0.43 0.371** 2.29 
LNAGE 0.033*** 10.72 0.034*** 9.72 0.049*** 7.28 0.074 4.11 
HMARK -0.006 -0.34 -0.026 -1.09 0.022 0.74 0.121* 1.95 
IFEE 0.000 0.05 0.001 0.28 0.003 1.10 0.018*** 3.25 
MFEE -0.004 -0.58 -0.005 -0.68 0.021* 1.66 0.108** 2.01 
AVGLEVERAGE 0.000 1.15 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.22 0.000* 1.83 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.001 -0.15 0.002 0.41 0.005 0.60 -0.027** -2.07 
RESTRICTION 0.001*** 4.00 0.001*** 3.79 0.001*** 3.70 0.002** 2.37 
LOCKUP 0.002** 2.46 0.003** 2.24 0.003 1.51 0.008** 2.12 
AUDIT -0.011 -0.77 -0.011 -0.71 -0.023 -0.79 -0.051 -0.62 
PERCAPITAL 0.001 0.05 -0.005 -0.39 -0.004 -0.23 0.037 0.72 
OPEN -0.057*** -4.74 - -4.33 - -4.39 -0.157** -2.51 
OPENENDED 0.011 0.73 0.007 0.40 0.027 1.07 0.025 0.49 
COMPLEXITY -0.009*** -3.71 - -4.07 -0.013** -2.39 -0.013 -1.09 
Strategy Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.244  0.213  0.122  0.069  
F-statistic 22.92  19.37  10.48  6.03  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.66  1.79  1.70  1.97  
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 31. Selectivity Bias and Derivatives Use 
This table presents the parameter estimates of cross-sectional analysis for Value-at-Risk estimates 
of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 2):  
 MEASURE ji = +  jCONTROL ji
j=1
N
 +  jDERIVATIVE ji + e
j=1
N
 ,  
where MEASURE ji  defines a risk or performance measure j of fund i; CONTROL ji  defines 
an additional control variable j of fund i, and DERIVATIVE ji defines a dummy variable for the 
use of a derivative j by fund i (1 if the derivative is used, otherwise 0). The control variables in-
clude the inverse Mills ratio. Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in 
which hedge funds report investing. This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test for the first-
order serial correlation. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
are given in italics. t-statistics are given in italics. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
 
Asset focus: equity 
 SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AE_OPTIONS 0.023** 1.96 0.022 1.62 -0.026 - 0.006 0.22 0.011 0.23 
AE_OTHER -0.019 - -0.017 - -0.190** - -0.042* - -0.117** -
IMILLS -0.079 - -0.073 - -0.150 - -0.164 - -0.299 - 
  STDEV D EXKURT   SKEW CF   
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AE_OPTIONS -0.428** - -0.298* - 0.342 1.14 -0.153** - -0.093 -
AE_OTHER -0.139 - -0.200 - 0.054 0.17 0.125* 1.92 0.062 0.98 
IMILLS -0.560 - -0.471 - -0.465 - -0.062 - -0.088 -
Asset focus: fixed-income 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AF_OPTIONS  -0.083 -1.40 -0.095 -1.50 0.005 0.05 -0.085 -0.91 - -1.98 
IMILLS -0.899 -0.76 -0.728 -0.49 0.121 0.03 0.769 0.35 -1.225 -0.36  
  STDEV D EXKURT SKEW CF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AF_OPTIONS -0.157 -0.55 -0.204 -0.56 0.431 0.37 -0.231 -1.45 - -2.03 
IMILLS -0.657 -0.06 1.593 0.14 -25.401 -0.60 5.925 0.78 -4.523 -0.71 
Asset focus: currency 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
ACUR_OPTIONS 0.016 0.48 0.019 0.52 -0.011 -0.05 0.077 1.03 -0.052 -0.41 
IMILLS -0.004 -0.01 0.196 0.21 4.129 0.67 1.259 0.42 4.380 1.59  
  STDEV D EXKURT SKEW CF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
ACUR_OPTIONS -0.880* -1.74 -0.755* -1.67 0.109 0.14 -0.202 -1.16 -0.256 -1.63 
IMILLS 18.304* 1.70 8.283 0.97 24.717 1.05 7.395* 1.69 2.935 0.85 
Asset focus: commodity 
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL MEAN 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AC_OPTIONS -0.018 -0.45 -0.059 -1.01 0.146 0.25 -0.115 -1.40 0.221 0.93 
IMILLS -2.267 -0.75 -2.870 -0.71 -45.335 -1.19 -11.824 -1.25 -15.462 -1.07  
  STDEV D EXKURT SKEW CF 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
AC_OPTIONS 1.485 0.97 1.184 1.17 -0.210 -0.33 -0.389** -2.03 -0.330** -2.03 
IMILLS -83.717 -0.93 -50.825 -0.87 -5.646 -0.12 -8.028 -0.62 -10.022 -0.89 
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 Acta Wasaensia     155 
  
In Table 31, the t-statistics the coefficients for the estimated coefficients for the 
inverse Mills ratio can be used to determine whether selectivity bias alters the 
results presented in Tables 12, 13, and 14.However, only couple of the coeffici-
ents for the inverse Mills ratio are statistically significant. The statistically signifi-
cant ones are those for currency specialized funds in explaining skewess of return 
distribuitions and return standard devition. The result implies that selectivity bias 
alters only the analysis of derivatives use of currency specialized hedge funds. All 
in all, the results presented in Table 31 suggest that selectivity bias is not a market 
problem in the analysis of this study, yet albeit it cannot be ignored. 
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8 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
The conclusions and discussion of this study are categorized according to the mo-
tives for hedge funds to use derivatives, investors’ benefits from derivative strate-
gies, financial stability, and micro and market-based factors of hedge fund per-
formance and risk. Finally, suggestions for future research are presented. 
8.1 Motives for Hedge Funds to Use Derivatives 
For mutual funds, the use of derivatives for cash flow management is strongly 
advocated by Deli et al. (2002), Marin et al. (2006), Frino et al. (2009). Hedge 
funds, instead, typically impose restrictions on investors’ rights to withdraw their 
cash, and therefore cash management motivated use of derivatives may not be as 
important for hedge funds as for mutual funds. Nevertheless, the results presented 
in this study suggest that equity index futures are used as a substitute for share 
restrictions to manage cash flows given by two features: first, the use of these 
derivatives is negatively associated with lockup period and restriction period. The 
result implies that when the use of these restrictions is limited, these derivatives 
are the substitute. Second, the use of equity index futures is associated with lower 
alpha of a hedge fund which can be considered as a result of lower illiquidity risk 
premium. This makes sense as the share restrictions in turn are associated with 
higher alpha and illiquidity risk premium is a considerable component of hedge 
fund alphas (see Aragon 2007). Thus, as Frino et al. (2009) find that equity index 
futures are used for cash management, this study suggests that the same character-
istic applies to hedge funds. But the use by hedge funds may be considered as 
inferior to the use of share restrictions. 
The results of Chen (2009) imply that the derivatives of hedge funds are used 
consistently for risk management. Aragon et al. (2008) also present evidence that 
equity options are used for nondirectional hedging strategies. The results of this 
study provide contradictory evidence against Chen (2009) as the risk of a hedge 
fund is not reduced by the use of derivatives. In fact, the use of derivatives and 
the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund is rather related to “hid-
den risks” strategies which hedge fund managers may have incentives to take (see 
John et al. 2006). For the use of equity options, the results are partly consistent 
with the evidence of Aragon et al. (2008). But the use of these derivatives is also 
found to be associated with “hidden risks” strategies. These characteristics may 
also be related to other financial institutions similar to hedge funds. However, the 
results for funds of hedge funds and hedge funds investing in other funds suggest 
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that the complexity is associated with lower risk. This finding also explains the 
different results for hedge funds by this study and Chen (2009), which includes 
funds of hedge funds in the same analysis with hedge funds. Seemingly, the use 
of derivatives by funds of hedge funds is more risk management motivated than 
that of hedge funds. 
From Black’s (1975) viewpoint, hedge funds may use options markets for specu-
lative trading but the major concern is whether this speculative trading really util-
izes information advantage. Aragon et al. (2007) find for a sample of 250 hedge 
fund advisors that their stock option holdings include predictive information. This 
study finds evidence that some characteristics which could be associated with 
informed trading: higher incentive fees, leverage use, and asset focus are associ-
ated with the use of equity options. It is also found that higher incentive fees and 
the use of leverage are associated with abnormal returns, but that the use of equity 
options is not found to exhibit such a characteristic. The use of equity options is 
also associated with higher Sharpe ratio but it is not associated with higher ap-
praisal ratio, which accounts for the simplest buy and hold option strategies 
through its alpha component. As such, higher incentive fees awarded for asset 
specialized equity option users do not seem to be reasonable. The results for per-
formance do not directly exclude the possibility that equity options are not used 
for informed trading. However, the ability of the factor model to account for the 
performance from the equity option strategies of hedge funds is associated with 
well known investment strategies rather than informed trading. Also, the associa-
tion with lower skewness of returns and the use of equity options by funds with 
their primary focus on equity support this conclusion as Whaley (2002) suggests 
that such strategies involve lower skewness. Alternatively, the profits from in-
formed trading may be captured by the other hedge fund characteristics used in 
this study. 
As an additional implication, in contrast to those of Chen (2009), this study con-
cludes that hedge funds behave like non-insurers rather than insurers in the equity 
options market (see Grossmann and Zhou 1996) due to the positive impact of use 
of equity options on performance (Sharpe ratio) and negative impact on skewness, 
which relates to limited upside potential. 
8.2 Investors’ Benefits from the Derivative Strategies 
Options strategies and other derivative strategies may be popular even among 
individual investors. Also, the studies by Board et al. (2001), Isakov et al. (2001), 
Whaley (2002), McIntyre et al. (2007), and Kapadia et al. (2007) suggest that 
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even the popular covered call strategy is profitable for investors. But the question 
relates whether these strategies are profitable at the fund management level. 
Hedge funds may also provide a laboratory to test the profitability of derivative 
strategies as they are free to perform them. For more conventional mutual funds, 
Marin et al. (2006) find in line with Koski et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (2004), and 
Fong et al. (2005) evince that the use of derivatives does not improve fund per-
formance although Marin et al. (2006) present some contradictory evidence. In 
relation to these studies, the present study does not merely indicate that deriva-
tives use may have a negative impact on the performance of a hedge fund but also 
that the marginal burden of performance is extremely high for the use of few de-
rivatives when the performance is measured using the Sharpe ratio. The marginal 
cost of increasing the complexity of a derivative strategy decreases with the com-
plexity. This characteristic implies that the implementation costs of the use of 
derivatives are high. This study also finds that the complexity of derivative strat-
egy is negatively related to the appraisal ratio of a hedge fund but this relation is 
rather linear. For funds of hedge funds, no negative complexity-performance rela-
tion is found but the complexity is associated with lower risk. This result implies 
that investors may benefit from the risk management carried out by funds of 
hedge funds. 
The use of complex derivative strategies by a hedge fund is also found to be 
clearly related to “hidden risk” as a heavier left tail of the return distribution of a 
hedge fund. The characteristic is also found for funds of hedge funds for which it 
is more difficult to detect the use of derivative has the opposite effect to that of 
the complexity. Thus, it is particularly the complexity and not just the use of de-
rivative which is associated with hidden risk in the returns of funds of hedge 
funds. The difference in this hidden risk between hedge funds and funds of hedge 
funds is its origin. For hedge funds, the risk is hidden in their exposures to mar-
ket-based factors while for funds of hedge funds the risk is hidden in idiosyncratic 
returns. Hedge funds may be motivated to take on the risk using market-based 
factors as the risk of a difference in their relative performance is mitigated. This 
type of herding behaviour may be a reasonable way for fund managers to manage 
reputational risk (see Scharfstein and Stein 1990) when extremely large losses 
occur. The systematic feature of hedge fund managers’ risk characteristics may 
also be regarded as a behaviour which tilts hidden risks to explode contempora-
neously. Therefore, these findings call for a marked attention and caution in the 
derivatives use by fund managers. Other potential explanations for the finding are 
correlated private information of fund managers (see Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
1992) and managers’ cueing private information from the trades of other funds 
(see Bikhchandani, Hirsheifer, and Welch 1992). Funds of funds in turn are lim-
ited in their conventional hedge fund exposures as they primarily invest in other 
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funds. Therefore, it is reasonable that their hidden risk strategies are related to 
their fund-specific risk as the present study suggests. In conclusion, as the re-
search suggests that utility maximizing investors prefer lower kurtosis and higher 
skewness (see Arditti 1967; Kraus et al. 1976; Scott et al. 1980), the use of de-
rivatives by a hedge fund has characteristics of higher moments not aligned with 
the preferences of the investors. 
Given the evidence of this study on performance statistics and risk characteristics 
associated with the use of complex derivative strategies, it is a well founded con-
clusion that it is not beneficial for investors to invest in complex derivative strate-
gies. Admittedly, the complexity is not found to be associated with the alpha of a 
hedge fund. This result implies that possibly by diversifying in hedge funds and 
reducing the impact of the denominators of the Sharpe and appraisal ratios, which 
are the volatilities of the returns and idiosyncratic returns, the problem can be 
mitigated.  
In options trading, hedge funds do not seem to lead to poorer performance as 
found for individual investors according to the evidence of Bauer, Cosemans and 
Eichholtz (2008). Thus, it would be better that hedge funds as professional inves-
tors use options rather than individual investors. However, it would still be much 
more sensible just to invest in simple buy-and-hold option strategies. For exam-
ple, Whaley (2002) suggests that these strategies can be profitable even after ac-
counting for skewness and kurtosis of the returns. 
A recent study by Frino et al. (2009) finds that the use of equity index futures by 
mutual fund managers may be beneficial for their investors as these derivatives 
may be used for cash management. This use may prevent significant fund inflows 
having a detrimental effect on the alpha of a fund as result of more efficient use of 
cash inflows. The results of this study present evidence that hedge funds using 
equity index futures show weaker abnormal performance. This association be-
tween the use of equity index futures and the performance is likely a result of the 
use of derivatives for uninformed trading and their substitute for efficient man-
agement of illiquid assets causing a loss in illiquidity risk premium. For hedge 
fund investors looking for alternative returns this characteristic may be undesir-
able. 
8.3 Financial Stability 
During the Russian financial crisis of 1998, the leveraged derivatives positions 
after extreme losses of the LTCM caused a need to control the bailout of this 
hedge fund, and the collapse of this hedge fund was a threat to financial stability. 
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Nine years later and in conjunction with the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, 
derivatives use again played a considerable role through financial engineering. In 
this crisis, a significant number of structured products which were structured us-
ing derivatives and subprime loans produced enormous losses. Both these cases 
are in conjunction with the results of this study as the study relates the use of 
complex strategies to higher probability of suffering extreme losses. 
Seemingly, the use of derivative strategies and asset specialized use of options by 
hedge fund-like institutions is “hidden risk” motivated and the last two financial 
crises, indeed, witness that derivative strategies can be a threat for financial stabil-
ity. As a consideration, the role of financial intermediates and their strategies (see 
John et al. 2006) may also be important. For hedge funds, this “hidden risk” is 
also related to market-based risk factors which may imply that the type of risk is 
likely to be systematic for all hedge funds and more dangerous to financial stabil-
ity as the risk may be realized contemporaneously. Due to this characteristic regu-
lators should consider more effective monitoring for the use of complex deriva-
tive strategies by hedge funds. For funds of hedge funds, the association between 
the complexity and hidden risk is rather related to manager-specific risk. 
Further, it could be that the asymmetry caused by the use of derivatives may not 
be seen when larger hedge fund portfolios are examined but history shows that 
even one hedge fund may undermine financial stability by its derivative strategies 
as in the case of LTCM. Therefore, special attention and regulation should be 
applied to large hedge funds employing complex derivative strategies. What is 
more, the complex derivative strategies do not seem to add value for investors. So 
why take risks by using complex derivative strategies if on average they are inca-
pable of showing a profit? 
In contrast to the use of complex derivative strategies, management fees, higher 
minimum investment, and restriction periods are associated with less “hidden 
risk” related to systematic exposure of hedge funds. Restriction periods, for ex-
ample, may protect hedge funds from investor sentiment changes and fire fund 
liquidations, higher minimum investments and higher management fees may keep 
small investors from investing in hedge funds which may be more exposed to fire 
fund liquidations in financial market turmoil. Good advice for financial authori-
ties would be to drive policies to encourage hedge funds to lengthen their redemp-
tion periods. 
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8.4. Micro and Macro Factors of Hedge Fund 
Performance and Risk 
Several micro factors for hedge funds such as size and age may affect the per-
formance and risk of hedge funds. The results of the study by Chen (2009) imply 
that the derivatives use of a hedge fund could be a micro factor of hedge fund 
risk. In this study, the results are also heterogeneous for different derivatives and 
asset specializations. The result for the heterogeneous implications of the use of 
options of hedge funds resembles the results for mutual funds by Johnson et al. 
(2004). 
The results for the asset specialized use of options were the most significant for 
equity specialized funds. In general, the asset specialized use of options in general 
is found to be associated with negative skewness in the return distribution of a 
hedge fund. It also  has a negative effect on the Sharpe ratio of equity specialized 
hedge funds but it is the only performance measure for which it has statistically 
significant association. In conclusion, the asset specialized use of options can be 
an important micro factor of performance and risk, especially for this type of 
hedge funds.  
The most significant micro factor of hedge fund performance and risk found in 
this study is the complexity of the derivative strategy of a hedge fund. The com-
plexity is capable of explaining the Sharpe ratio, the Sharpe ratio with downside 
volatility, and the appraisal ratio of a hedge fund. For funds of hedge funds, the 
complexity is capable in explaining their risk but not their performance.  
This study suggests that the complexity is especially well able to explain some of 
the left tails of the return distributions of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. 
The use of this factor is also theoretically well motivated (see John et al. 2006). 
The association found in this study for the left tail of the return distribution of a 
hedge fund is particularly related to market-based factors of hedge fund returns. 
Therefore, this study suggests that market-based factors are able to explain the 
special characteristics of hedge fund returns arising from the use of complex de-
rivative strategies. Consequently, there seems to be an association between mar-
ket-based factors of hedge fund performance and factors related to the derivatives 
use of hedge funds. Given these significant results, this study advocates the use of 
option- and derivatives-based micro factors for hedge funds in addition to option-
like market factors of hedge funds (see, e.g., Fung et al. 1997, 2001; Mitchell et 
al. 2001; Agarwal et al. 2004).  
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This study also presents results for other hedge fund characteristics which are 
related to the left tail of the return distribution of a hedge fund. Other hedge fund 
characteristics than derivatives use associated with a heavier left tail of the distri-
bution are lower minimum investment, openness to the public, shorter restriction 
period, lower management fees, and the use of high watermark provisions. More-
over, these results are mostly related to non-normality of market-based risk of a 
hedge fund. The study by Aragon (2007) argues that hedge funds benefit from 
share restrictions by managing illiquid assets better which is captured by illiquidi-
ty premium for investors. This study also reports that share restrictions may 
reduce the left tail of the return distribution of a hedge fund.  
8.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
In further studies, it would be interesting to ascertain what kind of hedge fund 
characteristics lead these funds to benefit from the use of options. It may well be 
that the sophistication of a hedge fund has an impact on its ability to benefit from 
the use of options. It may also well be that skilled managers can use options better 
than less skilled managers. The ability of hedge funds to engage in informed trad-
ing and its profitability should also be investigated. A viable way to study the 
problem further is to better classify those hedge funds that may have advanta-
geous information. Also, the impact of the use of derivatives on hedge fund risk 
could be investigated using samples constructed on the strategy of a hedge fund.  
A considerably further issue related to the complexity of the derivative strategy of 
a hedge fund may be herding behaviour associated with the complexity. For this 
potential research topic, the present study implies some directional evidence but it 
does not directly test whether the complexity is associated with herding behav-
iour.  
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APPENDIX 1. The Classification and Definitions of Hedge Fund Strategies 
 
 
- Convertible Arbitrage: The objective of this strategy is to invest in con-
vertible securities of a company. 
 
- Dedicated Short Bias: The objective of this strategy is to short overvalued 
equity securities and/or maintain a short exposure to the stock market. 
 
- Emerging Markets: This strategy involves investing in emerging market 
securities. 
 
- Equity Market Neutral: The objective of this strategy is to exploit market 
inefficiencies with minimum market exposure. 
 
- Event-Driven: This strategy exploits market inefficiencies associated with 
special corporate events. 
 
- Fixed-Income Arbitrage: The objective of this strategy is to exploit market 
inefficiencies in fixed-income markets. 
 
- Global/Macro: The objective of this strategy is to exploit global profit op-
portunities across various asset classes. 
 
- Long/Short Equity: This strategy involves investing in both long and short 
positions in equity markets using various investment strategies. 
 
- Managed Futures: The objective of these funds, which are also known 
Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), is to invest in financial and com-
modity futures 
 
- Multi-Strategy: The objective of this strategy is to allocate capital among 
different hedge fund strategies. 
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APPENDIX 2.  The Relation Between the Use of Equity Index Futures and 
Hedge Fund Performance 
This table presents the parameter estimates of the cross-sectional analysis for the performance and 
risk estimates of hedge funds. The model for the cross-sectional analysis is the following (Model 
3):  
 ,  
where  defines a measure associated with higher moments j of fund i; 
defines an additional control variable j of fund i;  defines a dummy variable 
on whether a hedge fund uses equity index futures and belongs to strategy group 1 (1 if yes), and 
 defines a dummy variable on whether a hedge fund uses equity index futures and belongs 
to strategy group 2 (1 if yes). Strategy group 1 includes the dedicated short bias, event-driven, 
equity long/short, emerging market, and equity market neutral strategies. Strategy group 2 in-
cludes the managed futures, global macro, convertible arbitrage, and fixed-income arbitrage strat-
egies. Asset dummies include controls for assets and primary assets in which hedge funds report 
investing. The sample includes 3,382 hedge funds. This table also presents the Durbin-Watson test 
for the first-order serial correlation. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity ro-
bust. t-statistics are given in italic. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. 
  
  SHARPE SHARPED ALPHA APPRAISAL 
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
C -0.620** -2.18 -0.565* -1.77 -4.343*** -4.07 -0.915* -1.68 
LNSIZE 0.033*** 11.52 0.035*** 10.23 0.068*** 3.98 0.048*** 7.29 
LNAGE 0.052 1.29 0.050 1.13 0.435*** 2.86 0.046 0.60 
HMARK -0.001 -0.05 -0.022 -0.98 0.042 0.70 0.015 0.54 
IFEE 0.000 -0.02 0.000 0.25 0.016*** 3.22 0.002 0.84 
MFEE -0.001 -0.19 -0.003 -0.35 0.120** 2.33 0.027** 2.05 
LEVERAGED 0.002 0.15 -0.002 -0.13 0.106** 2.22 0.026 1.12 
MINIMUM(Million$) -0.005 -1.30 -0.004 -0.67 -0.025** -2.05 -0.002 -0.17 
RESTRICTION 0.001*** 3.89 0.002*** 3.97 0.002** 2.31 0.002*** 3.37 
LOCKUP 0.002** 2.24 0.003** 2.37 0.007** 1.99 0.002 1.22 
AUDIT -0.011 -0.74 -0.010 -0.58 -0.060 -0.83 -0.011 -0.36 
PERCAPITAL 0.006 0.61 0.000 0.00 0.039 0.81 0.011 0.54 
OPEN - -3.55 - -3.34 -0.151*** -2.58 -0.111*** -4.34 
OPENENDED 0.014 0.93 0.011 0.59 0.052 1.13 0.041 1.55 
G1 -0.013 -1.23 -0.010 -0.80 -0.173** -2.54 -0.033 -1.42 
G2 0.023 0.86 0.026 0.77 -0.145 -1.07 0.036 0.75 
Strategy  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Asset Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.225  0.194  0.069  0.116  
F-statistic 22.79  19.07  6.58  10.90  
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.94   1.97   1.90   1.91   
* refers to a statistical significance at the 10% level; ** refers to a statistical significance at the 5% level;  *** refers to a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
  
